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Abstract 
 
Liberal constitutionalism is a dominant approach to contemporary political and 
democratic theory. A defining feature of liberal constitutionalism as it has been 
outlined by some of its proponents (Rawls: 1996, 1999a and Barry: 1995) is a 
commitment both to pre-political standards of justice and to the claim that democracy 
expresses the sovereignty of the people. Combining pre-political rights with the 
sovereignty of the people seems contradictory. The difficulty is how the people can be 
fully sovereign if they are constrained by rights outside the reach of popular 
sovereignty. Because both justice and democracy are foundational to liberal 
constitutionalism, this contradiction threatens to undermine the plausibility of the 
entire theory. If liberal constitutionalism fails, this calls for a re-thinking of how to 
conceptualize the relationship between justice and democracy in contemporary liberal 
thought. This thesis asks: how can liberal constitutionalists sustain their double 
commitment to justice and democracy? To answer this question I address three central 
questions for liberal constitutionalists concerning democracy. First, what is the role of 
reason in their theories; second, what type of democracy are they committed to; third, 
I question the role of civil and political rights in democracy. On the first question, I 
argue that a weak notion of public reason will serve liberal constitutionalism best. 
Furthermore, liberal constitutionalism fits best with a model of democracy 
emphasising deliberation combined with a weak notion of the common good. Finally, 
some of the underlying thinking behind both civil and political rights and democracy 
is derived from the same sources, which reduces the conflict between justice and 
democracy. Through an examination of these questions, I show that the critics of 
liberal constitutionalism often overstate the difficulties of combining justice and 
democracy. This warns us against an outright rejection of the tenets of liberal 
constitutionalism as is recommended by some critics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Is it possible to combine justice and democracy into a coherent political order? Liberal 
constitutionalism suggests so. There are two foundational features of liberal 
constitutionalism that suggest this possibility. First, liberal constitutionalism is defined 
by a political order based on a constitution outlining the workings of the political 
system including a set of civil and political rights derived from principles of justice. 
Second, it holds that democracy and the sovereignty of the people is an integral part of 
a legitimate political order. Holding both these propositions seems contradictory and 
untenable; it is difficult to maintain both an ideal of justice relying on pre-political 
commitments whilst at the same time being fully committed to the ideal of the people 
as fully sovereign. This contradictory feature gives rise to a dilemma for liberal 
constitutionalism: If justice requires pre-political rights outside the reach of 
democracy, this undermines the idea of democracy understood as the people being 
fully sovereign, and if democracy excludes pre-political rights this undermines liberal 
justice understood as a commitment to rights out of reach of democracy. Either liberal 
constitutionalism must choose justice over democracy, or choose democracy over 
justice. Holding on to the idea that both justice and democracy are equally important 
seems untenable. The central aim of this thesis is to analyse how this dilemma can be 
resolved. I will not suggest a solution that will once and for all resolve this dilemma, 
but I will suggest some ways in which the tension between justice and democracy can 
be eased based on contemporary theories of justice and democracy. 
Liberal constitutionalism has for long been a dominating force in theorizing 
about both justice and democracy. It has not only been influential but has for long 
been labelled as a successful way to organize political life under modern conditions 
more generally. Despite its widespread influence and dominance, many theorists are 
now questioning the seriousness of its democratic credentials. Both the defining 
features identified above are subject to criticism. First, some political theorists argue 
that liberal constitutionalism is unable to accommodate the increasing diversity and 
pluralism found in modern societies. Its strong commitment to pre-political principles 
of justice makes it insensitive and unable to respond adequately to political claims 
based on (among others) culture, identity, religion, race, ethnicity and gender. In 
addition, liberal constitutionalism has been criticized for not being sensitive enough to 
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the importance of citizen participation in the democratic process. Furthermore, these 
critics see the commitment to principles of justice as undermining the people as the 
authority of a society‟s positive law. The critics see the commitment to democracy as 
weak, because in case of conflict between the principles of justice and democracy, 
justice trumps the will of the people. For example, the critics hold that in a properly 
constituted liberal constitutional political order strong pre-political principles of 
distributive justice will trump the will of the people regarding re-distribution of wealth 
(Dahl: 1989, Dryzek: 2000). Liberal constitutionalism requires that the decisions made 
by the demos must comply with a liberal constitutionalist conception of re-
distribution. Such constraints on the people‟s ability to authorize laws undermine the 
authority of democracy, because the scope of democratic decision-making is 
restricted. In short, this means that the people cannot be fully trusted and given full 
authority to underwrite their own laws. Accordingly, this shows that the commitment 
to democracy is not serious.  
If these criticisms are successful liberal constitutionalism loses its appeal as 
being able to deliver a just and democratic political order. Much political and 
democratic theory is based on the liberal constitutionalist approach and if it fails it 
warrants a thorough re-thinking of how to conceptualize the relationship between 
justice and democracy. To start with, I will define and discuss the ambitions of liberal 
constitutionalism in more detail. Then I will in the following section outline three of 
the main challenges facing liberal constitutionalism, before in the final section 
offering a brief overview of how this thesis addresses these challenges. 
 
1. The Ideals of Liberal Constitutionalism 
This section first defines how I will understand liberal constitutionalism in this thesis, 
then traces the intellectual and historical roots of this tradition, and ends with a 
discussion of the ideals to which this definition and the intellectual tradition gives rise.  
The two important defining features of liberal constitutionalism I take to be an 
equally strong commitment both to a set of civil and political rights derived from 
justice and that democracy and the sovereignty of the people is a foundational aspect 
of a legitimate political order. These two features will be supplemented in the next 
chapter with two additional propositions that play an important role in the 
contemporary debate: the significance of pluralism and the principle of liberal 
legitimacy. In the next chapter I will also discuss this understanding of liberal 
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constitutionalism in relation not only to civil and political rights, but also to social 
rights and distributive justice. A concern for distributive justice has been a defining 
feature of some forms of liberal constitutionalism, most notably John Rawls‟ theory of 
justice (1999a), but also Ronald Dworkin‟s liberalism (1981a and 1981b) and Brian 
Barry‟s contractualism (1989, 1995, 2001 and 2005). Liberal constitutionalism 
belongs to liberalism and is distinguished from other forms of liberalism by insisting 
on the importance of a constitution where the basic workings of the democratic system 
and the set of fundamental civil and political rights are defined.  
The set of civil and political rights emphasizes values such as equality and 
liberty, which I take to be two of the important underlying values of liberal 
constitutionalism (more about these values below). Fundamental rights in this thesis 
are understood in the following way: „political liberty (the right to vote and to hold 
public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom 
of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological 
oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right 
to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by 
the concept of the rule of law‟ (Rawls: 1999a: 53). These rights are fundamental in the 
sense that they seek to protect a person‟s basic interests, whatever his conception of 
the good may be. Thus, it is supposed that it will be in any person‟s interest to have a 
right to influence the political process of society and to have the liberty of freedom of 
thought and religion, and to have his integrity protected. I do not take this list to be an 
exhaustive definition of the civil and political rights presupposed by liberal 
constitutionalism, but more as indicating what these rights entail. The definition and 
understanding of fundamental rights outlined above is how liberal constitutionalism 
and fundamental rights will be understood in this thesis. It is possible to see that this 
understanding is also reflected in the historical roots of this branch of liberalism. 
In the contemporary debate on liberalism, many trace the intellectual roots of 
liberal constitutionalism to two distinctive and transforming periods of European 
history: the Reformation and the Enlightenment, and distinguish between Reformation 
liberalism and Enlightenment liberalism. Both periods gave rise to dramatic social and 
political changes. The Reformation constituted a definitive break with the middle ages 
and the supreme religious authority of the pope. Two outcomes of this process had a 
significant impact on the development of liberal political thought. The first was how to 
accommodate the new situation of religious pluralism, and the second was how the 
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downfall of papal supremacy gradually led to a development of absolute monarchies 
(Skinner: 1978: 113). Traces of these influences are present in both the philosophies of 
Thomas Hobbes (1651) and John Locke (1689), whose works have strongly 
influenced the development of liberal constitutionalism.
1
 Thus, the historian of 
political thought Quentin Skinner argues that towards „the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, the concept of the state… had come to be regarded as the most 
important object of analysis in European political thought‟ (1978: 349). In support of 
this conclusion, he quotes Hobbes‟ statement in De Cive that „civil science‟ aims „to 
make a more curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects‟ (quoted in 
Skinner: 1978: 349). The importance of identifying the proper scope of rights and 
duties between the sovereign and the subjects here emphasized by Hobbes echoes an 
important concern in liberal constitutional thinking regarding the proper limits of the 
state and the political obligations the subjects have towards the state. This theme is 
further explored in Locke who presented an influential and classic formulation of 
constitutionalism which located political authority in the „body of the people‟ (quoted 
in Skinner: 1978: 338). These developments gave rise to influential ideas about a 
political order based on the ideas of consent, a constitution and a democratic order.  
In Locke‟s words, men are „free, equal and independent‟ and „no one can be… 
subjected to the Political Power of another without his own Consent‟ and furthermore, 
„[W]hen any number of Men have so consented to make one Community... the 
Majority have a right to act and conclude the rest‟ ([1689] 1988: 330-331). Locke 
emphasizes the significance of liberty and equality, both important building blocks in 
liberal constitutional theories of justice, and through his commitment to majority rule 
simultaneously gives importance to democracy. We see even here that Locke is 
committed to both an ideal of justice and an ideal of democracy.  
The importance of briefly surveying this starting point of liberal 
constitutionalism is twofold. First, these developments form an important background 
to understanding contemporary theories of liberal constitutionalism, such as the one 
advanced by John Rawls‟s (1999a, 1996). Second, and as we will see in later chapters, 
that in the contemporary debate on liberalism many argue for rejuvenating the ideals 
of Reformation liberalism to answer many of the challenges to liberal 
                                                 
1
 It is of course debatable to what extent Hobbes should count as a liberal, but the main point here is 
more that he has exercised influence on the development of liberal thought rather than the exact 
categorization of his philosophy. 
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constitutionalism present in contemporary societies. In the next section the 
significance of these challenges for liberal constitutionalism is discussed in more 
detail. 
 The second transforming period that was pivotal in the development of liberal 
constitutionalism was the European Enlightenment, during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century. This period gave rise to a double revolution in both politics and 
industry which in distinct ways transformed political, social and economic life 
(Hobsbawn: 1962). The French and American revolutions succinctly symbolize the 
political transformations taking place in this period, and the industrialisation and 
emerging capitalistic organisation of the economy and work life in England best 
symbolizes the profound impact of the industrial revolution. Both these revolutions 
were underpinned to an extent by a belief in moral and scientific progress and the 
possibility for humanity to make continuous social and moral progress. This sentiment 
was firmly expressed by Henri Saint-Simon who stated that „[T]he Golden Age of the 
human race is not behind us but before us; it lies in the perfection of the social order‟ 
(quoted in Bilton et al.: 1996: 37). This perhaps overly optimistic view of the 
possibilities for making social and moral progress was not only characteristic of 
science and politics at the time, but also of liberal thinking. 
 As we will see in chapter two, the liberal thinker John Stuart Mill was also 
optimistic about the possibility of humanity‟s making social and moral progress.  An 
important point related to the central concern of this thesis is that underlying this 
notion of progress was the presupposition that all human beings shared the same 
notion of reason and rationality. By addressing this shared notion of reason and 
rationality through enlightenment and education, more and more people would come 
to share the progressive ideas inherent in, for example, the ideals of the French 
revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity. A shared ability to reason and rationality 
was thought bound to lead to convergence on the truths of such liberal ideals. 
Arguably, the industrial revolution gave not only progress, but also created a range of 
new social arenas and social problems related to urbanisation and the development of 
a distinct class society, where the working class faced a grim and often uncertain 
social reality. These problems gave rise to a concern for social justice, which has since 
been an important element of liberal thinking (this issue will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter). Important in this context, both the notion of progress and a 
universalizable notion of reason found expression within liberal constitutionalism, and 
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traces of these aspects of the theory are still present within this perspective, although, 
these elements have proved to be controversial among contemporary political 
philosophers. 
 What has been said so far about the transforming powers of the Reformation 
and the Enlightenment is well-established. In a sense, this is simply a brief description 
of the development of modernity. Important constitutive features of modernity are the 
development of the nation state, the diminishing force of religion and tradition, the 
growth of rationality, continued urbanisation, industrialisation and scientific and 
material progress (Bilton et al.: 1996). The interesting feature of liberal 
constitutionalism is that it has been present through the entire period in which 
modernity has developed and transformed social and political life. It thus embodies 
and symbolizes many of the distinctive features of modern life. Furthermore, it has 
been a significant political and philosophical force in modern life and has influenced 
constitution writing and the development of liberal democracies around the Western 
world. Thus, given the influence and importance of liberal constitutionalism 
historically, and how closely the liberal constitutionalist project is tied to modernity, it 
is a question of great significance if this model now crumbles under the criticisms and 
challenges recently levelled against it.  
 From this brief outline of the historical context surrounding the development of 
liberal constitutionalism, we can appreciate some of the central ideals of this approach. 
These can briefly be summarised as centring around the rights of the individual versus 
the state and other individuals, pace the quote from Hobbes above regarding the 
importance of the limits of the state and the political obligations of the subjects in a 
commonwealth. A second concern we saw in the quote from Locke was the 
importance of democracy and its foundation in equality and liberty. A third ideal 
derivable from the ideals of equality and liberty is the idea of a universal notion of 
reason and rationality. The belief is that all human beings of sound mind have more or 
less similar capacities to reason and be swayed by reason. So, it is clear that also 
elements of the Enlightenment are influential in shaping liberal constitutionalism. In 
addition, in recent times the side effects of industrialization and capitalism with the 
development of class societies where the different classes enjoy highly different life 
chances and prospects for material prosperity have given rise to a concern for social 
justice and for the distribution of material resources in society. So, what defines liberal 
constitutionalism today is a commitment to the ideals of liberty, equality, the proper 
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limits of legitimate government, democracy and distributive justice. Politically, the 
ambitions of liberal constitutionalism are to realize these ideals to establish a society 
of members of equal moral standing. 
 In contemporary political philosophy, these aims form the foundation of liberal 
constitutionalism and the ambitions above have been developed in great detail. In the 
contemporary debate, these ideals have first-and-foremost been associated with the 
political philosophy of John Rawls, and it is perhaps partly due to the enormous 
influence his theory has enjoyed that liberalism has been the dominate approach to 
political philosophy during recent decades. Despite its recent flourishing, its 
credentials have increasingly been questioned and challenged. In particular, the idea of 
a universal notion of reason and rationality as expressed by the Enlightenment thinkers 
has proven to be controversial among contemporary critics of liberal 
constitutionalism. This notion has been difficult to maintain in modern democratic 
societies marked by strong moral and political disagreements. A second issue of 
dispute is what kind of model of democracy underlies liberal constitutionalism. More 
specifically, liberal constitutionalism has been criticized for embodying a simplistic 
understanding of democracy, because it has not acknowledged the importance of 
accepting the outcomes of the deliberations of the electorate. A third criticism argues 
that liberal constitutionalism is unable to deal adequately with questions of social 
justice and multiculturalism.  
Related to all these three issues is the problem of combining pre-political 
principles of justice with a similar strong commitment to democracy. The two first 
criticisms touch directly upon the apparent difficulty of combining justice and 
democracy within the same framework by focusing on how a workable and legitimate 
model of democracy where the demos is sovereign can be squared with the 
commitment to substantive moral rights outside the reach of ordinary politics. The 
third question is related to the central puzzle in this thesis in that it focuses on the 
scope of liberal constitutionalist justice. It asks what liberal constitutionalist justice 
requires and what its implications are for social justice and the many controversial 
issues concerning multiculturalism such as group specific rights and dealing with an 
increasingly diverse and pluralistic modern society. Central to the criticisms is the 
controversial character of the Enlightenment legacy. Many critics of liberal 
constitutionalism have suggested that liberal constitutionalist theory ought to 
emphasize more its historical and intellectual links with the Reformation rather than 
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the Enlightenment especially to overcome the challenges posed by multiculturalism. 
From the discussion in this section we see that liberal constitutionalism faces 
considerable challenges related both to the role of justice and democracy in their 
theories, and the role of social justice, and the broad range of issues associated with 
multiculturalism. In the next section, I will discuss these issues in more detail to see 
how these criticisms affect the liberal constitutionalist project. 
 
2. Three Challenges for Liberal Constitutionalism 
For liberal constitutionalism to present a plausible political theory the challenges 
briefly set out above must be answered, or at least the model of liberal 
constitutionalism must be more plausible than other competing political theories. 
Because of the important historical and political role liberal constitutionalism has 
played in the development of Western democracies a failure of liberal 
constitutionalism to offer a plausible political theory points towards a dramatic shift in 
political theory and possibly in politics too (in the longer term). In this section, I 
introduce in more detail the challenges that will occupy me for the most part in this 
thesis. The first challenge concerns how reason is understood in liberal 
constitutionalism, and contrasts the different understandings of reason expressed in 
Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism. The second challenge is over the kind of 
model of democracy to which liberal constitutionalism is committed. This issue is 
discussed with reference to two of the dominating approaches to democratic theory: 
pluralism and deliberative democracy. The third challenge to liberal constitutionalism 
is over the role of substantive rights in democracy. The list is of course not exhaustive 
regarding the challenges to liberal constitutionalism, but is indicative of the main 
concerns of liberal constitutionalism and democracy. 
 The first challenge is the understanding of reason in liberal constitutionalism. 
The criticism is that modern societies, instead of converging on a body of truths 
around which there is consensus, are instead marked by an increasing moral and 
political pluralism and diversity. Being committed to a universal ideal of reason that 
has it that our shared rationality and ability to reason will lead to moral convergence - 
as the inheritance from the Enlightenment presupposes - seems simply to contradict 
the political realities of modern societies. Modern societies are not marked by a 
convergence on moral and political questions; rather they are marked by an ever-
increasing disagreement and moral pluralism. This criticism is relevant to democracy 
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in two ways. First, if there is an ever increasing body of truths that everyone will 
endorse, this means that the role of democratic decision-making is downplayed. If 
reason and science can offer correct answers to a wide range of political questions, the 
need for democracy seems weakened. Secondly, the belief in a universal notion of 
reason, helps to justify the crucial set of civil and political rights. A shared notion of 
reason presupposes that all human beings will share some of the same basic needs and 
interests, such as an interest in protecting their personal and bodily integrity, being 
free to associate with others the way they want, freedom to express themselves as they 
want both privately and publicly, etc. These basic interests and needs coalesce into a 
set of civil and political rights seeking to protect the basic interests of all human 
beings. If this set of rights is not justifiable, the liberal constitutionalist approach 
seems doomed from the start. The challenge here is to show how a commitment to 
civil and political rights is compatible with diversity and pluralism. 
The concept of reason itself is many-sided and can be articulated in different 
ways in different contexts. In this thesis, I will mainly distinguish between a weak and 
strong understanding of reason. A weak understanding of reason has it that the number 
of moral and political principles that can be universally shared by human beings is 
limited to merely the set of civil and political rights associated with liberal 
constitutionalism. This thesis will discuss theories based on even weaker 
understandings of reason, but when it is said that the notion of reason underpinning 
liberal constitutionalism is weak what is meant is that the moral and political 
principles it claims can be universally shared is limited to civil and political rights. A 
strong notion of reason has it that the number of moral and political principles 
universally shared is more extensive, and goes beyond a set of civil and political 
rights, by, for example, including many principles of social justice, group specific 
rights, welfare rights, and so on. Such rights may be consistent with liberal 
constitutionalism, but they are not strictly required by it. The view this thesis will take 
on the rights associated with a strong notion of reason is that they are subject to 
reasonable disagreement, and not subject to universal agreement. Furthermore, 
divergence and convergence of reason will be used to describe a weaker and stronger 
notion of reason (where reason is more divergent we should have less confidence in 
the universality of its results, whereas where there is convergence on reasons, we 
might expect more extensive agreement).  
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The second challenge is to say what kind of democratic model liberal 
constitutionalism is committed to. For example, for liberal constitutionalism a 
plausible model of democracy is one with a constitution setting out the workings of 
the political system, and assigning civil and political rights to its citizens. In addition, 
the state ought to be impartial between competing conceptions of the good and not 
favour particular conceptions of the good over others. So far, this seems good, at least 
from a liberal perspective, but a challenge is that from the perspective of the two 
dominant contemporary democratic theories this view does not go down that well. 
Robert A. Dahl‟s pluralistic theory (1956 and 1989), which gained enormous 
influence between the fifties and the seventies, would find it hard to accept a 
constitution with a set of fundamental rights that go beyond what is necessary for a 
working democratic order. The reason is that such rights violate the democratic 
authority of the people by being outside the reach of the democratic process. Such a 
set of substantive moral rights beyond democratic control denigrates the idea of 
popular sovereignty and fails to take democracy seriously.  
From the perspective of another influential democratic theory, deliberative 
democracy, which gained influence during the nineties and onwards, the liberal 
constitutionalist approach to democracy is not satisfactory either. A troubling aspect 
with liberal constitutionalism for many deliberative democrats is the lack of attention 
it pays to deliberative procedures seeking to include and enhance wide participation 
among the electorate. Encouraging such participation is vital in establishing the 
legitimacy of democracy and in ensuring that the people is fully sovereign. For many 
deliberative democrats it is necessary to go beyond the mainly procedural model found 
in liberal constitutionalist understandings of democracy and to include a range of 
deliberative practices. The liberal constitutionalist model of democracy does not 
encourage wide participation, which, it is argued, is vital in building a legitimate 
political order. 
Now, the dilemma for liberal constitutionalists is that excluding a set of civil 
rights from the constitution would go against their deeply felt commitment to values 
such as equality and liberty. Little would be left of their commitment to justice if 
liberal rights were taken out of the constitution. So, for pluralists, liberal 
constitutionalism is too strong in the sense that it includes too many substantive 
elements in its model of democracy. For deliberative democrats, it is the opposite 
problem. Deliberative democrats would think that the liberal constitutionalist model of 
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democracy is not strong enough and ought to include more deliberation and perhaps 
even be more centred around consensus in order to gain legitimacy. What deliberative 
democrats would ask for would be a stronger notion of democracy, not a weaker one. 
 We see from the criticisms by the pluralists and the deliberative theorists that 
liberal constitutionalism is out of tune with both the two dominant approaches to 
democratic theory in the contemporary discourse. This reinforces the impression that 
liberal constitutionalism faces difficulties in incorporating a plausible understanding 
of democracy. It also shows that there is an important division in contemporary 
democratic theory over how to conceptualize a legitimate democratic order. Liberal 
constitutionalism can of course try to escape the dilemma by arguing that both the 
pluralistic and the deliberative understanding of democracy are wrong, and instead 
advance a distinct liberal alternative. This is a plausible reply, but if it is to work, it is 
necessary to address the underlying tension that is reinforced by the criticisms from 
pluralists and deliberative democrats. The criticisms can be said to exemplify some of 
the difficulties liberal constitutionalism is facing in trying to combine the ideal of 
popular sovereignty with the moral ideals of equality and liberty. For pluralism, which 
emphasizes the authority of the people and the value pluralism present in a democratic 
society, the liberal constitutional approach is clearly too strong because of its 
commitment to the ideals of equality and liberty. For deliberative democracy, the 
model is not strong enough as it does not emphasize deliberation, the sovereignty of 
the people and is not consensus-oriented enough. To satisfy the pluralist concern 
would be to give up on the ideals of justice, and to satisfy the deliberative concern 
would be to reject the acknowledgement of the importance of pluralism emphasized 
by the pluralist tradition in democratic theory. Thus, we see that in giving concessions 
to its critics, liberal constitutionalists are forced to give up some of their central tenets, 
and risk losing the distinctive character of their approach to political theory.  
 Finally, concerning the third challenge similar problems arise over the issues of 
substantive rights versus procedural rights and the issues of social justice and 
multiculturalism. The challenge concerning substantive and procedural rights was 
briefly touched upon above and has been one of the longstanding issues in democratic 
theory versus liberal constitutionalism. This issue is perhaps where the dilemma is 
most striking and seen in its most direct form. Many democratic theorists claim that 
including a set of civil rights in the constitution that is to be outside the reach of the 
democratic process is flatly anti-democratic and shows that liberal constitutionalists do 
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not take their commitment to democracy seriously (Dahl: 1989 and Dryzek: 2000). At 
the same time egalitarians and proponents of multiculturalism claim that liberal 
constitutionalists are not taking their commitment to justice seriously enough because 
the constitution does not include principles of social justice such as a strong defence of 
equal opportunity, universal basic income, or specific rights to groups of various 
kinds. Again, liberal constitutionalists are attacked from two fronts and fall between 
two stools and appear unable to respond to the competing demands from justice and 
democracy. Resolving this dilemma will be problematic as long as liberal 
constitutionalism remains equally committed to justice and democracy 
 In summary, liberal constitutionalism‟s commitment to justice and democracy 
has three facets each of which is problematic. First, the way in which liberal 
constitutionalism conceives of reason is problematic. Secondly, liberal 
constitutionalism‟s model of democracy is problematic. Thirdly, liberal 
constitutionalism‟s understanding of the role of civil rights is problematic. From this 
brief discussion, we see that for liberal constitutionalism to be taken seriously and for 
it to be able to provide a plausible political theory, it is necessary to resolve these 
tensions; or at least present a liberal constitutionalist theory that is more plausible than 
its closest competitors. How liberal constitutionalism can respond to these problems 
constitutes the main focus of this thesis and the next section sets out a brief overview 
of how I will go about discussing these problems. 
 
3. Overview of the Thesis 
My ambition in this thesis is not decisively to resolve the considerable challenges in 
combining principles of justice with a commitment to democracy. Instead, my 
ambitions are more modest, and my prime concern is to point out what seems to me to 
be a plausible political model of liberal constitutionalism given the starting point of 
commitments to both justice and democracy. 
 If equally important commitments to justice and democracy were not 
demanding enough, liberal constitutionalism is also committed to additional premises: 
the principle of liberal legitimacy and the fact of moral and political pluralism and 
diversity. The first refers roughly to the idea that a political order must be justifiable to 
all those individuals who are living under it. This echoes the concern above raised by 
Locke about human beings‟ fundamental equality and liberty and that no one can 
coerce another to obey a political order to which they have not consented. Pluralism 
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and diversity refers to the fact that modern societies are increasingly diverse and 
contain a wide variety of religions, faiths and systems of beliefs. Acknowledging this 
fact shows that liberal constitutionalism is sensitive to pluralism and diversity, but this 
fact also raises challenges in terms of how these different conceptions of the good can 
peacefully coexist together. For example, a controversial issue regarding pluralism and 
diversity has recently been over the claims made by many groups demanding group 
specific rights to protect their cultural and religious identity. For liberal 
constitutionalism, these two additional conditions make the challenge of combining 
justice and democracy even harder. Arriving at a political model justifiable to 
everyone living under it is difficult enough when trying to combine justice and 
democracy, but adding the additional requirement of doing this under conditions of 
wide moral and political disagreement makes the task even harder. On the face of it, 
this challenge seems impossible to meet and the liberal constitutionalist project 
appears quixotic in trying to achieve a just political order under such demanding 
conditions. However, this is the task liberal constitutionalists have set themselves, and 
the first chapter outlines these conditions in more detail and discusses them in relation 
to both justice and democracy. 
 Although many liberals are happy enough to accept the challenge in this way, 
they differ greatly in their answers as to how these challenges can be met. Although 
most liberals accept the idea of liberal legitimacy and reasonable pluralism, two main 
approaches can be identified: either they emphasize the intellectual heritage from the 
Reformation, or they emphasize the heritage from the Enlightenment. The 
Reformation based approach I argue is too weak to establish a truly liberal 
constitutionalist framework as it is not able to guarantee fundamental equality and 
liberty. In trying to accommodate increasing diversity in modern society by weakening 
the liberal ideals of equality and liberty, it gives too many concessions to those who 
reject the ideals of fundamental equality and liberty. Thus, this approach fails to 
realize a liberal constitutionalist account of justice.  
Conversely, Enlightenment liberalism ends up with too narrow a conception of 
reason and puts too many limits on the ability of democracy to arbitrate between 
different and divergent conceptions of the good. Especially when it comes to how to 
understand equality and liberty, it offers definitions that are narrow and that exclude a 
wide range of possible interpretations. This means that the terms „reasonableness‟ and 
„reasons‟ exclude many otherwise reasonable conceptions of the good. Enlightenment 
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liberalism brings to the table a rigid understanding of what reasonableness and reason 
entail. This rigid notion is unable to uphold the liberal constitutionalist commitment to 
democracy. Thus, we see that the two main approaches fail in delivering a political 
model that can accommodate both justice and democracy. Reformation liberalism fails 
in realizing liberal constitutionalist principles of justice; Enlightenment liberalism fails 
in fulfilling its commitments to democracy. Hence, the second chapter concludes that 
a third alternative is required to combine the different competing demands in a more 
plausible way. 
 A third alternative needs to incorporate both the commitment to fundamental 
rights of equality and liberty, and the commitment to democracy. Thus, a third 
alternative must embody both the perspectives of Reformation liberalism and 
Enlightenment liberalism. Crucially, this third alternative must employ a balanced 
notion of reason, not too strong or too weak, and it must acknowledge both the ideal of 
liberal legitimacy and pluralism. A theory that seems to meet this description - justice 
as impartiality - is discussed in chapter three. This theory seeks to combine the ideals 
of equality and liberty with a strong commitment to democracy; it acknowledges the 
principle of liberal legitimacy and is sensitive to the pluralistic character of modern 
societies. The theory sets out to combine these characteristics by relying on 
impartiality as a way to balance all these competing claims. Thus, this alternative 
appears to be an attractive model for a liberal constitutionalist order. However, when 
the theory is connected with its alleged political implications it seems to run into 
trouble, as at the end of the day, it seems that justice as impartiality is merely a version 
of Enlightenment liberalism and will encounter exactly the same problems as outlined 
above. At this point, several alternatives have been considered to see whether they can 
satisfactorily combine justice and democracy and simultaneously meet the 
requirements of liberal legitimacy and pluralism. However, none seems to live up to 
the expectations. The quest to find a theory suitable for a liberal constitutionalist 
political order appears to have failed. 
 However, all hope is not abandoned yet. Justice as impartiality can be 
interpreted in a weaker and more plausible way that might serve as a starting point for 
approaching a liberal constitutionalist order in a slightly different way. Following this 
thought, chapter four analyses the role of reason in justice as impartiality and sets out 
a weaker notion of reason than the one deployed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, 
I argue that there is a crucial distinction between what justice requires and what is 
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consistent with justice. The significance of this distinction is that even a strict 
Enlightenment notion of reasons and reasonableness can be consistent with justice 
under certain circumstances, but not required by justice under all possible 
circumstances. Thus, through democratic processes a society may choose to enact 
relatively strict limitations on, for example, group rights or to realize a strong notion 
of equal opportunity. These schemes may go beyond what justice requires, but 
nevertheless be consistent with justice, as they do not necessarily violate either 
someone‟s rights or the democratic process. By including this (commonsense) 
distinction, it is possible to meet some of the commitments to both justice and 
democracy without sacrificing one on behalf of the other. Such an interpretation has 
been called plausible but not persuasive, as it is unable to accommodate 
consequentialist intuitions when such intuitions appear plausible. Through a 
discussion of how this model is sensitive to consequentialist justifications of 
democracy, I reject this objection and point out how this theory is able to 
accommodate consequentialist intuitions when they are plausible and reject them 
when implausible. Thus, after supplementing the theory with some additional steps it 
seems that we have arrived at a point where we have a theory that might have the 
potential to realize the aims of liberal constitutionalism. 
Through the discussion in chapters 1-4 this thesis seeks to arrive at a plausible 
notion of reason. Allocating so much attention to the role of reason is important 
because the account of reason will inform the answers to the questions of democracy 
and the role of rights. My interpretation of justice as impartiality aims to establish a 
third alternative that is not too weak (Reformation liberalism) or too strong 
(Enlightenment liberalism). Although justice as impartiality has been understood as 
relying on a relatively strong notion of reason the interpretation in this thesis 
emphasizes the weaker elements as its core. Thus, when this issue is settled, the two 
next tasks are to analyse what kind of model of democracy follows from liberal 
constitutionalism and how substantive civil rights can be squared with democracy. 
These two questions are pursued in chapters five and six.  
 To start with the issue of a model of democracy, there are broadly speaking 
two main alternatives in contemporary democratic theory. One is to think of 
democracy as a realization of citizens‟ preferences and the majority principle as 
foundational, and where the citizens‟ role restricted to being voters in elections 
(pluralism). The other is as a process where there is an aim to encourage as wide 
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participation as possible and to employ a wide range of deliberative practices in 
ensuring impartiality and participation (deliberation). The problem with the first 
model is that it does not offer sufficiently protection to equality and liberty, and does 
not emphasize impartiality to the extent that liberal constitutionalism requires. The 
second, deliberative, model emphasizes impartial concerns through its focus on 
deliberative practices, but at the same time often deploys a thick notion of the common 
good that seems to be difficult to square with the pluralistic character of modern 
societies, as it is based on a relatively narrow conception of the nature of reason. To 
find a plausible liberal constitutionalist model of democracy it is necessary to reject 
both these models in their pure forms, and instead borrow elements from both to 
construct a model satisfying liberal constitutionalist concerns. Briefly stated chapter 
five holds that, what seems to suit liberal constitutionalism is to base democracy on 
deliberative procedures, but to leave out a strong conception of the common good and 
reason, and instead endorse the idea present in the pluralist model that the democratic 
system in itself represents a common good, and the strongest common good that is 
acceptable given pluralism. 
 With this model of democracy in hand, what remains is to find the proper 
scope for justice within it. A particularly longstanding controversy in democratic 
theory is the extent to which principles of justice can legitimately be squared with 
democratic sovereignty, and this controversy forms an important background for the 
issues discussed in this thesis and is one which it is crucially important to resolve. I 
argue that those who are sceptical about introducing substantive moral rights 
constraining the democratic process ought to be less sceptical for two main reasons. 
The first is that procedural democratic rights and the more substantive liberal 
principles of justice share some of the same underlying thinking. The justification of 
both procedural democratic rights and substantive civil rights and principles of justice 
is essentially based on the same appeal to justice (equality and liberty). Secondly, 
there is an analogy between deliberative democracy and the contractualist thinking 
which underpins justice as impartiality in that both models seek to avoid the biases 
and partiality which can taint the democratic process. Thus, those who are persuaded 
of the virtues of deliberative democracy ought to be less suspicious of the substantive 
rights that follow from the contractual framework in justice as impartiality. Chapter 
six, therefore concludes that the controversy over substantive moral rights is 
overstated by some critics, and that the procedural and substantive conceptions of 
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democracy are closer to each other than is often assumed by some democratic 
theorists.  
 Now with a model of democracy and an answer to the issue of substantive 
rights, that does not mean that these obstacles are cleared away. What it means is that 
liberal constitutionalism looks more plausible than its critics claim. Furthermore, it is 
possible to get a clearer picture of what a political model of liberal constitutionalism 
looks like and of its implications. Briefly outlined, the liberal constitutionalist model 
emphasizes a strong version of political equality to ensure that the democratic process 
is legitimate. Part of this concern includes deliberative processes to encourage wide 
participation. In addition, the constitution is supposed to include civil rights such as 
freedom of religion, the integrity of the person, rule of law, etc. Liberal 
constitutionalism is therefore a theory with strong procedural implications for how the 
democratic process is carried out. This concern is combined with a firm protection of 
individual rights to ensure that the democratic process does not violate the interests of 
the individual or of vulnerable minority groups. When it comes to issues of social 
justice such as equal opportunity, the model says that justice does not require a strong 
notion of equal opportunity, but also holds that such a notion of equal opportunity is 
consistent with liberal constitutionalism. It should already be stressed that this thesis 
does not aim to offer a full treatment of social justice in relation to democracy and 
liberal constitutionalism, but aims instead to discuss this case as an example of the 
political implications of the liberal constitutionalist position. The same applies to the 
issue of group rights. On this issue the liberal constitutional model says that group 
rights are acceptable as long as they do not interfere with the fundamental political and 
civil rights that form the backbone of liberal justice. I argue that this model yields 
plausible answers and - given the starting point of a problematic joint concern for both 
justice and democracy combined with liberal legitimacy and pluralism - a model along 
the lines outlined in this thesis seems inevitable. A weaker model would violate the 
commitment to justice and a stronger model would violate the commitment to 
democracy. In chapter seven I argue that the balance seems to be along the lines 
outlined in this thesis.  
 So, this is where the quest for an answer to the puzzling commitment to both 
justice and democracy found in liberal constitutionalism takes us. These two 
commitments can be combined, although it requires a fine balancing act to get it right. 
In the conclusion, I briefly summarize the main arguments of this thesis and attempt to 
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describe the political implications in more detail. These final reflections end with 
some remarks about the relationship between politics and philosophy, which is an 
important underlying issue in the quest for justice and democracy. 
  
4. Concluding Remarks 
How can liberal constitutionalism combine an equally strong commitment to both 
principles of justice and principles of democracy without running into trouble? That is 
the central question to be answered in this thesis and from the brief outline here we see 
there are three main challenges involved in combining these commitments. The first 
challenge is over the role of reason; the second over what model of democracy liberal 
constitutionalism can endorse; the third over how substantive rights can be combined 
with democracy. These challenges arise from the defining feature of liberal 
constitutionalism of being equally committed to justice and democracy. This double 
commitment is also present in the historical roots of liberalism, and today many 
theorists distinguish between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism. These two 
forms of liberalism will be extensively discussed in chapter two. Before embarking on 
that task the next chapter will elaborate two of the strongest constraints on liberal 
constitutionalism, which are the principle of liberal legitimacy and the demands that 
arise from the fact of pluralism. By introducing these two additional conditions liberal 
constitutionalists make it harder for themselves to create a plausible political order 
based on justice and democracy. However, the two additional constraints are 
nevertheless plausible, and follow neatly from the main concerns of liberal 
constitutionalism: moral equality, the liberty of the individual, and the need for 
consent. Analysing these additional constraints and how they are influenced by the 
concern for both social justice and for democracy aims to show the significance of the 
dilemma facing liberal constitutionalism in combining justice and democracy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Context of Liberal Constitutionalism 
 
A general law – which bears the name of Justice – has been made and sanctioned, not 
only by a majority of this or that people, but by a majority of mankind. The rights of 
every people are consequently confined within the limits of what is just. 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville
2
  
 
Tocqueville captured an important idea of the liberal constitutional notion of justice 
when he pointed out that justice goes beyond this or that majority, and in fact rests on 
an appeal to mankind. His idea has long informed the liberal tradition and remains 
influential. One aim of this chapter is precisely to describe how this idea is carried 
through in contemporary liberalism. I argue that in contemporary liberalism this 
appeal is informed by two crucial background factors. The first is how the increasing 
level of diversity and pluralism in modern societies profoundly affects politics and 
political theory. Secondly, liberals seek to anchor justice in a political order that can 
be justified to everyone living under it. This is often referred to as the liberal principle 
of legitimacy. Although both conditions are widely acknowledged by liberals, 
combining them, we will see, sharpens the dilemma of how justice and democracy can 
be combined. The idea of liberal legitimacy is an extremely demanding condition 
(although perhaps a highly plausible one). It points out clearly the high ambitions of 
contemporary theories of liberalism. However, the emphasis on diversity and 
pluralism makes it increasingly difficult to satisfy this condition both politically and 
philosophically. Attempts to satisfy these two background conditions are often 
criticized for either being unrealistic and too demanding to be implemented in 
practical politics, or as insensitive to how increasing diversity may be accommodated 
within a liberal framework. For example, both Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls are 
often criticized for being utopian and unrealistic (Gaus: 2003). Likewise, the 
liberalism of Brian Barry can also be said to be engaged in this project, but has often 
been criticized for being insensitive to the demandingness of these two conditions 
(Tully: 2002, Mendus: 2002 and Parekh: 2002). Despite their plausibility, as a 
                                                 
2
 Democracy in America, p. 301 
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foundation for political theorizing they pose great challenges that seem difficult for 
contemporary political theory to overcome. 
A second purpose of this chapter is to examine how these two conditions 
inform theories of liberalism. My discussion focuses specifically on the implications 
of these two conditions for social justice and for the role of democracy in liberal 
constitutionalist thought. Liberal constitutionalists‟ commitment to justice not only 
includes a commitment to fundamental civil and political rights, but many liberal 
constitutionalists are also strongly committed to ideals of social justice. The crucial 
question to ask concerning social justice is: how can principles of social justice 
accommodate pluralism and liberal legitimacy? My discussion of this question aims to 
point out how the commitment to social justice is difficult to align with these two 
background conditions. That is in part because a strong commitment to ideals of social 
justice is difficult to square with pluralism, and partly because a commitment to social 
justice is hard to square with a commitment to democracy. The question I am asking 
concerning democracy is „what does democracy require of liberal constitutionalism to 
accommodate pluralism and the principle of liberal legitimacy?‟. Democracy under 
pluralism requires that a liberal constitutionalist political order takes adequate account 
of the high level of moral and political divergence. This sounds commonsensical and 
obvious, but is made complicated since there are some limits for liberal 
constitutionalists. The resultant political order must ensure that liberal civil and 
political rights are protected. Liberal constitutionalists require a convergence on this 
liberal minimum to satisfy the liberal commitment to justice. The challenge for liberal 
constitutionalists is that the two background conditions represent competing demands. 
Pluralism and diversity demand acceptance of the divergence of reason regarding 
political and moral questions, while the principle of liberal legitimacy demands 
convergence of reason on certain political and moral questions. Thus, combining the 
two background factors in a way that can satisfy the competing demands from 
divergence and convergence represents a real and threatening challenge for liberal 
constitutionalism. I will not try to offer a precise answer to how liberal legitimacy and 
pluralism can be satisfied in this chapter, instead I aim to elaborate and set out some of 
the issues that need to be addressed in order to answer the challenges identified in the 
Introduction. 
 
 
 28 
1. Two Background Conditions of Liberal Justice 
Two features have especially informed much recent liberal political theory. The first 
one is of a mainly sociological character (although with important philosophical 
implications), and the second is of a mainly philosophical character. The first one 
holds that social life is marked by a plurality of conceptions of the good and political 
disagreement, for example, over moral values or the distribution of scarce resources. 
These disagreements often give rise to political conflicts. The second feature states 
that a morally legitimate political order is one that is acceptable to all those living 
under it. Despite the high level of disagreement and diversity, this premise has been a 
cornerstone of much of liberal theorizing in recent times. In this section, I outline how 
these features influence liberal theories of justice. 
Concerning the first condition, two leading democratic theorists Amy Gutmann 
and Dennis Thompson have argued that „of the challenges that American democracy 
faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement‟ 
(Gutmann and Thompson: 1996: 1). Moral disagreement is not only prevalent in 
today‟s America, but in fact, most societies around the world are characterised by 
moral diversity and pluralism. They are societies in which people have different (and 
sometimes competing) conceptions of the good. I will in this work understand 
different conceptions of the good as the fact that modern societies include persons 
with a variety of religions, philosophies, traditions and cultures, which each give 
special weight to different concerns and interests. For example, on this account 
Christianity, Atheism and the culture and traditions associated with a geographical or 
ethnic group can constitute a conception of the good.  
Importantly therefore, different conceptions of the good can be religious or 
secular and conceptions of the good thus come in many different versions. 
Furthermore, those who adhere to a certain understanding of what is good usually 
want to live in accordance with their conception of the good. Many also want public 
policy to cohere with their deeply held convictions. An example of this is how ethnic 
and cultural groups often argue in favour of being granted group specific rights 
reflecting, for example, their religious and cultural peculiarities. The questions 
covering such issues are wide, ranging from official acceptance and equal treatment of 
homosexuality to more prosaic and relatively trivial claims regarding exemptions for 
certain religious groups from wearing crash helmets while driving motor cycles.  
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During the 1990s and the 2000s many of the important conflicts of this kind 
have been discussed under the banner of multiculturalism. The questions covered by 
this label occupy a vast number of issues, and because of this, the term 
„multiculturalism‟ itself often defies a clear and unitary definition. Some of these 
issues consider claims from marginalized groups including ethnic, religious, sexual 
and demographic minorities. In addition, an important condition informing this debate 
is the underlying premise that modern societies are bound to deal with the diversity 
arising from culture and religion and offer political theories able to analyse adequately 
modern political life. In the words of one of the most active participants in this debate:  
 
Modern societies are said to be characterized by deep diversity and cultural 
pluralism. In the past, this diversity was ignored or stifled by models of the 
„normal‟ citizen, which were typically based on the attributes of the able-
bodied, heterosexual white male. Anyone who deviated from this model of 
normalcy was subject to exclusion, marginalization, silencing, or 
assimilation… Today, however, previously excluded groups are no longer 
willing to be silenced or marginalized, or to be defined as „deviant‟ simply 
because they differ in race, culture, gender, ability or sexual orientation from 
the so-called „normal‟ citizen. They demand a more inclusive conception of 
citizenship which recognizes (rather than stigmatizes) their identities, and 
which accommodates (rather than excludes) their differences. 
 
(Kymlicka: 2002: 327) 
 
Despite the legitimate concerns outlined in this passage, the status of such claims has 
been tremendously difficult to settle both politically and philosophically. Politically, 
partly because of resistance from majority populations who are unwilling to make any 
concessions to the groups mentioned above. Philosophically there are serious 
difficulties in translating claims based on culture and group identity into claims about 
rights and political demands. Many of the claims are based on groups and cultures as 
constituting a certain identity. However, the exact content of the terms „groups‟ and 
„culture‟ are fluid and escape an exact definition, and the problems associated with 
drawing clear distinctions between groups and cultures complicates any political 
process of awarding rights to groups based on ethnic and cultural identity (Kukathas: 
1997: 415-416). Although the debate has contributed to an increased awareness of 
marginalized minorities both in politics and political philosophy, it has given few 
determinate results. 
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In addition, the world provides human life with a scarcity of resources, and 
conflicts easily arise from competing claims over the use and allocation of such scarce 
resources. Scarcity of resources is often referred to as „moderate scarcity,‟ which is 
commonly understood to mean that the scarcity is within the upper and lower bounds 
of nature (Hume: 1777: 183-189 and Rawls: 1999a: 109-112). This means that the 
scarcity is not extreme; abundance of resources would not give rise to questions over 
their distribution, and the complete lack of resources will not give rise to any disputes 
over their distribution either, as there is nothing to distribute. In contrast to these two 
extremes, the dominant view is that resources are available in moderate amounts.
3
  
The important point here is not that scarcity and disagreements arising from 
different conceptions of the good automatically and always lead to a social order of 
constant and open conflict. Instead, the important point is the Hobbesian observation 
that conflict „consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in tract of time, 
wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known‟ (Hobbes: 1651: 84). The 
diversity of different conceptions of the good within most modern societies means that 
politics is partly shaped by the awareness of potential political conflicts. Of course, 
this does not mean that modern political life is in a constant „state of nature.‟ Instead, 
it means that the awareness of differently thinking co-citizens informs the political 
order, and that those who adhere to a different set of values than oneself are willing - 
under certain circumstances - to advance their own interests against competing 
conceptions of the good.  
Taken together, disagreements over values and scarce resources seem to be 
two important sources of conflicts of justice in contemporary societies. Either 
questions of justice arise over how to reconcile disagreement based on conflicts 
between different conceptions of the good, or over the distribution of scarce resources. 
An example of disagreement between different conceptions of the good concerns how 
they weigh values differently. This is especially evident in disagreements between 
religions or different cultural groups. Conflicts in such cases are often over the 
ordering and significance of different values. An example is how proponents and 
adversaries of group specific rights weigh the importance of cultural identity and the 
                                                 
3
 The conditions defined by Hume are usually referred to as the necessary and sufficient background 
conditions of justice, as in Rawls (1999: 109-112). This view has been challenged by Barry (1989) and 
more recently Vanderschraaf (2006). However, for the present purpose the point is not to engage in a 
discussion of the necessary and sufficient backgrounds conditions of justice but mainly to point out how 
scarcity is an important source of political disagreement. 
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importance of group autonomy differently. In disputes over resources, the central issue 
is not so often related to the importance of values, but how resources ought to be 
distributed between different groups who claim a legitimate stake in these resources. 
In capitalistic market economies, conflicts typically arise between owners of capital 
and labour over how to distribute the surplus from social cooperation. In the 
contemporary debate the former set of issues is often discussed under the label of 
multiculturalism, while the latter set of issues under the label of social justice. Both 
issues will form part of the discussion in this thesis. In either case an important point 
to notice is that questions of justice often invoke deeply held values or the livelihood 
of people, therefore disagreements over justice have the potential to end in deep and 
irreconcilable conflicts between different factions of society.  
An important task for political theory is to find ways to resolve disagreements 
over these issues. Theories of liberal justice suggest ways in which this might be done 
and one of the main concerns of a theory of justice is how different conceptions of the 
good can be reconciled and peaceful coexistence secured. This concern can be 
formulated in the following way: 
  
In its most general form it is simply that a society in which people accept no 
guide to conduct except their own conception of the good (in the broad sense 
now defined) is one doomed to mutual frustration and conflict. For if nobody 
recognizes any court of appeal with authority superior to that of his own 
conception of the good, there is no basis on which conflicts stemming from 
diverse conceptions of the good can be resolved.  
          
(Barry: 1995: 30) 
 
Simply put, society is made up of conflicting conceptions of the good, and what 
justice demands is a set of principles acceptable to all, which can be used to resolve 
disagreements. Crucially, a liberal constitutional order must be based on „authority 
superior to that of‟ particular conceptions of the good, otherwise there is a risk that 
might makes right. An order where might makes right is problematic from a liberal 
perspective because such an order easily violates the foundational ideal of equality 
underpinning liberal constitutionalism. 
People have an interest in resolving such deep disagreements, but it matters to 
them how these disagreements are resolved. It is important that they feel the political 
order they have to obey is one that is acceptable and morally justifiable to them. An 
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important aspect of contemporary political philosophy is to define such a political 
order. The significance of this point needs to be emphasized. For most members of a 
society, their lives will go better if not interrupted by social strife and conflict, so the 
interest and motivation to avoid social conflict is strong. Furthermore, if conflicts and 
disagreements over deeply held convictions and strong interests can be resolved in 
ways that are morally justifiable to all members of society this serves as a potentially 
fruitful political order. In different forms, this issue has preoccupied political 
philosophers at least since the seventeenth century, and some of the most influential 
solutions have been cast in terms of a social contract (Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau). 
The essence of this contract view „is that each of the contracting parties voluntarily 
accepts constraints on the pursuit of his own ends. And that is precisely what we are 
looking for: a mutually acceptable basis for restraint in the pursuit of one‟s conception 
of the good‟ (Barry: 1995: 31). A just political order would then be based on 
constraints acceptable to everyone. Effectively a political order acceptable to everyone 
is a public justification of the governing principles of the political order. Despite its 
public character, this contract relies on hypothetical consent and not actual consent, 
and is based on the good reasons someone would have in favour of accepting or 
rejecting a political order.  
Resolving disagreements by appeal to constraints acceptable to everyone 
informs many liberal attempts to define a legitimate political order. For example, these 
concerns were important motivations for John Rawls‟ re-formulations of his theory of 
justice (1996: xxxvii-lxii). The same concerns have also motivated some liberal 
theorists to argue in favour of the importance of sensitivity to marginalised ethnic, 
cultural and religious minorities (Kymlicka: 1989 and 1995). So important is this 
concern for legitimacy and public justification that it has been called the „moral 
lodestar of liberalism‟ (Macedo: 1990: 78). The essence of how liberalism 
accommodates these two conditions is through a political order framed around 
impartiality between competing conceptions of the good. This is an attractive solution 
to the problems of diversity and aims to create a political order which is justifiable to 
everyone. However, the problem as we will see towards the end of this chapter and in 
later chapters, is that this commitment to impartiality poses serious questions with 
regard to its implications and to how it ought to be conceptualised. 
A possible solution to conflicts of interest is one which is to the mutual 
advantage of all the involved parties. An important feature of such a conception of 
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justice is that people with conflicting interests agree to restrain their behaviour in ways 
advantageous to all the involved parties; hence, mutual advantage. Often the outcomes 
of such mutually advantageous agreements reflect the parties‟ „relative bargaining 
power‟ (Barry: 1995: 40). The problem with this is that agreements based on justice as 
mutual advantage „are no more than truces. As soon as one side or the other feels it 
can improve its position, there is nothing to restrain it as long as (measured within its 
own conception of the good) the prospective gains outweigh the anticipated costs‟ 
(Barry: 1995: 39). This latter feature creates a serious problem for justice as mutual 
advantage. Justice as mutual advantage is inherently unstable, as the outcomes will 
change with the relative bargaining power of the parties. If one party sees an 
opportunity to advance their case, there are no constrains to limit them, and effectively 
might makes right. Negotiations between unions and management might serve as an 
example to illustrate how the relative power of the two groups is likely to reflect the 
outcome of the negotiations. If the management has a strong relative bargaining power 
against their counterparts this advantage can be utilized to achieve an outcome serving 
their interests better than that of the unions. Thus, the outcome does not reflect what 
would be the wage distribution given equal bargaining power, but rather one that 
reflects the interests of the management more than anything else. As long as an 
agreement is based on relative bargaining power, the weak party is bound to accept the 
share offered by those with stronger bargaining power since there is no equality 
between the parties. 
 The only requirement for reaching an agreement in mutual advantage is that 
the weak party is better off with an agreement than when there is no agreement. In the 
extreme, weak parties may be forced to accept a political order they would not have 
accepted under a situation with equal bargaining power between the contracting 
parties. Accepting such an order might still be better than no agreement for the weak 
party. One might think that even if the relative bargaining power of the parties is 
reflected in the outcome, the weak party nevertheless accepts the agreement, and 
accepting the agreement is tantamount to finding the agreement justifiable. However, 
this is not the case. The weak party accepts the agreement only because they cannot do 
better and are afforded no protection in justice as mutual advantage. They do not need 
to think the agreement is just. Thus, justice as mutual advantage does not fit well with 
the ideal of restraints acceptable to everyone. Because justice as mutual advantage 
violates the liberal intuition about justifiability to everyone, it serves as an 
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unsatisfactory solution to questions of justice. In response to justice as mutual 
advantage, theories in the social contract tradition (Locke, Rousseau and Rawls) 
suggests a different way to conceptualize justice. 
The general premise which these social contract theories rely on is that „what 
we have to find is some course of conduct that can be accepted by all parties‟ (Barry: 
1989: 283). For justice as mutual advantage it is difficult to satisfy this premise 
because weak bargaining power may force a party to accept an agreement the party 
would not have accepted under circumstances of equality. Instead, principles 
acceptable to all „must have a certain quality of impartiality…the reasons for deciding 
should be general, publicly statable, and publicly defensible. It is the claim that the 
decision can be defended in ways that can in principle be equally acceptable to 
everyone that gives us the link between morality and impartiality‟ (Barry: 1989: 290). 
A legitimate liberal political order is not only acceptable to all the parties, because it 
offers all involved parties some advantages (however marginal they may be), but is 
also instead one that strives to be justifiable even to those who stand to be worst 
affected by it.  
So, morally justifiable principles comply with impartiality and public 
justification while non-justifiable principles violate impartiality. Combining 
impartiality, public justification and scarce resources leads us to the following 
definition of justice: 
 
the subject of justice is the distribution of rights and privileges, powers and 
opportunities, and the command over material resources. Taking the term 
“resources” in a suitably broad sense, we can put this succinctly by saying that 
justice is concerned with the distribution of scarce resources – resources about 
whose distribution a potential for conflict of interest arises. And if we ask what 
we are saying about an action or an institution when we say it is unjust, the 
general answer is, I suggest, this. We are claiming that it cannot be defended 
publicly – that the principles of distribution it instantiates could reasonably be 
rejected by those who do badly under it.  
 
(Barry: 1989: 292) 
 
This aims to tell us what justice is, and underlines the importance of the liberal ideal 
of legitimacy.  
Through this brief discussion we have arrived at an idea of the foundation of 
liberal theories of justice, which acknowledges both moral disagreement and 
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justifiability to those living under the political order. Taken together, these two 
premises lead to theories of justice aiming to be impartial between competing claims 
and conceptions of the good. However, a further question is to be answered, „why 
should we act justly?‟ On this question, justice as impartiality provides two possible 
answers. The first answer is that we should act justly because „of the long-term 
advantageousness to oneself of being just‟ (Barry: 1989: 359). According to Barry this 
is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for acting justly. Therefore, this answer 
must be supplemented with the following answer: „the motive is the desire to act 
justly: the wish to conduct oneself in ways that are capable of being defended 
impartially‟ (Barry: 1989: 363). An example is provided to show how this motivation 
works: „trade unions will be more willing to strike if they believe they have a just 
claim than they would be in the world of dispassionate calculation of relative 
bargaining advantage‟ (Barry: 1989: 365). The essence of struggles for justice is not 
the achievement of gains in itself, but that one‟s desire for justice is derived from a 
genuine feeling of being denied access to a resource or an opportunity one believes 
one should have for reasons that could be justified to others. 
In this section, we have seen that the social contract tradition and liberal justice 
are based on two crucial premises. (1) An important aspect of politics, but not the only 
one, is that politics is about disagreement and social life is marked by conflicts 
between different conceptions of the good and over scarcity of resources. (2) A 
justifiable political order is one based on impartial principles and is justifiable to 
everyone living under it. This position constitutes the dominant liberal approach to 
questions of justice. Hence, the foundation of many contemporary theories of 
liberalism is to be found in a concern for impartiality and a legitimate political order. 
For liberal constitutionalism to offer a plausible political order, it needs to be 
sensitive to the high level of pluralism present in modern societies. Increasing 
pluralism means that society is marked by an increasing divergence on moral and 
political issues. This fact makes it harder to reach convergence on moral and political 
questions, such as the principles of justice that give rise to the set of fundamental 
rights so dear to liberal constitutionalism. The difficulty is that the principle of liberal 
legitimacy requires convergence on a political order justifiable to everyone living 
under it. Justifiability to everyone raises the standard for what a just political order 
involves and pluralism shows that it is even harder to satisfy liberal legitimacy 
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because of the high level of disagreement in modern societies. Thus, liberal legitimacy 
and pluralism together sharpen the dilemma of combining justice and democracy. 
 
2. Social Justice: Principles of Justice and their Implications 
So far we have seen that liberal constitutionalism is committed to justice, democracy, 
and pluralism and liberal legitimacy. In addition, liberal constitutionalists have 
committed themselves to social justice. Equal opportunity and distributive justice have 
been important for many liberal constitutionalist theories. These commitments flow 
quite naturally from the ideal of equality. However, being committed to justice, 
democracy, pluralism and liberal legitimacy as the underlying and foundational 
propositions for their theories means also that the principles of social justice must 
comply with these theoretical commitments. This raises questions about what liberal 
constitutionalism requires and about the political implications of liberal 
constitutionalism. On the one hand, the commitment to the ideal of equality gives 
strong support for social and distributive justice. Because democracy can yield unjust 
outcomes judged by a liberal constitutionalist standard, constraints on the democratic 
process are important to realize social justice. On the other hand, invoking such 
constraints on a democratic society raises the question of the extent to which the 
people in a liberal constitutionalist regime actually can be said to be sovereign and the 
supreme authority of law. The commitment to social justice, therefore, exemplifies the 
dilemma for liberal constitutionalist theory with its double commitment to justice and 
democracy.  
Unrestricted democracy may undermine the case for social justice, while 
restricted democracy undermines the case for democracy. If justice requires certain 
principles of social justice that means that the political implications go beyond merely 
a constitution with civil and political rights, but also prescribe social rights, such as 
rights to universal basic income, rights to work and rights seeking to re-distribute 
wealth. Furthermore, this has two important political implications. Firstly, it means 
that large shares of the government‟s financial resources will be allocated to re-
distributive schemes outside the reach of ordinary politics. This leads to a second 
political implication, which is that such requirements imply that the commitment to 
democracy is further undermined since justice requires not only civil and political 
rights, but also a potentially wide range of re-distributive schemes. Thus, it appears 
that for liberal constitutionalists the commitment to democracy comes second to the 
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concerns of justice. If this is correct, the initial commitment to democracy appears 
rather hollow and insincere. In this section, I therefore discuss the place of principles 
of social justice in liberal constitutionalism.  
 The most well-known and debated principles of liberal constitutionalist justice 
are undoubtedly the two principles defended by John Rawls, and they serve as a 
natural starting point to see the kind of principles of justice to which liberal 
constitutionalists are committed. Rawls‟ principles are formulated in the following 
way: 
 
Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle). 
 
(Rawls: 2001: 42-43) 
 
The first principle states the equal moral status of all by assigning equal status to all 
members of society and it also assigns equal civil and political liberties to all. The 
second principle sets out what distributive justice requires: equality of opportunity and 
the difference principle, which states that inequalities are justifiable only if they work 
to the advantage of the least advantaged. An important point in relation to the issue 
discussed in this section is that Rawls insisted repeatedly that these two principles are 
„framed for a democratic society‟ (Rawls: 2001: 39). Furthermore, the account, „takes 
the primary subject of political justice to be the basic structure of society‟ (Rawls: 
2001: 39). Political justice here refers to how the „main political and social 
institutions… fit together into one unified system of cooperation‟ (Rawls: 2001: 39-
40). From these remarks, it is clear that justice is closely connected to the idea of 
democracy and that this conception of justice maintains a strong commitment to 
democracy.  
Although, Rawls maintained a link between his theory of justice and 
democratic politics, he did not say much about the implications of the principles of 
justice for democratic politics. This is not necessarily a weakness with the theory and 
his philosophical project as a whole because what he set out to do was to derive the 
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principles of justice for a democratic society, not to investigate their institutional and 
political implications. Because this particular version of liberal constitutionalism 
professes a strong commitment to equality this approach has often been referred to as 
„liberal egalitarianism.‟ In recent decades this liberal egalitarian approach has gained 
wide influence and attention. In addition, the egalitarian implications have been much 
discussed when other theorists have written on the implications of the broad family of 
principles that can be associated with this approach. With Rawls and these later 
developments, liberal egalitarianism has also been put under critical scrutiny and has 
provoked a large number of criticisms of the implications of its principles of justice. 
The most common interpretation of the institutional implications of liberal 
egalitarianism has been that it justifies „the post-war liberal-democratic welfare state‟ 
(Kymlicka: 2002: 88). Many interpreters thought of the works of John Rawls, Ronald 
Dworkin, Brian Barry (and a number of other liberal theorists) as a philosophical 
justification of the institutions of the welfare state that emerged in the 1950s – 70s. 
One commentator went as far as to describe liberal egalitarianism „a philosophical 
apologia for an egalitarian brand of welfare-state capitalism‟ (Wolff: 1977: 195). 
However, Rawls himself denounces this interpretation and explicitly dissociates his 
theory from the idea of a welfare state. Instead, he emphasizes the idea of a property-
owning democracy (Rawls: 1999a: xiv-xvi).  
While the welfare state allows wide inequalities and re-distribution to those 
who are unable to care for themselves, the idea of a property-owning democracy goes 
in a different direction. The aim is „to put all citizens in a position to manage their own 
affairs and to take part in social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect under 
appropriately equal conditions‟ (Rawls: 1999a: xv). This suggests that liberal 
egalitarianism goes beyond mere re-distribution through taxation, which plays a 
dominant role in the idea of a welfare state. Instead, the idea is to enable citizens to 
care for themselves ex ante, and to avoid ex post re-distribution. Ex ante endowments 
are more in line with both equality of opportunity and the difference principle, because 
initial equality would ensure both equality of opportunity and that social and economic 
inequalities are to the advantage of the least advantaged because the means of 
ownership would be widely dispersed (Rawls: 1999a: xiv-xv). 
A second element related to the implications of justice deserves attention at 
this point. This is a central idea in liberal egalitarian thought is that natural and social 
inequalities are undeserved. The idea is that no one deserves to be born into poor and 
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socially disadvantaged families or with severe handicaps making them immobile or 
only able to move around with the help of expensive equipment. Following from 
acknowledging this point, is the idea that if these inequalities influence your life 
prospects – for example, and that those from socially disadvantaged families and with 
severe handicaps face inferior life prospects compared with those who are from well-
off families and who are able bodied - then these inequalities ought to be compensated 
for. Achieving equality of opportunity seems to depend on the eradication of such 
inequalities in life prospects. 
Such compensation becomes even more complicated because it is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish those who are disadvantaged because of genuine social and 
natural inequalities and those who are disadvantaged through their own choices. 
Famously, those who choose to spend their life as beach-bums surfing at Malibu beach 
instead of participating in social cooperation such as paid labour cannot require that 
society ought to fund their lifestyle through transfers (Rawls: 1996: 182). Instead, 
citizens are responsible for their choices and must bear the responsibility of their 
choices when they are provided with equal life-chances (Rawls: 1999a: 7 and 81-86). 
However, as the recent debate on these issues shows, it is difficult to find political 
institutions and schemes able to distinguish adequately between people‟s unlucky 
circumstances and their voluntary choices, and hence to know when to hold citizens 
responsible for their own circumstances. Most people would agree that those born 
with disabilities and handicaps are subject to unlucky circumstances and deserve some 
kind of compensation. However, a different and more difficult issue that has received 
a great deal attention in the literature is how to avoid taxation of „hard-working 
citizens to subsidize indolent citizens who do not want to work‟ (Kymlicka: 2002: 83).  
Partly as a response to the limitations of welfare state re-distribution, and the 
recognition of the importance of the choice-chance distinction, a number of liberal 
egalitarian theorists have developed a wide range of schemes that seek to meet the 
requirements of liberal egalitarian justice. Examples of such schemes are Dworkin‟s 
(1981a and b) complex theory of auctions, markets and insurance schemes, universal 
basic income (Parijs: 1997), stakeholder society (Ackerman and Alstott: 1999) and the 
egalitarian planner (Roemer: 1999). The important point here is not the particular 
details of these schemes and their different understandings of how to draw the choice-
chance distinction, but that all of them aim in some way or another to meet the liberal 
egalitarian requirements of distributive justice.  
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These institutional developments have increasingly been criticised because 
they supposedly invoke the wrong spirit of egalitarianism. One influential critic 
attacking some of the liberal egalitarian attempts just mentioned (perhaps apart from 
Rawls) is Elisabeth S. Anderson, who argues that „much recent egalitarian theorizing‟ 
is „too narrowly focused on the distribution of divisible, privately appropriated goods, 
such as income and resources, or privately enjoyed goods, such as welfare. This 
neglects the much broader agendas of actual egalitarian political movements‟ 
(Anderson: 1999: 288). The conception of egalitarian justice that Anderson attacks 
„takes the fundamental injustice to be the natural inequality in the distribution of luck‟, 
and is named “luck egalitarianism” and „relies on two moral premises: that people 
should be compensated for undeserved misfortunes and that the compensation should 
come only from that part of others‟ good fortune that is undeserved‟ (Anderson: 1999: 
289-90). Although this might seem like a legitimate concern for egalitarians it leads us 
to ask the important question: „whether luck egalitarianism identifies the right 
standard of what justice requires‟ (Anderson: 1999: 296, original emphasis)? 
Anderson criticises the focus of much recent liberal egalitarian thought as too pre-
occupied with making distinctions that are increasingly difficult to relate to what 
justice actually requires in modern societies. The target is not equality as such, but 
rather the treatment of equality by “luck egalitarians.” 
Against the futility of the current liberal egalitarian approaches Anderson 
proposes an alternative conception of equality called „democratic equality,‟ which 
among other things requires „that everyone have effective access to enough resources 
to avoid being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in civil society‟ 
(Anderson: 1999: 320). This alternative is a more robust understanding of equality that 
does not rely on esoteric and impractical distinctions between worthy and unworthy 
receivers of compensation and re-distribution. Such an understanding of equality will 
make sure that citizens can participate in equal terms in politics and social life, but 
does not seek radical re-distribution of wealth and resources. Understanding equality 
in this way is preferable because this view coheres more closely with our intuitions 
about equality as it applies to „human arrangements, not to the natural order‟ 
(Anderson: 1999: 336). What is enough depends on cultural and individual 
circumstances and is context dependent. Furthermore, Anderson explicitly rejects the 
idea of ex ante distributions because democratic equality is mainly concerned with the 
„capabilities relevant to functioning as a human being‟ (Anderson: 1999: 320). What a 
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human being needs is „equality in the capability or effective freedom to achieve 
functionings that are part of citizenship, broadly construed‟ (Anderson: 1999: 321). In 
more familiar terms democratic equality rejects the difference principle and instead 
requires that „[O]nce all citizens enjoy a decent set of freedoms, sufficient for 
functioning as an equal in society, income inequalities beyond that point do not seen 
so troubling in themselves‟ (Anderson: 1999: 326).  
These latter points require some elaboration. First, the requirements described 
by Anderson seem not very different from how the idea of a modern welfare state was 
conceptualized above: allowing for large inequalities and relying on modest ex post 
redistribution. Second, democratic equality does not seem to require equality of 
opportunity as understood by luck egalitarians. Instead, justice requires the capability 
to function equally as a citizen. That does not necessarily mean equality of opportunity 
as defined by Rawls. Furthermore, allowing wide inequalities in wealth and income 
may lead to political systems where those with more wealth and income can translate 
these resources into increased political influence and undermine the idea of equal 
citizenship. 
Although Anderson‟s criticism points out important shortcomings in liberal 
egalitarian theories and in the way in which principles of justice are translated into 
politics, her own alternative seems also to be afflicted by some problematic features. 
Democratic equality is compatible with great inequalities between those with 
disadvantaged and more advantaged social backgrounds. Even if it is easy to agree 
that something has gone wrong in the liberal egalitarian quest for choice-chance 
sensitive equality, it is important to bear in mind that an important motivation for re-
distribution has been to ameliorate persistent inequalities based on class and social 
background. This concern is absent from the understanding of democratic equality. 
Although luck egalitarians go wrong in their esoteric quest for a choice-chance 
sensitive equality, leaving out the idea of equalizing across social class also seems to 
be a flawed way of conceptualizing equality. It is therefore unclear to what extent 
Anderson has taken into account the liberal egalitarian criticism of the traditional 
welfare state. For example, acceptance of wide inequalities and their consequences for 
citizens opportunities might contribute to upholding class inequalities. Avoidance of 
such class inequalities that give rise to highly unequal life prospects has long been an 
important target of egalitarianism in general. Although Anderson sets out to remedy 
the problems with liberal egalitarianism she seems to be vulnerable to some of the 
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problems liberal egalitarians see with the traditional capitalistic welfare state type of 
re-distribution. Therefore, it is hard to say if democratic equality really represents an 
improvement on liberal egalitarianism. 
To sum up the contrast between luck egalitarianism and democratic equality, 
luck egalitarianism argues that what justice requires is radical re-distribution of wealth 
and privileges in a manner that is fair to the important choice-chance distinction. In the 
quest for a set of political institutions and schemes to achieve this ambition luck 
egalitarianism has gone wrong by suggesting solutions that are not only impractical, 
but are also narrowly focused; so much so they have lost sight of some of the 
important reasons why we should care about equality in the first place. Democratic 
equality criticizes and responds to this esoteric quest and proposes a simpler and 
neater understanding of what equality requires in complex democratic societies. 
However, it can be objected against democratic equality that the understanding of 
equality is too loose with the result that it does not address the importance of 
equalizing inequalities based on class and social background. 
The upshot of all this is not necessarily to discredit either liberal egalitarianism 
or Anderson‟s alternative, but rather to point out the difficulties with deriving what 
liberal constitutionalist justice requires in relation to democracy. Luck egalitarians 
strive for detailed, and possibly highly intrusive, principles in their eagerness to realize 
justice. Democratic equality takes a different approach and holds that the implications 
of justice are more modest and that what is required is to ensure that citizens have the 
necessary capacity to function as equal citizens in modern industrialized societies. 
Democratic equality aims at equalizing (presumably through re-distributive schemes) 
up to the point where citizens have the capabilities to participate fully in the 
democratic process, hence democratic equality. However, the remarks by Rawls at the 
beginning of this section suggested that his egalitarian emphasis also had the same 
goal in mind when he formulated the principles of justice. In a way, it is therefore 
possible to say that both Anderson and the egalitarians she is criticizing share some of 
the same goals, but they differ widely when it comes to what is required to achieve 
these goals. Luck egalitarians and other egalitarians have a much stronger conception 
of what is required to achieve such equality, while from the perspective of democratic 
equality, being a functioning citizen requires less in terms of re-distributive schemes 
than is required by liberal egalitarianism. 
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Clearly, democratic equality goes much better with a strong commitment to 
democracy as the implications are not wide ranging. Democratic equality does not 
constrain the democratic process by imposing radical and demanding principles of re-
distribution of wealth and privileges. Thus, this understanding of equality is easier to 
square with the understanding of democracy where the people is sovereign and the 
authority of a society‟s positive law. Luck egalitarianism in contrast has more wide 
ranging political implications that are harder to square with democratic and popular 
sovereignty, because it constrains the democratic process by imposing radical and 
demanding principles of re-distribution. The general conclusion to draw from the 
discussion in this section is first that, even if liberal constitutionalists are aware of the 
double commitment to justice and democracy when they discuss the implications of 
their principles, a strong conception of what social justice requires makes it difficult to 
square with democracy. Thus, the issue of social justice increases the difficulty for 
liberal constitutionalist theory of combining justice and democracy. 
 
3. Political Justice: The Possibilities of Democracy 
So far it is clear that liberal constitutionalism is committed to justice and that this 
commitment threatens its commitment to democracy. In this section I will discuss the 
liberal constitutionalist commitment to democracy in more detail. This discussion 
seeks to reveal that liberal constitutionalism is as committed to democracy as it is to 
justice. That is because the liberal constitutional concern for democracy is derived 
from the foundational values of equality and liberty. Thus, democracy becomes a 
natural part of liberal constitutional thought. Equality and liberty give rise to both 
principles of justice and a democratic order. Acknowledging this closes off one 
possible solution to the dilemma of combining justice and democracy. If liberal 
constitutionalism was closer to either justice or democracy one way to resolve the 
dilemma could be to argue that either justice or democracy is its supreme value. 
However, if it is correct that both justice and democracy are equally important this 
solution is closed off, and it is necessary to find a solution able to balance the double 
commitment by giving equal weight to both justice and democracy.  
 The equal weight attached to both justice and democracy can be revealed 
through a discussion of the tasks of political philosophy. Jeremy Waldron has 
suggested „two tasks for political philosophy: (i) theorizing about justice (end rights 
and the common good etc.), and (ii) theorizing about politics‟ (1999: 3).  The first task 
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requires political philosophers to ask „[W]hat are the implications of (for example) 
John Rawls‟s theory of justice so far as democratic and constitutional procedures are 
concerned?‟ Concerning the second task one ought to ask „[W]hat are we to think 
about democratic and constitutional procedures, given that such procedures have to 
accommodate a politics for those who differ fundamentally about whether theories like 
Rawls‟s are correct?‟ (Waldron: 1999: 3). The two tasks of political philosophy 
distinguished by Waldron here are first (1) what does a specific theory of justice 
require, and (2) how can we establish procedures and a political system in the midst of 
profound disagreement over what justice is. Waldron here sees these as separate 
questions, and argues that (2) can be pursued independently of (1). 
 However, I believe that political philosophers must pursue both these 
questions, because they are hard to separate.
4
 The reason why (1) and (2) cannot so 
easily be separated is that (2) presupposes (1). Effectively, (2) requires a theoretical 
starting point, and this can only be found through task (1). Waldron asks us to focus 
on how democracy can be possible under circumstances of disagreement. In a liberal 
context, this means that we must theorize about what a legitimate democratic order 
justifiable to everyone living under it would look like. Important to this task is to 
define the necessary and sufficient conditions for such an order, and this is where (1) 
and (2) connect. Defining the conditions of such an order is bound to rely on a wide 
range of moral and normative premises and principles. Examples of such notions are 
equality, liberty and impartiality. Without a clearly worked out position on how these 
notions are to be understood the task of (2) becomes clouded. To analyse if a political 
order based on, for example, equality, liberty and impartiality is justifiable and 
workable under conditions of disagreement it is crucial to know what the implications 
of these concepts are. Therefore, it is important to emphasize both tasks, because they 
are inter-connected and cannot easily be separated. The important point to stress here 
is that the pursuit of the implications of liberal constitutionalism must go along with 
the pursuit of what is required by a democratic order given pluralism and widespread 
disagreement. 
This brief discussion suggests that there is reason to be sceptical about 
separating the two tasks of political philosophy in the way proposed by Waldron. 
Instead of giving priority to one of the tasks, it is important to bear both tasks in mind 
                                                 
4
 Andrew Mason (2006) makes the same observation, although without discussing how the two tasks 
are related. 
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when doing political philosophy. Procedures of how to reach agreements on issues of 
common interest must be supplied with some standards of what is fair and just in 
determining the outcomes of questions of common interest. Obviously, it is likely that 
in diverse and pluralistic societies different people will disagree about these standards. 
When people disagree over how to interpret a certain principle or ideal an important 
question to ask is what a particular view requires in terms of political implications.  
The second task is to work out how people with widely different and possibly 
conflicting interests can peacefully coexist without undermining the stability of 
society. This is a task that has worried many liberal constitutionalists and some have 
argued that the aim of liberal constitutionalism is not „to tell us how to live. It 
addresses itself to a different but equally important question: how are we to live 
together, given that we have different ideas about how to live‟ (Barry: 1995: 77, 
original emphasis). Working out what this means involves working out a set of 
procedures for public decision-making that can be justified to all reasonable citizens, 
and it also involves working out the more substantive implications of those 
procedures. In this way, it is necessary to ask both about the implications of justice 
and about fair procedures for public decision-making. Thus, we see that in one sense 
the liberal constitutionalist commitment to democracy is strong because telling us how 
to live together cannot exclude a democratic framework if the political order is 
supposed to be based on equality and liberty.  
Thus, taking democracy seriously is of paramount importance for liberal 
constitutionalists, as it is a requirement of the theory in the same way as is the 
commitment to civil and political rights. In fact, democracy constitutes the necessary 
framework for the important civil and political rights. The significance of this 
conclusion is that the commitment to democracy runs as deep as the commitment to 
justice (chapter six, section two will discuss this point in more detail). For liberal 
constitutionalists, a political model that does not take the commitment to democracy 
seriously is as unacceptable as a political model unable to offer proper protection of 
civil and political rights. This shows that the commitment to democracy runs as deep 
as the commitment to justice, and secondly, it shows that when the competing 
demands of justice and democracy conflict, liberal constitutionalists have no 
overarching principle to which to turn to reconcile such conflicts. This point raises an 
additional doubt as to whether the double commitment to justice and democracy can 
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be combined without being in tension and threatening the plausibility of liberal 
constitutionalism. 
  
4. Concluding Remarks 
The context surrounding liberal constitutionalism is increasingly complex and it 
sharpens the problem of how to combine justice and democracy successfully. The 
commitment to justice and democracy is supplemented by a commitment to liberal 
legitimacy and pluralism. Adding these supplementary conditions makes it harder to 
fulfil the commitment to justice and democracy. Pluralism implies that there is 
divergence on political and moral issues in society and this divergence makes the task 
of arriving at a political order acceptable to all those living under it even harder. 
Liberal constitutionalists suppose convergence on the workings of the political system 
(including civil and political rights), but given current moral divergence, Waldron 
argues that such convergence may be hard to achieve.  
We have seen in this chapter that convergence on a political order is further 
complicated by the issue of social justice. Liberal constitutionalists are not only 
committed to ideals of democracy and fundamental rights, but also to ideals about 
social justice derived from their foundational values (equality and liberty). There are 
several problems attached to this commitment. First, it is not clear what the different 
principles require in terms of institutions, policies, etc. Second, it is not clear how this 
commitment to social justice can be squared with a commitment to democracy. In 
addition, we have seen in this chapter that liberal constitutionalism is as committed to 
democracy as it is to justice, as the concern for democracy is essentially derived from 
the value of equality and liberty. This made it clear that the dilemma of combining 
justice and democracy cannot be resolved through emphasizing justice over 
democracy, or democracy over justice. 
A further difficult question in contemporary liberal theory is to what extent the 
competing demands between convergence and divergence can be met. Because of 
moral and political divergence, the political order justifiable to everyone living under 
it must be thin in that it cannot rely on thick moral notions. This means that to satisfy 
the principle of liberal legitimacy a political order must exclude controversial moral 
notions that could reasonably be rejected by those living under this order. This leads 
us in the direction of a neutral or impartial political order. The difficulty is that liberal 
political theory requires convergence on a political order, while the divergence in 
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society makes this difficult. For liberal constitutionalists the specific difficulty lies in 
arriving at a political model weak enough to accommodate divergent moral and 
political views, but at the same time strong enough to yield distinctively liberal 
conclusions. In the next chapter, I will discuss two approaches to how the competing 
demands of divergence and convergence are combined in contemporary liberal theory. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Boundaries of Reason in Liberalism  
 
There has been a controversy… concerning the general foundation of Morals; 
whether they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain the 
knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling 
and finer internal sense; whether like all sound judgement of truth and falsehood, they 
should be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whether like the perception 
of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and 
constitution of the human species. 
 
David Hume
5
 
 
Contemporary discussions of the role of reason in liberal thinking often distinguish 
between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism. Recall from the Introduction that 
the former employs a weak notion of reason with wide room for accommodating 
divergence of reason. The latter employs a thicker notion of reason and supposes 
convergence of reason on a wider set of questions. Both these representatives of 
liberal theory draw their inspiration from two of the most important transformative 
periods in European history. Reformation liberalism traces its intellectual roots back to 
the religious wars in Europe during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. Enlightenment 
liberalism in contrast traces its origin back to the optimistic view of the possibilities 
for human moral progress and the idea of a universally shared notion of reason that 
was influential during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. The purpose of this chapter is to 
discuss the role of reason in contemporary liberal theorizing and to argue against the 
stark distinction between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism.  
The Reformation theory I will discuss does not see reason as the foundation of 
morality. Instead, the foundation is found in the advantages one derives from social 
cooperation with other members of society. These advantages are a form of sentiment 
as they are based more on „immediate feeling‟ and are dependent on what human 
beings find agreeable or not. The Enlightenment views I will discuss derive the 
foundation of morality from reason: they base their theories on „a chain of argument 
                                                 
5
  Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 170. 
 49 
and induction‟ and hold that these arguments and the notion of rationality „should be 
the same for every rational intelligent being‟ to paraphrase the passage above by 
Hume. In this chapter I will discuss in more detail how these two approaches seek to 
satisfy the principle of liberal legitimacy while still being sensitive to the high level of 
diversity and moral pluralism present in most modern societies.  
Trying to combine liberal legitimacy while simultaneously seeking to 
accommodate pluralism is a difficult task and leads to a dilemma for liberal political 
theory. Reformation liberalism‟s emphasis on accommodating diversity and the 
toleration of moral and religious pluralism runs the risk of paying too much attention 
to diversity without ensuring adequate protection for individual rights. In contrast, 
Enlightenment liberalism has the opposite problem. Enlightenment theories argue that 
through reasoning all sound adults can arrive at the same conclusions regarding a 
relatively wide and comprehensive set of moral and political questions. However, this 
runs the risk of being insensitive to the diversity of moral beliefs and conceptions of 
the good. Thus, the dilemma faced by contemporary liberals is that their theories are 
either too strong or too weak with respect to diversity and consensus. The crucial issue 
is how this dilemma can be resolved to salvage liberal theorizing.  
Both these rival understandings of liberalism capture important elements 
embodied in liberal justice. However, ultimately I believe neither description is fully 
adequate for understanding the role of reason in liberal justice, and in contemporary 
theories of liberalism in general. Although there are elements within liberalism 
moving in opposite directions, to distinguish between Reformation and Enlightenment 
liberalism I will argue is wrongheaded. Instead, I will in this chapter first hold that it is 
wrong to think of liberalism as either reason based or diversity based (as the 
distinction between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism suggests). Instead, 
liberal theories are bound to rely on both these elements. Distinguishing between 
Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism does not exhaust the understandings of 
reason that are possible (and plausible) within liberalism. In addition, Reformation and 
Enlightenment liberalism are not mutually exclusive.  
Part of the argument I will advance in this chapter is that liberalism is bound to 
some extent rely on convergence of reason, but that is not the same as relying on a 
controversial notion of reason that invokes the ideals of autonomy and moral progress 
associated with the Enlightenment. Even if neither Reformation liberalism nor 
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Enlightenment liberalism is entirely satisfactorily, I argue that elements of both are 
required of a workable liberal theory.  
Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism present a dichotomous view of 
reason. A second part of the argument in this chapter is that liberalism ought to 
understand reason as being within an upper and lower boundary. These boundaries 
require more convergence than Reformation liberalism, but less convergence than 
Enlightenment liberalism. The task is therefore to balance the competing demands 
from convergence and divergence, rather than to choose one side. My point in this 
chapter is not to say that the truth lies somewhere between two extreme positions, but 
that it is a mistake in the first place to think of two opposing and mutually exclusive 
ideals.  
My discussion proceeds by first elaborating the distinction between 
Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism. I then discuss an example of Reformation 
liberalism based on mutual advantage and game theory where convergence on 
controversial political and moral truths is minimal. I argue that this attempt fails from 
a liberal point of view because abandoning a notion of public reason altogether will 
not satisfy the liberal precept of a universally justifiable political order. I then continue 
by discussing two theories exemplifying Enlightenment liberalism, emphasising the 
role of deliberation and reasonable pluralism. I argue that neither of these two 
alternatives is suitable as a foundation for justice, because their underlying premises 
rely on too strong a notion of reason. In the final section, I discuss the insights of the 
three first sections to see whether there is some alternative way of thinking of 
contemporary liberalism other than merely as caught between convergence and 
divergence of reason.   
 
1. Reformation and Enlightenment Liberalism 
In this section, I will first offer brief definitions and discussions of the terms 
Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism. Then I will discuss how these two terms 
relate to contemporary theories of liberalism. Finally I will discuss how this 
distinction relates to deep and serious questions about the possibility of satisfying the 
liberal principle of legitimacy.  
The distinction between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism relies in 
turn on a distinction between diversity versus autonomy and reason. The claim is that 
Reformation liberalism was initiated by the pressure from growing religious diversity 
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during the Reformation period in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. Furthermore, the 
liberalisms of the Reformation aimed to show how the violent conflicts sparked by 
religious diversity could be peacefully resolved. Important in this respect was the 
development of a concept of toleration of different Christian denominations (e.g., 
Locke: 1689). This eventually gave rise to civil rights such as freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech.  
By contrast, Enlightenment liberalism developed out of the optimistic view of 
human progress that was influential during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries in much of 
Europe. It was based on a firm faith in the capacity of human reason to arrive at 
correct decisions. Historical representatives of this type of liberalism are Immanuel 
Kant and John Stuart Mill. The significance of the distinction between the two kinds 
of liberalism is that Reformation liberalism leads to toleration and divergence of 
reason, while Enlightenment liberalism relies on autonomy and the supposed 
convergence of reason. I will now examine in more detail what is at stake in 
distinguishing between these two versions of liberalism. 
Rawls points out that the „Reformation had enormous consequences‟ and 
meant „the appearance within the same society of a rival authoritative and salvationist 
religion,‟ which led to asking: „How is society even possible between those of 
different faiths? What can conceivably be the basis of religious toleration‟ (Rawls: 
1996: xxv-xxvi)? These two questions are as important today as they were during the 
time of the Reformation because contemporary democratic societies are perhaps even 
more marked by religious, cultural and ethnic pluralism than the societies of the 
European Reformation. A central premise for Rawls is that a large part of this 
pluralism is reasonable, because the free use of reason leads to a diversity of answers 
to religious, moral and political questions (Rawls: 1996: 54-58). The solution to how 
peaceful coexistence between different religions is possible must therefore take into 
account the diversity of conceptions of the good found in most democratic societies.  
This view can be contrasted with the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century liberals who „hoped 
to establish a basis of moral knowledge independent of ecclesiastical authority and 
available to the ordinary reasonable and conscientious person‟ (Rawls: 1996: xxviii). 
This project saw its most sophisticated expressions in Mill‟s and Kant‟s ideals of 
individual autonomy (Rawls: 1996: xliv). Mill, for example, not only advanced an 
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ideal of autonomy,
6
 but also famously claimed that: „as mankind improve[s], the 
number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the 
increase: the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and 
gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested‟ (Mill: [1859] 
1991: 49). Mill‟s optimism about convergence has been doubted in recent years, when 
we have witnessed an increase, rather than a decline, in diversity.  
 The fundamental problem with this way of understanding reason is that Mill 
and Kant not only set out ideals that were to apply universally to a justified political 
order, but also went beyond these and set out moral ideals for which they also claimed 
universal scope. However, clearly the ideal of autonomy in Mill and Kant is 
incompatible with those conceptions of the good that reject autonomy. Thus, an ideal 
of autonomy, for example, cannot serve as the foundation of a political order in 
societies marked by pluralism because it is bound to exclude a wide range of 
conceptions of the good that are not based on the value of autonomy. Furthermore, 
basing a political order on doctrines embodying specific moral ideals is at odds with 
the idea that the state ought to be neutral between different conceptions of the good. 
The liberalism of Mill and Kant is therefore a blind alley for those who seek to justify 
a just political order in conditions of reasonable pluralism, as those who are not 
adherents of autonomy as a moral ideal have good reason to reject a political order 
based on it. 
 Essentially, the crucial distinction this brief discussion of Reformation and 
Enlightenment liberalism points towards is that Reformation liberals suppose that 
reason will naturally diverge, while Enlightenment liberals suppose that reason will 
naturally converge. Proponents of the distinction between Reformation and 
Enlightenment liberalism argue that liberalism can offer a justifiable political order by 
changing the emphasis from autonomy and a strong shared notion of reason to a 
framework where the pluralistic nature of modern societies is appreciated and taken 
into account. One of the strongest proponents of Reformation liberalism, William 
Galston, holds that this shift of emphasis is not only of theoretical and philosophical 
importance but that the two understandings of liberalism „point in quite different 
directions in currently disputed areas such as education, rights of association, and the 
                                                 
6
 It should be noted that Mill himself did not use the term „autonomy,‟ instead, he used the term 
„individuality,‟ which refers to the capacity to make independent decisions about what is in one‟s best 
interest and about how to live one‟s life. This term and use of it correspond well with understanding 
autonomy as the capacity to make up one‟s mind about religious, moral and political issues. 
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free exercise of religion‟ (Galston: 1995: 521). Liberalism ought not assume that 
universal answers to these issues can be found even within the most homogenous 
societies. Instead of assuming that this is possible, „liberalism is about the protection 
of diversity, not the valorization of choice… To place an ideal of autonomous choice – 
let alone cosmopolitan bricolage – at the core of liberalism is in fact to narrow the 
range of possibilities available within liberal societies (Galston: 1995: 523). 
The significance of distinguishing between Reformation and Enlightenment 
liberalism is not restricted to a discussion of identifying the roots of modern theories 
of liberalism. In fact, the discussion raises important questions concerning what is a 
legitimate political authority, what are our political obligations to a legitimate political 
order, and ultimately what are the reasons liberals can offer non-liberals for supporting 
liberal institutions. All these questions pose deep challenges for liberals, but are 
crucial in making a liberal project both philosophically defensible and politically 
viable. Perhaps the most serious question to answer (and the most serious threat to 
liberalism) is how liberals can justify liberal institutions to non-liberals. Offering 
detailed answers to these important questions is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
some of these issues will be discussed in later chapters.  
The difference between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism is that the 
latter requires more convergence on a wider range of issues than the former. More 
specifically this means that the political order derived from Reformation liberalism 
will embody fewer substantive principles than a political order based on 
Enlightenment liberalism. Furthermore, Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism 
have different political implications. The great challenge with the principle of liberal 
legitimacy is that if the political order is either too weak or too strong it fails to offer a 
political order that is legitimate to everyone living under it. If a political order makes 
too many concessions to accommodate diversity and moral disagreement, it runs the 
risk of not being able to protect fundamental rights. Likewise, if a strong and thick 
political order influenced by Enlightenment liberalism is advanced, it presupposes 
convergence of reason on issues where reasonable citizens may disagree. If the notion 
is not strong enough, the political order ceases to be a liberal political order, and if the 
political order is too strong, it coerces citizens to comply with an ideal of liberalism 
that is highly controversial. Neither of these positions is attractive and both question 
the legitimacy of the political order. What this amounts to is that liberal theories must 
find an alternative to these two approaches to satisfy the two background conditions 
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discussed in the previous chapter. To see this more clearly I will, over the next two 
sections, discuss three alternative ways of reconciling liberalism with the demands of 
pluralism and diversity. 
  
2. Politics as Coordination 
An appealing strategy to come to terms with the demands of diversity and to satisfy 
the liberal principle of legitimacy is to think of such accommodation as a coordination 
game between conflicting interests. Such a view represents a „minimum‟ conception 
of reason, because it relies on the assumption that acceptable solutions are those in the 
interests of all the parties, or optimal from the perspective of game theory. In one 
important respect, this approach is well-suited to accommodate diversity because it 
does not appeal to reason, but instead to the advantages citizens receive from social 
cooperation. A high level of divergence of reason can therefore be tolerated as long as 
social cooperation is more beneficial than non-cooperation for the members of the 
society. Furthermore, since the idea of benefits received from social cooperation is 
doing the real work here, a notion of public reason shared by the members of society 
becomes redundant.  
It is instructive to start an analysis of how to deal with diversity with this 
approach, because it points in the direction of the advantages of a weak notion of 
reason. A weak version of reason is attractive because it waters down the number of 
assumptions that must be shared, and as such is minimally controversial. This seems 
to be exactly the kind of solution required by the critics of Enlightenment liberalism. 
Central to the main argument of this chapter is to show that Reformation liberalism 
and Enlightenment liberalism are not mutually exclusive, as elements of both are 
needed to deliver a workable liberal political theory. Examining reason as a 
coordination game is a useful step in supporting this conclusion, although I believe 
this approach ultimately fails. Nonetheless, it is instructive as a starting point to 
identify the lower limits of reason and so define the boundaries of reason in liberalism. 
The central ideas underpinning this approach are simple to grasp intuitively, 
and appear as an attractive starting point to accommodate diversity. The central 
premises are that (1) society is marked by deep disagreements over a wide range of 
questions such as justice, the meaning of life and what a good society is, and (2) these 
disagreements lead to potential political conflicts, but (3) we also derive benefits from 
cooperating with other persons. Given that divergent opinions have the potential to 
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cause conflict, and given that we gain benefits from cooperating, we have an interest 
in avoiding the conflicts that make cooperation difficult. This leads us to the 
conclusion that we must coordinate our divergent ideas about justice and what a good 
society is to continue to reap the benefits from social cooperation. 
Concerning (1) and (2) Jeremy Waldron, a proponent of this view, describes 
the level of disagreement in society in the following dramatic terms: „There are many 
of us, and we disagree about justice... we disagree also about what count as fair terms 
of co-operation among people who disagree about the existence of God and the 
meaning of life. We disagree about what we owe to each other in the way of tolerance, 
forbearance, respect, co-operation, and mutual aid‟ (Waldron: 1999: 1). We see that 
these claims about disagreement resemble the same claims underlying the critique of 
Enlightenment liberalism. Our use of reason does not lead to convergence on moral 
and political issues. Rather, it leads to divergence, and according to Waldron 
disagreement runs deep: in modern societies people disagree about almost all moral 
and political issues. 
Because of the deep disagreement in modern societies, „a person should not be 
surprised to find himself from time to time under a legal obligation to participate in a 
scheme that he himself regards as undesirable on grounds of justice‟ (Waldron: 1999: 
7). For example, a person may find himself in a society where the legal system 
discriminates against women and he is under legal obligation to obey this system even 
if he strongly disagrees with it on grounds of justice. We must be prepared to make 
such sacrifices in order to continue to receive the benefits of social cooperation. Given 
the deep level of disagreement, to find oneself under such obligations might not be 
surprising, but on what grounds can such obligations be justifiable? This is where the 
idea of how we benefit from social cooperation comes under pressure. Although we 
disagree strongly, we have an interest in preserving the benefits of social cooperation 
amid fundamental disagreements, which is the third premise identified above.  
 
The authority of law rests on the fact that there is a recognizable need for us to 
act in concert on various issues to co-ordinate our behaviour in various areas 
with reference to a common framework, and that this need is not obviated by 
the fact that we disagree among ourselves as to what our common course of 
action or our common framework ought to be. 
        
(Waldron: 1999: 7) 
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The felt need and benefits associated with coordination on some matter outweigh the 
disadvantages associated with finding oneself under political obligations one strongly 
disagrees with. Essentially, coordination is to our mutual advantage. It is rational to 
accept coordination, even if the chosen outcome goes against our preferred alternative. 
The person above who is situated in a society discriminating against women has 
reason to put up with this because he also receives great benefits from the current 
social arrangements. Thus, the crucial point is that the advantages of social 
cooperation outweigh the disadvantages associated with possibly unjust political 
obligations from the perspective of an individual. 
 This view rests on the claim that coordination is preferable to non-coordination 
even if the outcomes of bargaining deliver something thought to be morally wrong 
according to one of the coordinating parties. This is a strong claim and the potential 
consequences of it point to a weakness with this approach. If it is the case that 
coordination is always preferable to non-coordination, this might have two unintended 
implications. First, it means that coordination games where the parties are allowed to 
use their threat advantage and relative bargaining power to skew the outcome in their 
preferred direction are acceptable, since the solution is nevertheless superior to non-
coordination. Some might not only experience that they live under a legal and political 
framework they strongly disagree with, but also under an order they are forced to 
accept. In the previous chapter we saw that from the perspective of liberal 
constitutionalism there are weighty reasons not to accept a political order based on 
mutual advantage as relative bargaining power might force weak parties to accept 
schemes strongly disfavouring their basic interests. 
Secondly, this also means that a legal and political order penetrating almost 
every aspect of life is preferable to non-coordination. Hence, strongly oppressive laws 
and regimes might be permitted on this account, if the overall advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages. This position is problematic from a liberal point of view as it does not 
offer a firm protection to the interests of the individual. For example, coordination 
might give rise to a political order with little room for individual discretion and 
privacy. On this view, almost any government would be better than no government, as 
a government would guarantee some order and predictability. However, not every 
aspect of life ought to be under political control.  
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These two consequences of coordination are decisive objections to this 
approach. Use of threat advantage and potentially limitless political power seems not 
to be very reassuring for those who find themselves under a legal and political order 
with which they strongly disagree. If this order came about by the use of force or is 
potentially limitless, then there are good reasons for those who disagree with the legal 
order not to accept it. Although coordination is superior to non-coordination and the 
benefits associated with social cooperation are strong reasons to accept the order, 
politics as coordination is not necessarily persuasive from a liberal perspective. 
Relying on the idea that coordination is in general better than non-coordination even 
when producing morally wrong outcomes is contentious. Underlying this view is 
either the idea that non-coordination will have disastrous consequences or that the 
benefits from social cooperation exceed those of non-coordination. Both these 
assumptions are questionable. Non-coordination gives associations to a Hobbesian 
state of nature and as Gerald Gaus observed: „We can depict Hobbes‟s state of nature 
as a no-agreement point, and all civil societies as equilibrium points. The power of 
Hobbes‟s characterization of the state of nature is that it is so horrible that every 
conceivable political society is a coordination equilibrium that Pareto-dominates every 
non-coordinated point‟ (Gaus: 2003: 92-93). The persuasiveness of politics as 
coordination depends on these controversial assumptions. By describing the 
circumstances of non-coordination as less disastrous the number of civil societies 
appearing attractive diminish, and non-coordination more plausible. Similarly, 
reducing the benefits of social cooperation has the same effect by making non-
cooperation more attractive. 
 The important in with discussing these assumptions is that if non-cooperation 
(the state of nature) is described in more favourable terms, and the benefits of social 
cooperation are thought of as less than is assumed on this model, then those who find 
themselves under a legal and political order they object to on grounds of justice have 
weaker reasons to accept it as superior to non-cooperation. Hence, they have more 
reason to endorse the idea that the outcomes of politics must not be based on relative 
bargaining power and ought instead to be constrained within certain limits. The crucial 
question is „why should I accept a legal or political order with which I strongly 
disagree?‟ 
 Waldron‟s response to this question assures us that „people sometimes or often 
vote their considered and impartial opinions when they are addressing controversial 
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issues of justice and rights… citizens and representatives often do vote on the basis of 
good faith and relatively impartial opinions about justice, rights, and the common 
good‟ (Waldron: 1999: 14). I will not quarrel with Waldron on the possibility of 
impartiality, as a central premise of this thesis is that impartiality has some merit. 
What I want to draw attention to is that an appeal to impartiality is at odds with 
premise (1) above. If disagreement runs as deep as described by (1), how can it then 
be possible to rely on impartiality? Surely, it must be difficult to discern a common 
interest or arrive at a definite understanding of „good faith‟ given the level of 
disagreement we are faced with according to (1).  
 Waldron might reply that the idea is not that people necessarily agree on what 
is in the common interest or what impartiality means, but that they sincerely try to 
make an effort to think of what is in the common interest and what impartiality 
requires. The question is if this reply is strong enough to persuade the person who is 
obliged by a legal and political order with which he strongly disagrees? I believe not, 
because if disagreement runs as deep as suggested by Waldron then people are likely 
to think of the common interest and impartiality in terms of their own understanding 
of justice, fair terms of social cooperation, rights, etc., because there is no shared basis 
for convergence on these terms. Furthermore, what kind of motivation do the citizens 
in Waldron‟s society have to act impartially? Essentially, politics as coordination is a 
mutual advantage theory, and if one group see the opportunity to invoke principles or 
policies undermining the equal worth of members of other groups there is nothing to 
stop them from doing exactly that. This aspect of mutual advantage is precisely what 
makes it objectionable from the perspective of liberal constitutionalism, because it 
violates strong intuitions about equality and impartiality. 
 Alternatively, impartiality can be understood in a stronger sense where there is 
some convergence on what the common interest and impartiality require. If so, this is 
a much stronger notion of impartiality and the common interest than is expressed in 
(1) above. For Waldron‟s argument to be coherent, he must either reject this more 
substantive understanding of the common interest and impartiality, or he must accept 
the weak notion that does not offer anything more than the current order. Waldron 
cannot have it both ways. He cannot both say that disagreement runs so deep that 
almost no agreement is possible and at the same time state that it is possible to discern 
a clear and uncontroversial meaning of what the common interest and impartiality 
mean.  
 59 
 These remarks merge into a concluding point concerning politics as 
coordination. Waldron is aware of the high level of disagreement in modern societies 
and I think he is correct in thinking that given diversity and pluralism it is necessary to 
assume a weak understanding of reason because convergence on a wide set of 
assumptions is unlikely to arise. So, the starting point is at least the right one. 
However, the problem is that politics as coordination does not offer an attractive 
answer to those who disagree with the outcome of the decision-making process.  We 
saw in the previous chapter how important to liberal political theory a political order 
justifiable to everyone living under it was, and it is on this crucial question that 
politics as coordination fails. It simply has no compelling answer to offer those who 
disagree with a given political order. There is a worry with coordination theories that 
in the end they just become power struggles. To cover that hole in the argument, it is 
necessary to introduce substantive moral premises such as the common interest and 
impartiality, which undermine the view that disagreement permeates every aspect of 
politics.  
The insight to draw from this discussion of Waldron is that although it is 
attractive to try to build a civil order on as weak assumptions as possible given 
diversity and pluralism, Waldron‟s proposal is too weak to yield a political order 
justifiable to everyone. In the end, to strengthen the plausibility of his theory, auxiliary 
arguments based on the common interest and impartiality are required to yield 
justifiable conclusions. However, introducing these elements reveals that a political 
order must be based on something stronger than coordination to be persuasive. In the 
next section, I discuss two liberal approaches which share the conviction that a 
legitimate political order must acknowledge diversity and pluralism, but which have 
stronger substantive assumptions than can be found in Waldron‟s theory.  
 
3. The Politics of Consensus 
While Waldron holds that a political order may be justifiable even if a morally wrong 
political order may follow, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls (whom I discuss in this 
section) are concerned with how thicker assumptions can provide a justifiable 
framework for a political and legal order. Both are aware of the significance of 
diversity, and both seek to present the elements of a political order that would be 
justifiable to everyone given diversity and pluralism. However, if Waldron‟s approach 
was too weak in the end, the approaches advanced by Habermas and Rawls seems to 
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be at the opposite end of the scale in that they assume rather strict and strong 
requirements for a justifiable political order. 
 My discussion in this section does not aim at a full treatment of these thinkers‟ 
ideas about the role of reasoning in relation to politics. My treatment of both Rawls 
and Habermas here is rather cursory, but it does take issue with some of the aspects of 
their theories commentators have often found questionable. Nonetheless, I do not 
claim, or aim for, a wholesale rejection of their theories. What I aim for instead is to 
point out some potential difficulties with their theories that are relevant for discussing 
the role of reason in liberal constitutionalism.  
 To start with Habermas, a central idea underpinning his political philosophy is 
that moral justifications demand „real cooperative effort‟ (Habermas: 1991: 67). Only 
through actual deliberation of all affected can it be shown that a principle is valid. This 
idea leads to the following condition that a principle must satisfy: „All affected can 
accept the consequences and side effects its general observance can be anticipated to 
have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred 
to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) (Habermas: 1991: 65, 
original emphasis).  
This view is a striking contrast to Waldron‟s position discussed in the previous 
section. For Waldron it was acceptable and legitimate that a morally wrong political 
order with which citizens disagreed strongly was still justifiable because the gains that 
citizens derived from social cooperation outweighed the disadvantages of the 
legislative order with which they disagreed. For Habermas it is imperative that the 
political and legal order is morally acceptable to all those living under it. Although 
citizens will benefit more than they lose, it is necessary that a principle is justifiable to 
everyone. 
 Examples of principles on which this process of deliberation can reach 
consensus are principles of justice and morality, while questions about values – what 
constitutes a good life – cannot be resolved through deliberation (Habermas: 1991: 
108). Habermas‟ argument is that principles of justice and morality are both within the 
realm of rationality and it is therefore possible to reach consensus on these issues. 
Questions about values are not subject to rationality to the same extent because they 
are more subjective. Consensus on issues of justice and morality is exactly what the 
critics of Enlightenment liberalism deny given our plural societies.  
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I think there are two points to be made in relation to Habermas‟ account. First, 
it is unlikely that consensus can be reached on all questions of justice and morality. 
Consensus is unlikely partly because morality and justice cover such a vast number of 
questions. It is one thing to agree on principles for democratic decision-making and 
basic questions of justice, but quite another to settle the question of abortion through 
deliberative practices and reach a consensus acceptable to everyone. The scope of 
possible consensus seems too wide on Habermas‟ account. The problem with 
Habermas‟ account is that he requires consensus on a too wide range of questions. For 
it to be possible to reach a consensus on all questions of justice and morality it is 
necessary that rationality is subject to wide interpersonal comparison. The level of 
disagreement in most modern societies does not show that consensus is impossible, 
but it seems to be extremely difficult to reach consensus on all questions of justice and 
morality. To insist that questions of justice and morality can be settled through 
deliberation and discourse seems to be to neglect the idea that reasoning leads to ever-
increasing divergence rather than convergence. 
Furthermore, it is difficult always to see the crucial difference between, on the 
one hand, questions of morality and values, and on the other hand, how to live a good 
life. Many moral questions are precisely questions about how we attach value to 
certain ideals. In the case of abortion it is crucial for our conclusion whether we attach 
value to the importance of the choice of women to determine whether they want to end 
or continue the pregnancy, or whether we attach importance to the rights of the foetus. 
Claiming, as Habermas does, that values and questions of morality are separate is 
questionable. 
Second, even if it were possible in principle to reach consensus on both 
questions of justice and morality, it is debatable to what extent the conditions 
Habermas describes can actually be realized in modern and diverse societies. Indeed, 
Habermas himself acknowledges that we must often resort to majority rule. He writes: 
 
Majority rule retains an internal relation to the search for truth inasmuch as the 
decision reached by the majority only represents a caesura in an ongoing 
discussion; the decision records, so to speak, the interim result of a discursive 
opinion-forming process. To be sure, in that case the majority decision must be 
premised on a competent discussion of the disputed issues, that is, a discussion 
conducted according to the communicative presuppositions of a corresponding 
discourse. Only then can its content be viewed as the rationally motivated yet 
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fallible result of a process of argumentation that has been interrupted in view 
of institutional pressures to decide, but it is in principle resumable.  
 
    (Habermas: 1996: 179) 
 
What is left, then, is the idea that the democratic process must be conducted in the 
manner described above, and in the spirit of trying to achieve consensus. Watered 
down in this manner, one might ask how different Habermas‟ account is from more 
standard views about democracy, such as Robert Dahl‟s (1956 and 1989), which rely 
on a more aggregative view of the democratic process. Majority rule seems always to 
embody some element of aggregation, and is not always sensitive to the ideas of a 
discursive and deliberative process. It is not particularly well suited to capture the 
emphasis on consensus on questions of justice and morality as described by 
Habermas. 
 I take these points to suggest that basing a legitimate political order on 
deliberation leading to consensus is highly demanding and does not seem to relieve 
critics of Enlightenment liberalism of their worries about the convergence of reason. 
Although consensus is in the end rejected, Habermas‟ theory is clearly in the spirit of 
Enlightenment liberalism when asserting that questions of justice and morality are 
suitable for reaching consensus. The remarks by Habermas mirror Mill‟s position in 
the sense that they envisage a future in which the human capacity to reason will yield 
an ever-growing body of truths shared by humanity, and this is precisely what is 
problematic with Enlightenment liberalism. 
 Moving from Habermas to Rawls, we see the same tendency to base a 
legitimate political order on consensus. In this section I will focus on some aspects of 
Rawls‟s later work, which suggest that he is more closely aligned to Enlightenment 
liberalism than Reformation liberalism, although Rawls himself in his later work seeks 
to identify himself more closely with Reformation liberalism rather than 
Enlightenment liberalism. The question Rawls asks is: „How is it possible for there to 
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain 
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines‟ 
(Rawls: 1996: xxxix)? 
I believe this question is certainly one of the most important questions liberals 
must answer, and in a sense it contains the crux of what contemporary liberal 
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philosophy aspires to (accommodating pluralism and offering a political order 
justifiable to all those living under it). This question also captures the idea that 
contemporary societies consist of a wide plurality of religious and moral doctrines, 
which fits in with the idea of Reformation liberalism. We also saw in the first section 
of this chapter how Rawls is trying to distance himself from the liberalism of, for 
example, Kant and Mill. At the same time, Rawls acknowledges that it is necessary 
that there be convergence on justice (1996: xx). This position is compatible with a 
notion of reason weak enough to accommodate diversity and pluralism, and still 
strong enough to yield a liberal framework. It is also a position much stronger than the 
idea that politics is essentially about coordination. Instead, the aim is a position 
defensible to each and every citizen. Rawls‟ question is clearly interesting as it strives 
to strike a balance between the strong and the weak elements present in liberalism. 
 Asking this question leads eventually to the „principle of liberal legitimacy‟, 
which is stated in the following terms by Rawls: „our exercise of political power is 
fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials 
of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason‟ (Rawls: 1996: 
137). Certainly, this principle contains the crux of the liberal idea of impartiality 
between different conceptions of the good. This idea is not only an important element 
of Rawls‟ theory, but is central in the theories of other important liberal theorists (as 
we saw in the previous chapter).  
Although Rawls clearly wants to distance himself from the Enlightenment 
liberalism of Kant and Mill, he still supposes convergence on a number of 
controversial ideas. For example, as part of his endeavour to reach an overlapping 
consensus on justice between reasonable doctrines he argues that it is necessary to 
accept the objectivity of political judgements (Rawls: 1996: 110-131). Rawls claims 
that the moral principles derived from „an objective procedure of construction that 
expresses all the relevant requirements of practical reason are “most reasonable” and 
provide the grounds for claims of moral truth of more particular judgments‟ (Freeman: 
2007: 357). The idea of the objectivity of political judgments requires „that a 
conception of objectivity has an account of agreement in judgment among reasonable 
agents‟ (Rawls: 1996: 112). The problem with the idea of objective political 
judgements is the same as the problem Rawls identified in Kant and Mill; that they 
relied on a controversial notion of rationality that was objective in the sense that the 
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use of reason would yield intersubjective moral and political agreement. In 
introducing the idea of the objectivity of political judgements Rawls is simply relying 
on some of the same controversial notions as the theorists he criticises and from whom 
he wishes to dissociate himself.  
Nonetheless, Rawls is aware of the difficulties associated with relying on 
objectivity and the possibility of agreement on political judgements, and holds that it 
is reasonable to assume that citizens disagree even „in cases of constitutional essentials 
and matters of basic justice‟ (Rawls: 1996: 241). Thus, even if objectivity is required, 
this weak understanding of objectivity suggests that Rawls relies on a substantively 
weaker account than, for example, Mill.  
Despite this weakening of the objectivity requirement there is another feature 
that suggests that the objectivity of political judgements is to be understood in a 
stronger way. As part of acknowledging the reasonableness of disagreement even „in 
cases of constitutional essentials‟, it is at any time legitimate to appeal to „our 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we 
give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive 
doctrine is said to support‟ (Rawls: 1999b: 144). This additional feature suggests that 
there are two kinds of reasons that can be given in favour or against a principle or 
policy. The first kind of reason is a reason originating in our own conception of the 
good. That is to say, this type of reason is based on premises and considerations that 
apply specifically to this view. The second kind of reason is a public reason that does 
not originate within a specific conception of the good, but instead appeals entirely to 
„a political conception of justice‟ (Rawls: 1999b: 144).  
However, it is unclear what kind of work the reason originating within a 
conception of the good is actually doing, since in a political conception of justice the 
decisive reason will necessarily be the public reason based on political values. Even if 
an appeal to reasons originating within one‟s conception of the good is legitimate, it 
can only be done if there are additional public reasons supporting the same policy or 
principle. In the end the scope for appealing to reasons from within one‟s conception 
of the good is highly limited and contingent on there being a public reason for the 
same policy or principle. Requiring public reasons in this way undermines the 
minimalistic and weak understanding of reason, strongly restricting the kind of 
reasons that are acceptable as public reasons, and this pushes the notion of reason 
again back towards Kantian and Millian understanding. 
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What I want to draw attention to is the fact that the features mentioned above 
all slant Rawls‟s re-formulation in the direction of Enlightenment liberalism. 
Furthermore, the attempt to create a justifiable political order does not necessarily 
need to take the form of Waldron‟s minimalistic order, centred on coordination and 
benefits from social cooperation. In fact, a point that can be made from the 
examination of Habermas and Rawls in this section is that even if both theories seem 
to apply a strict notion of reason it might be impossible to base a justifiable political 
order on merely a weak or minimalistic conception of politics. The underlying point is 
that liberalism cannot escape some reliance on reason. The crucial question is how 
strong the understanding of reason ought to be. 
The discussion in this and the previous section has given us some ideas about 
the limits of reason in liberalism. Although Enlightenment liberalism leaves a bad 
taste in the mouth of many liberals it is hard to see how a political order not based on 
convergence on certain crucial issues is feasible. Keeping these different and opposing 
perspectives in mind is useful for working out which of these strategies should be 
adopted by liberal constitutionalism, and in the next section I will bring the 
perspectives discussed here and in the previous section together by asking how 
liberalism can respond to the competing demands from divergence and convergence of 
reason. 
 
4. Balancing Divergence and Convergence of Reason in Liberalism 
I will now argue that the discussions in the previous sections point out that a strict 
distinction between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism cannot be maintained 
because liberal theories cannot be exclusively defined by either approach. Instead, an 
important insight is that the notion of reason in liberalism must be strong enough to 
avoid the use of threat advantage and require convergence of reason regarding this 
point. At the same time, diversity makes it difficult to require consensus on all 
questions of justice and morality and to suppose the objectivity of political 
judgements. With respect to these issues, divergence of reason is legitimate. The 
solution is therefore to articulate a political order embodying elements of both 
Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism. Hence, Reformation and Enlightenment 
liberalism are not mutually exclusive. A plausible understanding of reason in 
liberalism needs elements derived from both approaches. To substantiate this point I 
will examine four insights from the discussions of the previous sections. 
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 I have argued that politics considered just as coordination has two serious 
drawbacks. First, it permits the use of relative bargaining power and threat advantage. 
Second, it does not include any limits on the use of political power as long as the gains 
from social cooperation outweigh the disadvantages from living under a political order 
with which one disagrees. Coordination, thus, sets few constraints on the use of 
reason. To avoid the unintended drawbacks of threat advantage and unlimited political 
power Waldron was in the end forced to invoke the value of impartiality. However, he 
does not define impartiality and indeed insists that widespread disagreement over the 
implications of justice make it impossible to reach a useful definition of it.  
The first insight we can draw from politics as coordination is that the high 
level of disagreement present in most modern societies sets strict limits on the number 
of things one can expect to be the subject of consensus. In response to this point 
Waldron concluded that it is plausible to accept living under a legal and political order 
with which one disagrees, because the gains from social cooperation still outweigh the 
disadvantages associated with that order. These gains are what make politics as 
coordination justifiable to all. Politics understood as coordination avoids the 
difficulties with defining reason in a way justifiable to everyone. Nonetheless, this has 
a cost; threat advantage and unlimited political power are permissible, and these side-
effects may threaten important interests of the person such as the opportunity to live a 
life in accordance with his or her own will. They may also force a person to accept 
highly unfavourable conditions based on weak bargaining power. Although this order 
places few constraints on reason, and thus can accommodate wide political 
disagreement, it may justify morally dubious political orders. A second insight to draw 
from politics as coordination is that despite the attractiveness of basing a political 
order on coordination, it comes at a high cost. This points in favour of a political order 
based on a thicker (although potentially more controversial) foundations. From a 
liberal constitutional perspective, this means that at least the use of threat advantage 
and potentially unlimited political power must be avoided. Thus, convergence on the 
acceptability of these two issues is required. 
While coordination places few limits on reason, Habermas and Rawls place 
many more restrictions on reason. My brief discussion pointed out how their theories 
relied on ideal conditions for reasoning in politics with a strong emphasis on ideal 
deliberation and consensus. In some respects, their views can be criticized for relying 
on an overly optimistic view of the possibilities of reaching consensus. Of course, this 
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is not to deny that their views contain many valuable insights. Attractive features of 
both views are that they offer strong protection to the interests of the individual 
through their emphasis on consensus. However, the emphasis on consensus also gives 
rise to concern. Both views end up as highly demanding both at a practical level and 
concerning their conceptualization of public reason. Leaving the practical difficulties 
with consensus aside for a moment, both Habermas and Rawls demand that citizens 
subscribe to controversial propositions such as the objectiveness of political 
judgements and a highly idealized version of deliberative democracy. Obviously, the 
more controversial propositions that are built in the harder it is to accommodate 
pluralism, but importantly it is necessary to rely on some sort of shared notion of 
public reason to avoid the collapse of the political into mere coordination. The crucial 
question for Habermas and Rawls is if their accounts build in too many controversial 
conditions or not, and my discussion suggest that the number of controversial features 
of their theories requiring convergence of reason may be difficult to square with the 
high level of pluralism in modern societies.  
Despite their differences, all three theorists discussed in this chapter endorse 
the principle of liberal legitimacy. The principle of liberal legitimacy is put under 
strong pressure when applied to highly diverse societies as the range of beliefs asking 
for accommodation often conflict and make justifiability to all reasonable citizens 
possible. The difficulty liberal political theories face is that both an overly weak and 
an overly strong notion of reason undermines the ideal of a political order justifiable to 
all. Politics as coordination undermines this ideal by focusing too much on the gains 
from social cooperation, and consensus theorists undermine the same ideal from the 
opposite direction by being too demanding of their citizens. A third insight to be 
highlighted from the discussion in this chapter is that a plausible liberal theory is 
therefore bound to be within these bounds; neither too weak nor too strong.  
It might be argued that reaching an equilibrium along these lines is impossible, 
but this is the aim liberals have set themselves when acknowledging both the principle 
of liberal legitimacy and the need to accommodate diversity. All three theorists 
discussed in this chapter can be taken as attempting to offer answers to the dilemma of 
how the conflict between the weak and strong elements of contemporary theories of 
liberalism can be resolved. Despite the fact that my discussion pushed Waldron 
towards Reformation liberalism, and Habermas and Rawls closer to Enlightenment 
liberalism, neither of these two categories fit the examined theories very well. Those 
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who invoke this distinction by denouncing Enlightenment liberalism and emphasising 
how Reformation liberalism can accommodate diversity give a false impression of 
how diversity can be accommodated. Therefore, a fourth important insight from this 
chapter is that the examination of these theorists throws doubt upon the usefulness of a 
hard and fast distinction between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism. The 
discussion in this chapter has pointed out the complexity associated with 
accommodating diversity and to suggest a quick fix through Reformation liberalism is 
simply to underestimate the difficulty that lies in fulfilling the promise of the liberal 
principle of legitimacy.  
 The solution is not a wholesale rejection of Enlightenment liberalism and a 
wholehearted embrace of Reformation liberalism. Instead, a solution must follow 
along the lines of the dilemma formulated above. The equilibrium is reached when the 
political order effectively blocks threat advantage and unlimited political power 
without relying on consensus across a wide range of controversial topics. Avoiding 
these two pitfalls guards against a wide range of oppressive practices. Furthermore, 
rejecting a strong consensus takes properly into account how deeply many 
disagreements run in politics and relies on the idea that politics is essentially about 
disagreement, rather than agreement. Saying that politics is essentially about 
disagreement rather than agreement does not exclude the possibility of reaching 
agreement on some issues. It is only that many political disagreements are extremely 
difficult given that questions of justice reflect disagreements over deeply held 
convictions and people‟s livelihood. These and many other issues are issues where 
people disagree and they constitute an important part of what politics is all about 
(although it is not exclusively about these issues). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Enlightenment liberalism has been blamed for liberalism‟s assumed inability to 
accommodate diversity because it controversially presupposes convergence of reason 
on a wide range of ideas. As a reaction against the supposed failure of Enlightenment 
liberalism, Reformation liberalism is held up by many liberal theorists as the proper 
response to the challenges from diversity and pluralism. Politics as coordination might 
be interpreted as an attempt to answer the challenges posed by diversity and pluralism 
in the spirit of the Reformation. However, we found that this approach has two serious 
drawbacks that fail to satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy. The discussion of 
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Habermas and Rawls pointed towards two more promising ways to accommodate 
diversity and pluralism, but in the end, both include substantive, controversial 
elements in their theories in ways that threaten to undermine their attempts to 
accommodate diversity.  
The discussion of these three alternatives reveals the dilemma for liberal 
constitutionalist theories. Given their embracing of the principle of liberal legitimacy 
it becomes increasingly difficult to accommodate diversity and pluralism. Liberal 
theorists‟ endeavours become either too weak (as in the case of Waldron) or too strong 
(as in the cases of Habermas and Rawls). Furthermore, this points out that liberalism is 
bound to be based on convergence on some basic tenets, otherwise the political order 
will cease to be a liberal one, but it cannot be too strong without unjustly excluding 
some reasonable citizens. The task is to find a balance between these competing 
demands. Hence, to talk of a stark distinction between Reformation and 
Enlightenment liberalism only serves to divert attention away from how this task can 
be accomplished. The distinction between Reformation and Enlightenment liberalism 
thus poses a false distinction and promises a quick fix to the challenge of diversity and 
pluralism that is not viable. Instead, we have seen that it is necessary to base a 
legitimate political order on some convergence, but that does not mean a version of 
Enlightenment liberalism equivalent to Kant‟s or Mill‟s perfectionist liberalisms.  
The next chapter will outline the structure of a theory aiming to balance these 
competing demands in a way that is stronger than the politics as coordination, but at 
the same time weaker than politics as consensus. If this alternative succeeds, it means 
that it is possible to arrive at a plausible understanding of reason, and a plausible 
liberal constitutionalist model sensitive to the demands of both liberal legitimacy and 
pluralism. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Impartial Alternative 
 
Socrates: What subject of difference would make us angry and hostile to each other if 
we were unable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but 
examine as I tell you whether these subjects are the just and the unjust, the beautiful 
and the ugly, the good and the bad. Are these not the subjects of difference about 
which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and other 
men become hostile to each other whenever we do? 
Euthyphro: That is the difference, Socrates, about those subjects. 
 
Socrates
7
 
 
If such influential theories as Waldron‟s Hobbesian theory, Rawls‟s political 
liberalism and Habermas‟s communicative and discursive theory fail to provide an 
ideal framework for creating a workable political order one might think that no other 
alternative exists for creating a liberal constitutionalist political order. Given the 
competing demands of liberal legitimacy and pluralism, the task is simply too hard. 
Before drawing that conclusion, however, there are reasons to explore one more 
possibility: the contractual framework developed by T. M. Scanlon and Brian Barry. 
The attractiveness of this theoretical framework is that it is based on impartial and 
equal constraints that seem to fit well with liberal legitimacy. In addition, this 
framework acknowledges the significance of pluralism and relies on weaker 
assumptions than politics as consensus. Scanlonian/Barryian contractualism thus 
appears as a middle way between politics as coordination and consensus, and if this 
impression can be sustained it offers a promising framework for determining the role 
of reason in liberal constitutional theory. 
This alternative has two fundamental building blocks, the contractual theory 
developed by Scanlon, and Barry‟s development of this contractual framework into a 
theory called justice as impartiality. This chapter aims to outline these two basic 
building blocks in sections one and two. Then, section three will discuss some of the 
political implications of justice as impartiality. Although this theory is a promising 
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alternative to the theories discussed in the previous chapter the main conclusion of my 
analysis is that the theory shares some of the same problems as the consensus focused 
theories of Rawls and Habermas. Justice as impartiality appears to rely on a narrow 
and strict understanding of reason that is difficult to square with pluralism. For 
example, the theory seems to be insensitive to many demands of cultural and religious 
accommodation. Furthermore, the political implications seem detailed and wide 
ranging. For example, the strong notion of equality of opportunity defended by Barry 
suggests a limited role for democratic decision-making. Both these implications, if 
they reflect accurately the commitments of the theory, threaten the plausibility of 
contractualism to provide an alternative to the theories already discussed. Because 
justice as impartiality shares some of the problems associated with consensus theories, 
the liberal constitutionalist promise of justice and democracy seems unrealistic, as 
none of the potential theoretical frameworks seems to withstand scrutiny. Socrates 
therefore seems to have been right when he pointed out that questions of justice are 
subject to disagreement and even hostility. Despite this discouraging conclusion, 
towards the end of the chapter I will point out the possibility of re-interpreting some of 
the controversial tenets to find a possible way forward in building a foundation for a 
liberal constitutional political order. 
  
1. The Structure of Justice as Impartiality 
It is natural to start an analysis of the structure of justice as impartiality with the 
fundamentals of Scanlonian contractualism because justice as impartiality is built 
around important aspects of Scanlon‟s account. Scanlon‟s theory is based on the 
concept of „reasonable rejectability‟. However, it is open to question what exactly this 
means. This difficulty arises because although it is relatively clear what 
reasonableness means in a discussion of abstract and general principles, as soon as the 
discussion focuses on more concrete examples of what the abstract principles actually 
require things become far from clear. Given the centrality of the term „reasonable‟, 
and given its importance for understanding what justice requires, it will be an 
important focus of discussion in this chapter.    
Contractualism, according to Scanlon, is concerned with moral wrongness in 
general and not specifically with justice, and the general formulation states that: „An 
act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any 
system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonably 
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reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement‟ (Scanlon: 1982: 119). To 
see exactly what it means for a principle to be reasonably rejectable several of the 
terms mentioned in this statement need further explanation. 
First, the term „reasonable‟ aims to „exclude rejections that would be 
unreasonable given the aim of finding principles which could be the basis of informed, 
unforced general agreement. Given this aim, it would be unreasonable, for example, to 
reject a principle because it imposed a burden on you when every alternative principle 
would impose much greater burdens on others‟ (Scanlon: 1982: 111). This statement 
relies on the view that everyone shares the same interest in reaching an agreement 
given equal concern for everyone‟s interests. It is only in the hypothetical contract 
situation that it is required that everyone shares this motivation for agreement. In real 
life, it is not required. In other words, in real life the parties are free to pursue their 
self-interest and their own conceptions of the good (but they must be motivated by a 
desire to be able to justify their actions to similarly motivated others),
8
 and they must 
accept constraints on their self-interest and on the pursuit of their conception of the 
good. This underlines the fact that the term „reasonably rejectable‟ is primarily 
directed towards the hypothetical original position, and that the social contract 
requires hypothetical consent and not actual consent. 
An „informed‟ agreement „exclude(s) agreement based on superstition or false 
belief about the consequences of actions, even if these beliefs are ones which it would 
be reasonable for the person in question to have‟ (Scanlon: 1982: 111). A weakness 
with this formulation is that it does not say what informed agreement is, just what an 
informed agreement cannot be. Furthermore, Scanlon says no more about the nature of 
superstition and false beliefs. Often the central disagreement between, say rival 
conceptions of the good is over exactly what constitutes superstition or false beliefs. 
Just to take a simple example, Christians and Atheists will disagree strongly over what 
constitutes superstition and false beliefs. Christians will argue that to claim that God 
exists does not constitute superstition or a false belief. Atheists will disagree with this 
statement and argue that it certainly constitutes superstition and a false belief. Even if 
science is taken as a basis for what can be constituted as „informed‟ it is still of limited 
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with „reasons‟ to justify one‟s actions to others. This is a notable change of emphasis, but I believe that 
this change does not affect the argument of this thesis (or have any bearing on the use of Scanlonian 
contractualism in political philosophy more generally). 
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use in deciding conflicts of interests between groups. Disputes over, for example, 
distributive justice or freedom of religion cannot easily be settled by science, as 
science does not provide straightforward answers to resolve such disagreements. It is 
therefore unclear what „informed‟ agreement actually involves. 
The lack of clarity is re-enforced by the fact that the „informed‟ condition also 
excludes false beliefs and superstition that it is reasonable for a person to have. This 
moves the understanding of the condition in the direction of understanding „informed‟ 
as an expression capturing the idea of an objective moral truth that can be 
acknowledged by all moral actors. These truths are not explicitly stated, but affect 
which outcomes can be counted as reasonable. Regardless of how one decides to 
interpret this term, it stands out as one of the most difficult terms to grasp in this 
theory. I will discuss this term in more detail when discussing Barry‟s adaptation of 
Scanlon‟s theory in developing his own theory of justice. 
A problem with this formulation is that it does not say what informed 
agreement is, just what an informed agreement cannot be. Furthermore, Scanlon says 
no more about the nature of superstition and false beliefs. Often the central 
disagreement between, say, rival conceptions of the good is over exactly what 
constitutes superstition or false belief. Just to take a simple example, Christians and 
Atheists will disagree over what constitutes superstition and false beliefs. Christians 
will argue that the claim that God exists is not a superstition or a false belief. Atheists 
will disagree and argue that such a claim is a „superstition‟ and is certainly false. Even 
if science is taken as a basis for what can be constituted as „informed‟ it is still of 
limited use in deciding conflicts of interests between groups. Disputes over, for 
example, distributive justice or freedom of religion cannot easily be settled by science, 
as science does not provide straightforward answers to resolve such disagreements. It 
is therefore unclear what „informed‟ agreement actually involves. 
To say that an agreement is „unforced‟ simply means that neither coercion nor 
„being forced to accept an agreement by being in a weak bargaining position‟ are 
permitted to influence the outcome (Scanlon: 1982: 111). The unreasonableness of 
unequal bargaining power played an important role in rejecting politics as 
coordination in the previous chapter, and it has strong intuitive appeal to hold that 
being forced to accept an agreement is something very few would accept as fair or 
reasonable. In addition, a principle that cannot be reasonably rejected must be an 
impartial principle. Impartiality is defined by Scanlon as limiting principles that 
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cannot be reasonably rejected to those „which it would be rational to accept if you did 
not know which person‟s position you occupied and believed that you had an equal 
chance of being in any of these positions‟ (Scanlon: 1982: 120). The important point is 
to give equal weight to the contracting parties‟ concerns.  
This leads to another feature of this understanding of contractualism - namely 
that „when we consider a principle our attention is naturally directed to those who 
would do worst under it. This is because if anyone has reasonable grounds for 
objecting to the principle it is likely to be them‟ (Scanlon: 1982: 123, original 
emphasis).  Hence, one of the concerns of contract theory is to provide sufficient 
protection for the interests of the weakest groups in society.  
 As we have seen, the scope of Scanlon‟s theory is moral wrongness in general 
and although justice is concerned with what is right and wrong, the scope of justice is 
narrower. Essentially, a theory of moral wrongness is concerned with the question of 
what is right or wrong in general, while justice is focused on a subquestion of morality 
and social justice; more precisely on the question: „how are we to live together, given 
that we have different ideas about how to live?‟ (Barry: 1995: 77, original emphasis).9 
To suit this different purpose Scanlon‟s theory must be adapted in several ways and I 
will now go on to discuss how justice as impartiality is built around Scanlon‟s 
contractualism.  
 Again, what is meant by „informed‟ must be unpacked in order to see more 
clearly what reasonableness means in justice as impartiality. „Informed agreement‟ on 
Scanlon‟s definition means that an agreement should not be based on superstitions or 
wrong beliefs. Barry acknowledges that the trouble with this is that „one person‟s 
superstition is another‟s belief‟ (Barry: 1995: 69). Given that the purpose of justice as 
impartiality is to reach an answer to the question of how people with different ideas 
about how to live can still live together it is not necessary to consider how superstition 
can be distinguished from the truth. Instead, Barry says, justice requires „that they [the 
parties] know the bare facts about their society but also that they know that other 
societies do things differently and that their own could feasibly be different in various 
ways‟ (Barry: 1995: 107). The crucial element is that justice as impartiality does not 
take a position on whether one religious faith or another is superstitious. Taking a 
position on this issue would violate the commitment to impartiality between different 
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conceptions of the good. Furthermore, being informed to make political decisions does 
not require an answer to this issue. Making political decisions requires only 
knowledge about one‟s own and other societies not knowledge about what constitute 
superstitious and false beliefs. 
Given that it is likely that people will disagree both over what constitute 
superstitious and false beliefs and over other political issues, an important goal of 
justice as impartiality is to prescribe a fair procedure for making decisions. „If freedom 
to worship in the way you think right is of great importance to your own ability to live 
what you regard as a good life, then you are asked to accept that it is important to 
others too‟ (Barry: 1995: 84). Instead of taking a position on the issue of what 
constitute false and superstitious beliefs justice as impartiality asks us to accept the 
idea of equal rights to things such as freedom of religion. Emphasizing equal rights to 
worship makes references to false and superstitious beliefs irrelevant, because the 
theory does not need to discriminate between beliefs on grounds of their truth value. 
To understand what difference Barry‟s rejection of a strong understanding of 
the „informed‟ condition, consider, for example, a society dominated by a group of 
Atheists and a group of Christians. As a matter of fact, one of these groups must be 
wrong. The beliefs of the mistaken group are false. On Scanlon‟s account, this group 
would not be „informed‟ and thus not fully reasonable. Instead of adopting this 
position, Barry holds that it is precisely the question concerning which group is right 
or wrong that is disputed. Furthermore, this question cannot be conclusively answered. 
Consequently, Barry accepts that those who for example hold a conception of the good 
like Christianity can count as reasonable and informed. Barry is thus more inclusive 
than Scanlon in accepting a wider range of reasons as legitimate. 
Furthermore, Barry makes two other important adaptations of the Scanlonian 
understanding of informed agreement and reasonableness. The first is that citizens are 
expected to have knowledge of their own society and alternative societies and they are 
expected to be able to understand and evaluate the implications of policy proposals by 
political parties (Barry: 1995: 107-108). Given that modern societies are increasingly 
complex and that evaluation of policies is difficult even for experts on specific 
subjects, this requirement must be understood in a relatively weak way; there is a limit 
to the extent to which one can expect citizens to grasp detailed policy proposals. 
Nevertheless, despite the growing complexity of modern societies, it is still 
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meaningful to say that it is plausible to require a general knowledge of policies and 
their intended consequences.  
Even if people are informed in the way stipulated above, it is still possible that 
they will disagree over what is reasonable. It is when such issues arise „proceduralism 
has a part to play‟ (Barry: 1995: 69). What Barry has in mind here is that „legislation, 
for example, should be based upon consultation, in the course of which concerned 
individuals and organizations are given enough time to formulate comments on 
proposals; there should be hearings, where experts and others with something to 
contribute to a process of rational evaluation have a chance to state their case and 
answer questions‟ (Barry: 1995: 103). The idea here is a process marked by impartial 
procedures giving the appropriate chance to everyone concerned to express their views 
on the suggested legislation. To an extent, this resembles the actual process of law-
making, although in this wording it is of course more idealized than current practices 
in most democracies. It is important to notice that democratic decision-making is 
assigned an important role in determining the outcomes of questions of social justice. 
The thought behind all this is that it is reasonable for people to disagree about issues 
of social justice and the best way to resolve such disputes is through democratic 
decision-making marked by impartial procedures. People who disagree with the 
outcomes are more likely to accept the outcomes if the process leading up to the 
decision was fair and impartial and if they had an equal chance to express their views 
(Barry: 1995: 150).  
 There is a second element to what it means to be reasonable and this is perhaps 
the most important one: „the willingness to accept reasonable objections to a proposal 
regardless of the quarter from which they come‟ (Barry: 1995: 100). Essentially this 
means being able to see things from the perspective of others, and acknowledging that 
others‟ reasons are as important as one‟s own. This does not mean that one also has to 
attach the same evaluative status to everyone‟s opinions after considering their merits 
and weaknesses, but only that one must have a fundamental willingness to try to see 
things from the perspective of others. Exactly what this requires is perhaps impossible 
to define precisely but an example of what this might involve in practice is to respect 
the authority of democracy, as far as the democratic process follows fair and impartial 
procedures. Reasonableness then requires a democratic culture where the value of 
democratic decision-making is widely appreciated. To think of reasonableness in 
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terms of impartial procedures and deliberative practices is an attempt to construct a 
practical and workable approximation of a highly abstract and theoretical notion.  
 We can now see that justice as impartiality‟s account of „informed‟ differs 
from Scanlon‟s in two main ways. Firstly, justice as impartiality does not aim to assess 
the truth claims underlying different conceptions of the good. Instead, the idea is to 
find principles for how to avoid conflicts based on competing conceptions of the good 
and the distribution of scarce resources. Secondly, what is crucial is that agents ought 
to be motivated to find terms to live together even if they strongly disagree about how 
one should live. A central element in contractualism is to be able to see the importance 
of putting oneself in the situation of others and granting them the same rights and 
advantages as one wants for oneself. The basic requirement for being an informed 
citizen in this sense is to be able to comprehend policies proposed by different parties 
and their implications, and to have a basic knowledge of one‟s society and of 
alternative societies.  
 Although these notions of what it is to be informed and what it is to be 
reasonable appear plausible, each is highly contentious in contemporary political 
philosophy. The problem is twofold. First, it is unclear what exactly it means to be 
reasonable in many situations. Secondly and related, the term „reasonable‟ is part of 
the machinery that is doing the real philosophical work in the argument as a 
principle‟s justifiability effectively rest on its being reasonable or not. Hence, it 
becomes tremendously important to know more precisely what this term means. 
However, the problem is that if one cannot arrive at a precise meaning of the term then 
it seems difficult to assign such importance to it. Relying on a concept that is hard to 
define and that is doing an important job in the theory seems to point towards a 
weakness in contractualism. 
 Regarding these points, it can be said that someone who never attaches any 
weight to reasons given by, for example, women because he thinks women are 
naturally inferior to men, may easily be labelled as unreasonable for not 
acknowledging the equal moral status of men and women. However, it is a lot more 
complicated to discern what it means to be reasonable when the question is not 
whether men and women have equal moral status or not but, for example, whether 
treating women as equal to men involves schemes like special representation of 
women in parliament. The difficulty here is that one might acknowledge that there are 
reasonable arguments on both sides of this issue. Hence, it is not obvious that in cases 
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where women are not granted special representation, this is a clear case of an injustice. 
Therefore, it is difficult to attach such strong weight to what counts as reasonable, 
because what counts as reasonable is elusive as soon as one moves from abstract 
principles to political requirements in actual societies. That is unless the term can be 
given clearer content.  
In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, Barry develops two approaches to 
judge what can reasonably be rejected. The first is an a priori approach which asserts 
that many unjust schemes can be detected by starting from the Scanlonian original 
position and asking „whether there are things that nobody would reasonably accept in 
the absence of coercion, including the implicit coercion of nonagreement 
outcome…Examples that spring to mind immediately are slavery, apartheid, and 
genocide‟ (Barry: 1989: 347). These schemes are ruled out as those who will do badly 
under them have a strong - and reasonable - interest in rejecting them. This approach 
relies only on reason, and does not in any way rely on empirical considerations and is 
in this sense a priori.  
By contrast, to derive more determinate answers to more detailed questions of 
justice one needs to consider to what extent a principle or a policy recommendation is 
suggested by the „circumstances of impartiality‟. The „circumstances of impartiality‟ 
are defined „as the conditions under which the substantive rules of justice of a society 
will tend actually to be just‟ (Barry: 1995: 100). This requires that one investigate the 
empirical evidence. For example, Barry writes, that a society in which   
 
each section of the population has its own organizations and organs of 
communication to articulate its interests and aspirations is closer to the 
circumstances of impartiality than one in which, say business is well organized 
but labor is not, and in which almost all the organs of mass communication are 
owned and controlled by the rich. Similarly, a political system in which parties 
represent the distinctive interests and aspirations of different groups is closer to 
the circumstances of impartiality than one in which all successful candidates 
have either to have money or to be acceptable to those who have it.   
 
(Barry: 1989: 347) 
 
The extent of impartiality and equality found in these circumstances provides an 
answer to how just a given society is.  
This second approach is not concerned with deriving abstract principles, but is 
concerned with how the abstract principles derived by the a priori approach fare in 
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actual societies. The central thought is to investigate to what extent the institutions of 
actual societies can be said to express the ideals of these abstract a priori principles. 
This is necessary in order to say something more determinate than just that slavery is 
unjust. Barry calls this second approach the „empirical method‟ (Barry: 1989: 347), 
and it is a departure from the original Scanlonian contractualism which simply relied 
on what could be derived directly from the hypothetical contract situation based on 
reason. The empirical method has two important features. First, it is based on 
empirical evidence. Moral truths and unjust/just schemes are based on how 
impartiality fares in specific societal contexts. It proposes that it is possible to say 
something accurate about justice. This leads to the second feature: it provides 
substantive answers to questions of justice. By applying the empirical method, the idea 
one arrives at determines answers about the just distribution of rights and economic 
resources. Thus, if the empirical method works, this approach will, to a large extent, 
determine what is just or unjust.  
However, invoking the empirical approach does not clarify the meaning of 
reasonableness. For Barry, the empirical method seeks to identify to what extent the 
actual institutions and workings of a society are impartial. It is precisely in such an 
enterprise that it becomes difficult to assign a precise meaning to what justice requires 
because it is not entirely clear that it is possible to identify how impartiality in, for 
example, the relations between employers and employees actually ought to be 
conceptualized. As we have seen, it is unreasonable to claim that women are inferior 
to men, but it is not clearly unreasonable to claim that treatment as equals does not 
involve special representation in parliament. Similarly, it is unreasonable to argue in 
favour of a general principle giving employers exclusive rights to determine the 
relationship between employers and employees, but it is not clear that impartiality 
necessarily requires strong unions (although, it often seems plausible) to create a 
balance between the two parties. The important point here of course is not whether or 
not unions are required to level the playing field between labour and capital, but rather 
to note that the claim that justice requires unions or special representation for women 
relies on substantive arguments and is not something which can be decided a priori 
through abstract reasoning in the Scanlonian original position. The empirical method 
is therefore bound to rely on a wide range of controversial empirical and substantive 
arguments.  
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For justice as impartiality to derive clear and unambiguous answers to the 
questions Barry asks in the quote above a precise meaning must be attached to what is 
meant by reasonableness. The two examples above show that it is relatively clear what 
reasonableness means at an abstract and general level, but as soon as one asks what it 
means in particular and practical cases it is unclear, and it may be possible to find 
reasons on both sides of the issue that appear reasonable. What justice requires, 
therefore, seems to be relatively clear in the abstract, but as soon as one moves to 
actual and particular cases it soon becomes blurred and unclear.  
This difficulty is not only present in justice as impartiality, but is also found in 
contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy more generally. Some of the most 
important disagreements between liberal political philosophers concern not whether 
justice requires the protection of certain rights and a democratic political order, but 
exactly what rights and what kind of democratic order. Many of the important debates 
are about such issues as whether equal treatment of women and religion involves 
banning headscarves in schools and the use of religious symbols in public. The 
disagreement is over what is reasonable in this particular case, not whether women 
and religions ought to be treated as equals and impartially.  
The same applies to a wide range of other issues, too. Does impartial and equal 
treatment of ethnic minorities require that we assign them group specific rights and 
special representation in parliament? This is how the discussion goes on in many 
issues related to social justice and multiculturalism. The crucial issue in many of these 
debates is what justice requires, rather than what justice is. Since so many of the 
important debates are precisely about what justice requires, it is important to the 
analysis of the relationship between general and abstract principles and practical and 
particular cases to see how the general and abstract informs the particular and how we 
move from one level to the other.  
A second question this issue raises is over the scope of justice. Barry‟s 
distinction between the a priori and the empirical method puts stress on exactly this 
ambiguity in political philosophy and that is what makes his theory of justice an 
interesting starting point to explore this issue in detail. It is important to acknowledge 
that this philosophical ambiguity is not the only element that needs to be explored 
when analysing what justice requires. Another, and equally important element, is the 
political implications of the theory. That is to ask what kind of political structures are 
required by justice. This question is important in determining the scope of justice and 
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also in ascertaining what kind of institutions justice requires and how these institutions 
ought to work. Along similar lines to the ambiguity discussed above, the idea that 
justice requires a democratic order is not controversial, but exactly what type of 
democracy and what justice requires of democracy are questions that are as disputed 
as is the question of what justice requires in terms of public policies. Examples of such 
disputed issues are debates about whether democracy ought to be organized around 
deliberative practices and models of democracy where participation and consensus 
play an important role, or whether democracy ought to emphasize procedures and 
majority rule. To explore the scope of justice and its political implications, it is 
important to start with an analysis of what justice requires. The next section starts this 
exploration by outlining what justice as impartiality seems to require.  
 
2. Two Requirements of Justice as Impartiality 
The previous section pointed out the intimate relationship between Scanlon‟s 
contractualism and justice as impartiality. Scanlon‟s theory can in many ways be said 
to be made less demanding by Barry‟s adaptations. We saw especially that this was 
the case with the understanding of reasonableness. Furthermore, the aim of Scanlon‟s 
theory was moral wrongness in general, while justice as impartiality aims to address 
the issue of how peaceful co-existence is possible given widespread disagreement over 
how to live. This is the purpose of the theory, but still we saw that the distinction 
between the a priori and the empirical approach created two ambiguities in 
establishing what peaceful co-existence would entail. The first ambiguity was how to 
connect the a priori and the empirical approach. The second ambiguity was concerned 
with the scope of justice. Given these ambiguities, the aim of this section is to 
examine in more detail what justice as impartiality requires. 
I will argue in this section that a liberal theory of justice - like justice as 
impartiality - has two main requirements. The first is that it requires a democratic 
order. This is clear from the emphasis on proceduralism, and the importance attached 
to the requirement that a political order be justifiable to everyone. The second 
requirement is that justice as impartiality demands that the basic rights of each person 
are protected through a system of fundamental rights. Furthermore, these two 
requirements are closely linked to the scope of justice and the notion of impartiality 
underlying justice as impartiality. A second aim of this section is to tie the two 
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requirements to the crucial distinction in justice as impartiality between first-order and 
second-order impartiality and the scope of justice.  
I begin with the scope of justice, which, Barry says, „do[es] not apply to all 
political questions but only to those involving what we may call “constitutional 
essentials‟” (Barry: 1995: 144). Constitutional essentials are meant to secure a 
person‟s basic rights and liberties. What is outside the scope of justice as impartiality 
are „much tax legislation and many laws regulating property; statutes protecting the 
environment and controlling pollution; establishing national parks and preserving 
wilderness areas and animal and plant species; and laying aside funds for museums 
and the arts‟ (Barry: 1995 144).10 Although these issues are outside the scope of 
justice that does not mean a theory cannot say anything about them. Instead, what it 
means is that on these issues there is a range of possible outcomes consistent with 
justice and that justice as impartiality does not prescribe particular outcomes (although 
it would proscribe those outcomes that are outside the range permitted by the theory). 
It is difficult to define this range in detail, but an important task of this thesis is to 
suggest some indicative boundaries. (Chapter four offers a framework for 
understanding the role of reason and Chapter seven discusses some implications 
regarding social justice and the role of group rights). Barry holds that the typical rules 
and principles laid down in a constitution include 
 
agreement on the desirability of the usual guarantees against detention without 
trial, torture of suspects, and so on. Constitutions also need to lay down the 
basic rules defining the workings of the political system so as to remove them 
from the reach of governments and legislative majorities, which have an 
obvious interest in manipulating the rules in order to perpetuate their own 
tenure. Freedom of speech and freedom of political organization are also best 
thought of as an aspect of a satisfactory political decision-making process. 
 
 (Barry: 1995: 85)  
 
In these quotations, we see that justice covers only a limited number of questions and 
is restricted to securing basic rights and describing the workings of the political 
system. Other issues are left to ordinary politics. However, the constitution also puts 
limits on legislative bodies and majorities who might have an interest in manipulating 
the political process. Thus, the scope of justice as impartiality is restricted to 
                                                 
10
 Barry follows here the same distinction as made by John Rawls in Political Liberalism, p. 214. 
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„constitutional essentials‟ securing basic rights and restricting majority-rule. In 
addition, this scope is restricted to only a few issues; all other issues are open to the 
ordinary course of politics. Given the emphasis in the previous section on deliberation 
and proceduralism we also see that democracy is given an important role in the theory.  
One way in which democracy is constrained is through judicial review.
11
 This 
means that the democratic process does not rely only on majority-rule, but is 
supplemented with procedures or institutions that aim to protect fundamental rights 
such as freedom of religion. Following this, the role of the constitution is to „set out 
some constraints on the operation of the legal system and … lay down the 
fundamentals of the political system‟ (Barry: 1995: 94). This means that the scope of 
justice is restricted to such constitutional essentials while other issues are primarily 
questions of ordinary politics rather than questions of justice. 
Regarding the status of the abstract principles of social justice, it is clear that 
these are not constitutional essentials and cannot be subject to judicial review because  
 
courts are wholly unsuited for the kinds of judgement that are needed. For 
what is at stake in any given society includes (to mention only some of the 
most obvious) the form of economic organization (private ownership, public 
ownership, workers‟ cooperatives, and so on), the system of taxes on income, 
inheritance and gifts, and the basis on which cash transfers are made. These 
are, if anything is, the stuff of politics.  
 
(Barry: 1995: 95)  
 
The important point to note here is that questions not suitable for judicial review are 
those concerning „the overall level of expenditure and the general organization of the 
service‟. These issues „are more suited to the government and legislature, even when 
they too involve questions of justice‟ (Barry: 1995: 98). Judicial review has a role to 
play concerning how „principles such as non-discrimination, equal educational 
opportunity and equal access to health care‟ are implemented (Barry: 1995: 98). Thus, 
for justice as impartiality it is acceptable that „the French choose to fund children 
heavily and pensioners less generously while the Germans have very generous 
pensions but less generous child benefits‟ (Barry: 1995: 97). We see from this that 
                                                 
11
 I will here and throughout this thesis understand judicial review in a wide and non-technical way by 
referring to judicial review merely as a practice where the judiciary interprets the law in accordance 
with the constitution (and can thus strike down laws that are unconstitutional). 
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justice as impartiality allocates a limited (but important) role to the judiciary, and 
leaves wide scope for societies to decide many issues regarding justice through 
democratic decision-making.  
Not all democratic theorists share this less comprehensive view. Some argue 
instead that justice not only requires social and welfare rights to be included in the 
constitution, but also that democracy requires this. A notable example is the recent 
democratic contractualism proposed by Corey Brettschneider in which the claim is 
made that democracy requires that all  citizens „are entitled to have their basic needs 
met‟ (2007: 130). This gives rise to welfare rights such as a right to a job, universal 
basic income and a right to in-kind resources to cover basic needs (Brettschneider: 
2007: 128). Justice as impartiality resists this move for the reasons given above. These 
issues are the „stuff of politics‟, and thus the stuff of democracy. 
Nonetheless, even if justice as impartiality only seeks to constitutionalize 
fundamental rights, and not social rights, this is still contentious. Many democratic 
theorists hold that invoking fundamental rights outside the reach of democracy 
denigrates the idea of democracy itself. Robert A. Dahl, for example, argues that 
introducing a set of fundamental rights outside the reach of politics is essentially 
guardianship and rule by the wise, which undermines the idea of democracy itself 
(1989: 163-175). Similar thoughts enjoy a prominent role in the works of a wide range 
of other influential democratic theorists like Jeremy Waldron (1999), John Dryzek 
(2000), and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996) (among others).  
Another version of this criticism is to reject a strong legal constitution based on 
judicial review and instead emphasize a political constitution (Bellamy: 2007). This 
approach is more in line with the accounts given by the democratic theorists 
mentioned above. It takes seriously the challenges posed by unrestricted majority rule 
and argues that judicial review instead of supporting democracy undermines 
democracy. The solution is to strengthen the institutions and the workings of the 
democratic system instead of resorting to extra-democratic schemes such as judicial 
review. The tension these theorists see with fundamental rights outside the reach of 
politics is that such rights are ones on which the people have not had the chance to 
vote, or to decide whether they think the political system ought to include them.   
This, the critics argue, undermines democracy because it denigrates the idea of 
the people as sovereign. Given the importance of a legitimate political order justifiable 
to everyone, for liberals this criticism, if correct, has devastating implications for the 
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idea of fundamental rights. Not only does it put pressure on the plausibility of a liberal 
constitutionalist order, but it also puts pressure on the relationship between justice and 
democracy. There seems to be a deep tension between the idea of justice understood as 
a set of fundamental rights and a democratic order based on the idea of the people as a 
legitimate source of political authority. This is a much debated and notorious tension 
between liberal constitutionalists and democratic theorists, and I will pursue this 
debate in greater detail in Chapter six. 
So far in this section, I have pointed out that justice as impartiality emphasizes 
basic individual rights such as freedom of religion, the integrity of the person and 
equal political rights within a democratic context. In addition, democracy is allocated 
an important role in that most issues, apart from the constitutional essentials, are 
within the scope of politics rather than the scope of justice. Thus, the scope of justice 
seems to be limited, while the scope of politics remains relatively wide.  In the 
remaining part of this section, I will discuss in more detail how one can distinguish 
between questions that belong primarily within the scope of justice and questions that 
belong primarily to the realm of politics. 
An important distinction in this respect is between first-order and second-order 
impartiality. It is important to discuss this distinction as it cuts across the fierce debate 
between partialists and impartialists that has been central to much recent moral 
theory.
12
 Two of the central questions in this debate have been: 1) whether impartiality 
has implausible consequences, i.e., demands impartiality in all situations by 
individuals, and 2) whether impartiality makes personal relations difficult, i.e., by 
requiring us to treat strangers and friends on the same terms (Becker: 1991). If justice 
as impartiality demands impartiality in all situations and requires that strangers ought 
to be treated on the same terms as friends, the theory seems to have implausible and 
intrusive implications. First-order impartiality is interpreted to require that faced with 
the choice between saving one‟s wife or the archbishop of Cambray from a burning 
house, impartiality requires one to consider who to save impartially and not take into 
consideration that one of the persons happens to be one‟s wife (Godwin: 1985). 
However, I believe that the distinction between first-order and second-order 
impartiality can show that such implications do not follow from this theory:  
 
                                                 
12
 See the following for some important contributions to this debate: Baron (1991), Deigh (1991), 
Friedman (1989), Kekes (1981), Mendus (2002). 
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What the theory of justice as impartiality calls for are principles and rules that 
are capable of forming the basis of free agreement on reasonable terms. If we 
call impartiality in this context second-order impartiality, we can contrast it 
with first-order impartiality, which is a requirement of impartial behaviour 
incorporated into a precept. Roughly speaking, behaving impartially here 
means not being motivated by private considerations. This is often cashed out 
by claiming that to be impartial you must not do to one person what you would 
not do for anybody else in a similar situation. Where your being a friend or 
relative of one but not the other is excluded from counting as a relevant 
difference. 
 
(Barry: 1995: 11) 
 
This distinction is important for several reasons. First, the aim of justice as 
impartiality is the justification of political institutions, not the justification of 
individual action. The tenets of the theory apply to the institutions of government and 
the officials representing it. They do not apply to all individual actions, but leave a 
wide scope for individual discretion. If the theory prescribed a certain conduct for 
persons in every situation, the theory would itself be a conception of the good and 
hence not impartial. To ensure that people have adequate ability to pursue their own 
conceptions of the good, and because the scope of justice is restricted to constitutional 
essentials, justice does not require strict first-order impartiality. It is mainly in relation 
to issues of public concern that strict impartiality is required. This means, for example, 
that different religions ought to be treated on equal terms and receive the same 
benefits and obligations and that important government contracts ought not to be 
awarded on the basis of religious or ethnic affiliation. 
Even if it is not clear from the brief outline of this distinction exactly how 
justice as impartiality draws the line between first-order and second-order impartiality, 
it is clear that the scope of first-order impartiality is limited and does not set out a 
moral ideal covering a wide range of issues and aspects of one‟s life. The burden of 
first-order impartiality is mainly an institutional burden and a burden for those 
individuals occupying public roles within the institutional framework of public 
institutions. It is not a moral ideal for individuals regulating most or all aspects of their 
lives. The distinction between first- and second-order impartiality tries to define a 
framework in which individuals and groups of individuals can realize their moral 
ideals without being unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged.  
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In fact, justice as impartiality firmly rejects the idea of basing public policy or 
public institutions on a moral ideal (apart from a strict ideal of impartiality between 
conceptions of the good). Indeed, this limited understanding of the range of first-order 
impartiality differentiates justice as impartiality from other versions of liberalism. 
Some liberals (such as, for example, Will Kymlicka (1989), Joseph Raz (1986) and 
Bruce Ackermann (1980)) have argued that the foundational value of liberalism is an 
ideal of moral autonomy. Autonomy constituted, for example, an important part of 
John Stuart Mill‟s liberalism, and Mill stressed the importance of promoting 
individuality (autonomy), which he understood as the individual‟s ability to engage in 
independent thinking and self-determination over his or her own life. This belief 
informed both The Subjection of Women and On Liberty. Perhaps the most prominent 
liberal proponent of autonomy in contemporary political philosophy is Joseph Raz, 
who explicitly acknowledges his debt to Mill (Raz: 1986: 367-373). Liberalism based 
on autonomy is often called perfectionistic because it upholds certain moral ideals and 
argues in favour of the realization of personal autonomy for individuals. This ideal is 
not impartial between autonomy and non-autonomous conceptions of the good and 
violates the idea of impartiality. A controversial feature of autonomy as a moral ideal 
is that  
 
a conception of the good as autonomy does not imply that the pursuit of all 
substantive conceptions of the good is equally valuable. Only those 
conceptions that have the right origins – those that have come about in ways 
that meet the criteria for self-determined belief – can form a basis for activity 
that has value. It is therefore unlikely that the good as autonomy will be 
advanced by distributing resources in a way that takes no account of the 
autonomous or non-autonomous origins of people‟s substantive conceptions of 
the good. 
 
(Barry: 1995: 131-132)   
 
Instead, justice as impartiality has a more restrictive view of autonomy: „all that the 
theory of justice as impartiality insists on is that the decision should be the outcome of 
a fair political process. There is thus nothing built into justice as impartiality that leads 
to its endorsing policy prescriptions derived from a conception of the good as 
autonomy. It is procedurally neutral‟ (Barry: 1995: 132). This underlines how the 
procedural aspects of justice as impartiality aim to be neutral between different 
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conceptions of the good, and notice here that what Barry has in mind is the idea of 
autonomy as a moral ideal. An autonomy based version of liberalism would restrict 
the scope of acceptable outcomes to those encouraging autonomy. This contrast shows 
that the scope of first-order impartiality in justice as impartiality imposes weaker 
restrictions on acceptable outcomes than are imposed by other versions of liberalism.  
Despite the controversial role of autonomy in liberalism, it has played a 
foundational role in some recent theories of democracy. For example, Robert E. 
Goodin who „presupposes individuals who are autonomous‟ and claims that 
democracy on his view „is essentially a matter of treating those autonomous 
individuals with equal consideration and respect‟ (2003: 23). Another example is 
Thomas Christiano‟s highly egalitarian theory, which is strongly in the spirit of John 
Stuart Mill. With reference to Mill, Christiano argues that democratic societies are 
more likely than other societies to yield just outcomes and thus concludes that „the 
tendency will be towards convergence‟ (1996: 83). These remarks are clearly close to 
the Enlightenment ideal of appealing to a universal notion of reason that is based on 
an ideal of autonomy and a belief that the use of human reason will lead to a 
convergence of reason and truth. It has been central in this thesis to reject such a 
strong and controversial understanding of Enlightenment liberalism and, in line with 
the rejection of autonomy as a moral ideal, these two democratic theories are too 
strong for justice as impartiality. Even if some convergence is needed it should not be 
based on a controversial moral ideal such as autonomy. Instead, it is necessary to rely 
on a somewhat weaker understanding of reason to ground a theory of democracy 
compatible with liberal legitimacy and pluralism. 
To sum up the discussion: justice as impartiality applies to constitutional 
essentials. It emphasizes impartiality between different conceptions of the good, and 
rejects an ideal of autonomy, although autonomy as such is compatible with the 
theory. In addition, the theory relies on a key distinction between first-order and 
second-order impartiality. This distinction is important because if the theory required 
impartiality in all moral questions, it would cease to be impartial, and instead would 
depend upon a conception of the good by virtue of putting forward a moral ideal for 
every aspect of life. This is not the ambition of justice as impartiality, which aims only 
to describe the appropriate ground rules for people with different conceptions of the 
good who need to coexist peacefully.  
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The interpretation I have offered in this section holds that justice as 
impartiality requires two things of a political system: (1) a set of fundamental rights 
and (2) a democratic order. The substantive implications are limited and mainly 
confined to the set of fundamental rights derivable from the Scanlonian original 
position. This seems to put into question the role of the empirical approach discussed 
earlier in this chapter. According to that approach, justice as impartiality may generate 
detailed substantive policies and be applied to assess the impartiality of a range of 
institutions and principles governing society. 
Now we have an overview of the main tenets of justice as impartiality. To 
make the picture of this theory complete the next section broadens the perspective and 
shifts the focus to the political implications of this theory. These implications are 
developed more fully by Barry in Culture and Equality (CE) and Why Social Justice 
Matters (WSJM). These works rest on the contractual framework developed in justice 
as impartiality and articulate in more detail the implications of this approach in 
controversial cases such as what equality of opportunity requires and the limits of 
freedom of religion and group specific rights for ethnic and cultural minorities. 
Considering the implications of justice as impartiality for these cases will, I believe, 
shed light on the scope of justice as impartiality. 
 
3. Political Implications: Social Justice and Group Rights  
Both CE and WSJM are in different ways linked with justice as impartiality. CE 
shares its intellectual roots with justice as impartiality, while WSJM aims to use the 
idea of reasonable rejectability as it was developed in justice as impartiality to derive 
specific principles of social justice. I start this section with a brief introduction to these 
later works and to the way in which they are linked to the earlier work. As will be 
clear, my analysis of the proposals in these two later works questions the extent to 
which Barry‟s practical proposals can really be claimed to be derivable from justice as 
impartiality. This observation underlines the difficulties that arise when we move from 
the general to the specific in terms of what justice implies. I end this section with a 
discussion that aims both to show that the implications of justice as impartiality are 
ambiguous and to illustrate the dilemma of convergence and divergence of reason that 
was central to the argument of the previous chapter. In this respect, justice as 
impartiality embodies both weak and strong elements reflecting the weak and strong 
versions of liberal theorizing discussed in the previous chapter. If it is possible to 
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arrive at a clearer understanding of the role of reason in justice as impartiality, then 
this will yield valuable insights not only important for how to understand justice as 
impartiality, but also for the understanding of reason in liberalism more generally. 
Trying to clarify further the understanding of reason in justice as impartiality will be 
the focus of the next chapter. 
 In CE, Barry aimed to refute many of the ideas and policies associated with 
multiculturalism and to show how a liberal egalitarian approach can either 
accommodate or reject the claims made on behalf of multiculturalism. Underlying this 
approach is a faith in a universal notion of reason and a firm belief in the ideals of the 
Enlightenment that CE shares with justice as impartiality. An underlying premise of 
justice as impartiality was the rejection of the view that the „Enlightenment project of 
addressing the reason of every human being of sound mind was a gigantic error‟ 
(exemplified by postmodern ironists such as Richard Rorty and community and 
tradition oriented philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre) (Barry: 1995: 3-4). CE seeks 
to continue the defence of the Enlightenment project; Barry describes the book as 
„constitute[ing] a defence of it [the Enlightenment]‟ (Barry: 2001: 16). The 
Enlightenment project is understood by Barry to be concerned with the justification of 
political institutions by reference to general principles that can be acknowledged by all 
human beings of sound mind (Barry: 2001: 16). Both justice as impartiality and CE 
share this common starting point and both aim to justify institutions and policies by 
reference to reason rather than traditions and shared beliefs. Both can therefore be said 
to engage in the same project. 
In WSJM, Barry‟s discussion of how social justice can be realized is not 
directly concerned with the Enlightenment, but is still closely linked to justice as 
impartiality. Barry says that „a very elaborate chain of argument‟ is not necessary „to 
show that the principles appealed to in this book [WSJM] satisfy the „reasonable 
rejectability‟ test put forward in Justice as Impartiality‟ (Barry: 2005: ix). 
Consequently, this means that the conclusions reached in WSJM are compatible with 
justice as impartiality, and although they are different projects, both belong within the 
same theoretical framework. We can see from this that the later works are both 
somehow engaged in the same project as justice as impartiality either through 
adopting some of the same foundational premises or through applying the same 
theoretical framework to derive conclusions. My discussion of these two works will 
mainly focus on equality of opportunity and the status of group rights. Both these 
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issues have been controversial among political philosophers and in politics and thus 
they serve as good examples to judge the implications of justice as impartiality.  
Consider first Barry‟s views on exemptions and group specific rights as 
outlined in CE. Multicultural critics of liberalism have argued that universal rights 
may accommodate the majority satisfactorily, but minorities and marginalised groups 
require special accommodation and special rights to acquire the same status as the 
majority in modern liberal democracies. Especially well known is Iris Marion Young‟s 
claim that universal citizenship of the type advocated by liberal egalitarians, such as 
John Rawls and Brian Barry (among others), is unable to accommodate minorities and 
marginalised groups in society (Young: 1989). Consequently, this has given rise to 
arguments in favour of differentiated citizenship rights (Kymlicka: 1995 and Young: 
1989). Another claim frequently made is that liberals „absolutize liberalism‟ by 
dividing „all ways of life into liberal and nonliberal, equate the latter with illiberal, and 
talk of tolerating and rarely of respecting or cherishing them‟ (Parekh: 2003: 240). 
Although multiculturalism is a diverse concept, many of the claims made by different 
defenders of multiculturalism share a concern for different minority groups (religious, 
ethnic and marginalised groups) and for the problems these groups face because the 
universal rights granted by liberal egalitarians are inadequate for improving their 
position in society and securing them justice. 
A question related to the rights of minorities that has troubled both politicians 
and political philosophers has been the legitimacy of exemptions granted to cultural, 
religious and ethnic minorities from generally applicable laws. Liberals have in 
general been reluctant to grant such exemptions to groups partly because they see such 
rights as offering certain groups privileges and also because the set of universal 
citizenship rights is supposed to cover the needs of all citizens including minority and 
marginalized groups. This concern ties in with the ideal that Barry associates with the 
Enlightenment – the ideal of justifying political institutions through an appeal to 
universal reason. From this ambition arises a suspicion of group rights precisely 
because the set of universal citizenship rights is intended to support and address the 
needs of all individuals. Therefore, exemptions are „anomalies to be tolerated because 
the cure would be worse than the disease. But they provide no support for any 
extension to new cases… the current exemptions were a mistake that is awaiting 
rectification at an opportune time, so it would be absurd to add to their number in the 
meanwhile‟ (Barry: 2001: 51). For Barry, then, exemptions may be permitted, but are 
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considered as pragmatic and necessary anomalies. At any rate, this shows that the 
scope for exemptions is present, but severely limited. Similarly, if groups cannot be 
granted exemptions from generally applicable rules, the room for granting groups 
differentiated citizenship rights is equally limited.
13
 
This uncompromising attitude towards exemptions is in striking contrast to the 
importance justice as impartiality attached to proceduralism in earlier sections. When 
there was disagreement over what was a reasonable public policy we saw that justice 
as impartiality emphasized the importance of fair and democratic procedures to reach 
a decision. Moreover, the scope of justice underlined the same concern; it was 
confined to constitutional essentials. However, what we see here in the case of 
exemptions and group specific rights is that instead of relying on the democratic 
process to decide what is reasonable or not, the theory itself provides the answer to 
what justice requires. Judging from this example, justice as impartiality is not only 
concerned with constitutional essentials, but also determines what justice requires at a 
very detailed level.  
On the position Barry adopts in CE, justice has not only the procedural and 
weak substantive implications already discussed, but also strong substantive 
implications about the content of generally applicable laws. This seems to justify the 
worry expressed by the democratic theorists mentioned in the previous section who 
disagreed on principle with the idea of extra-democratic substantive rights attached to 
the democratic system. This obviously puts into question the relationship between 
justice as impartiality and CE, as the former does not seem to underwrite the policies 
suggested in the latter. Since justice as impartiality emphasized constitutional 
essentials, proceduralism, and peaceful coexistence so strongly it is even more 
surprising to notice the shift from justice as impartiality to CE.  
Moreover, in the previous section we saw how justice as impartiality - through 
the distinction between first-order and second-order impartiality - had weak 
implications regarding specific outcomes. The theory aimed instead to offer a 
framework for making it possible for people with different conceptions of the good to 
live peacefully together, and an important part of that was the emphasis put on fair and 
impartial political procedures. The impression was that the theory was mainly 
                                                 
13
 Barry can be interpreted as more hospitable to exemptions than the impression given above. See 
Festenstein (2005: 109-118) for a careful and detailed examination of Barry‟s position. However, in the 
end, as acknowledged by Festenstein, it seems „that Barry‟s response fails to deal with the rationale for 
claims for difference-sensitive rights and policies (2005: 114). 
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concerned with securing constitutional essentials such as freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech, not with detailed outcomes regarding public policy. The 
impression that one gets from CE is that justice as impartiality does have strong 
substantive implications, and this is a worry to some democratic theorists as it 
suggests that substantive principles of justice and their alleged implications trump 
democracy in a liberal constitutionalist political order. Not only is Barry‟s view on 
group specific rights controversial in itself, but the important point to emphasize here 
is that it has implications for the place of democracy in a Barryian liberal state. 
Similar substantive implications appear to apply to the understanding of the 
ideal of equality of opportunity, too. In the contemporary debate, equality of 
opportunity is often understood in one of two ways: either as referring to levelling the 
playing field, which means redressing inequalities in education, income and standard 
of living among different social groups, or as simply referring to non-discrimination, 
which means that positions and offices ought to be open to all, regardless of sex, race, 
sexuality and class-background, etc.
14
 On this issue Barry argues in favour of a radical 
understanding of what levelling the playing field requires, and he claims that this is of 
utmost importance in realizing justice.  
This case offers a second example of how the alleged substantive implications 
of justice as impartiality are at odds with the procedural framework developed in 
justice as impartiality. The procedural framework of justice as impartiality does not 
deliver a strong understanding of equality of opportunity, but that is precisely what 
Barry argues follows from the reasonable rejectability thesis that is at its foundation. A 
strong understanding of equality of opportunity is not necessarily at odds with the 
procedural framework, but it does not at all follow as a requirement. Despite this 
important distinction, Barry assumes in WSJM that a strong notion of equality of 
opportunity necessarily arises from justice as impartiality. 
 Equality of opportunity has been one of the most important issues of social 
justice for some time, and it constitutes one of the main pillars of social justice for 
liberal egalitarians such as Barry. Moreover, it is a principle with a great deal of 
support among politicians, voters and political philosophers alike. One reason why 
this principle matters so much is that: 
                                                 
14
 See John Roemer (1998) for a discussion of this understanding of equality of opportunity. See also 
Andrew Mason (2001 and 2006) for detailed discussions of the role of equality of opportunity in 
political philosophy.  
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Children start with, and grow up with, an enormous variety of different 
resources. On the basis of just a few facts about a child, such as its social class 
and its race or ethnicity, we can make a good prediction of where it will finish 
up in the distribution of earnings, the likelihood that it will spend time in jail, 
and many other outcomes, good and bad. 
 
(Barry: 2005: 41) 
 
On Barry‟s view, different starting points and wide inequalities have a cumulative 
effect and they result in, for example, wide differences in life expectancy. For 
example, males in the poorest areas of Oslo (Norway) can on average expect to live 68 
years, while males in the more affluent parts of Oslo can expect to live at least 80 
years. This shows that the life expectancy for the least advantaged in one of the 
wealthiest and most egalitarian societies is actually similar to the life expectancy only 
found in some of the poorest countries in the world, such as, Vietnam, where the 
average life expectancy for males is roughly the same as for males in the poorest parts 
of Oslo.
15
 Life expectancy can be more equal within poor societies such as Vietnam 
compared with more wealthy societies, which implies that they are in a sense more 
egalitarian.  
Although different life expectancies can be the result of different choices and 
not only of unequal opportunities, the differences in life expectancy between wealthy 
and poor parts of a society indicate that the living standards between rich and poor 
groups are wide. Liberal egalitarians claim that in societies where, for example, it is 
possible for affluent parents to give their children advantages (compared with less 
affluent parents) in competition for places in higher education there is a serious 
injustice. The children of less affluent parents start with disadvantages not faced by 
their more affluent competitors for jobs and places in higher education. Because these 
children (or their parents for that matter) did not choose to be born into these more 
unfortunate circumstances, these inequalities are undeserved and irrelevant from a 
moral point of view. Consequently, justice requires of us that society seeks to 
ameliorate such inequalities so children of affluent and less affluent parents can have 
the same opportunities available to them.  
                                                 
11
 http://www.ssb.no/ssp/utg/200506/03/. Report on inequalities of life expectancy by Statistics 
Norway. 
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For liberal egalitarians - as we saw in chapter one - a significant distinction 
when it comes to equality of opportunity is between choice and circumstance. The 
central idea is that those who through their own deliberate choice make poor decisions 
contributing towards lower life expectancies or reducing the opportunities available to 
them must be considered to be responsible for these decisions and thus must bear the 
costs of them if they made these decisions from an initial state of equality of 
opportunity. If, in contrast, they were simply born into more unfortunate 
circumstances that offered them fewer resources and opportunities, then they should 
not be held responsible for these inequalities or be expected to bear the full 
consequences of these unchosen circumstances. To level the playing field, it is 
necessary to identify the circumstances of different groups and persons and see which 
parts are choice and which are circumstance dependent. Through complex technical 
schemes, some theorists have tried to differentiate between inequalities due to 
people‟s choices or circumstances (see, e.g., Roemer: 1998). The rationale for such 
exercises is that inequalities based on different choices do not require rectification, 
while inequalities based on unfortunate circumstances do.  
 Although Barry is aware of the choice/circumstance distinction (Barry: 1991), 
he has a different approach to the requirements of justice. Instead of relying on a 
highly technical (and perhaps fruitless) debate to reach an answer as to what justice 
requires in terms of equality of opportunity, he instead leans on the findings of social 
science regarding social inequalities. To reduce the impact of different starting points 
Barry argues that „the first demand of social justice is to change the environments in 
which children are born and grow up so as to make them as equal as possible, and this 
includes (though it is by no means confined to) approximate material equality among 
families‟ (Barry: 2005: 58). A second demand „is that the entire system of social 
intervention, starting as early as is feasible, should be devoted to compensating, as far 
as possible, for environmental disadvantages‟ (Barry: 2005: 58). Thus, equality of 
opportunity demands equalization in two ways: equalizing children‟s environments as 
much as possible, and the state should intervene as early as possible and as far as 
possible to compensate and nullify environmental disadvantages.  
This strong interpretation of what equality of opportunity requires raises 
uncertainty about the scope of justice. Recall from the previous section that social 
justice was not a constitutional essential, and that standards of social justice were „the 
stuff of politics‟. From the perspective of the empirical method, it is clear that most 
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current societies – even among wealthy and relatively egalitarian societies such as 
Norway – are far from realizing equality of opportunity. Part of the problem here is 
that many inequalities run very deep. These inequalities require far-reaching measures 
to equalize the environment of children. Hence, to follow the logic expressed in the 
empirical method, where the aim is to compare actual practices with the ideal, what is 
required is to equalize as early as possible and as far as possible. This strong 
interpretation of what equality of opportunity requires raises uncertainty about the 
scope of justice because it increases the scope of first-order impartiality. The strong 
interpretation of equality of opportunity would involve the scope of justice extending 
wider than merely constitutional essentials and the basic framework for democratic 
politics. The strong interpretation of equality of opportunity implies that children‟s 
environments should be equalized as early as possible and environmental inequalities 
should be compensated for as far as possible. If this were the state‟s duty, it would 
extend the scope of first-order impartiality dramatically as it would widen the scope of 
justice to go far beyond its defined scope in justice as impartiality.  
However, such an increase in the scope of first-order impartiality is at odds 
with the idea that justice is restricted to constitutional essentials and a set of fair 
procedures for public decision-making. Such an increase in first-order impartiality 
might also have intrusive implications for how most people understand family life and 
the upbringing of children. The demands of equality of opportunity would affect 
family life in quite detailed ways and would undermine the family‟s sense of control 
over its own destiny. If such consequences follow, the strong interpretation of equality 
of opportunity not only seems not to be required by justice as impartiality, but is 
actually in conflict with justice as impartiality‟s commitments to the distinction 
between first-order and second-order impartiality and the scope of justice. This 
analysis underlines the difficulty highlighted earlier regarding the difficulty of moving 
between general a priori principles and the specific details of how these principles are 
realized. 
 To sum up the discussion, both examples discussed in this section are at odds 
with the presentation of justice as impartiality in the previous section as offering a 
defence of fundamental rights and a democratic order. The two examples discussed 
here suggest instead that the scope of justice goes far beyond these two requirements, 
and not only prescribes the basic rules for the political system and social cooperation, 
but also determines legislation and social policy in detail. This gives us a different 
 97 
picture of what justice requires than the account that seemed plausible from the 
discussion of justice as impartiality in sections one and two. We are now facing two 
competing views of what justice requires. On the one hand, the scope of justice 
emphasizes democratic procedures and the protection of the set of fundamental rights 
found in justice as impartiality. On the other hand, included in the scope of justice are 
also detailed policies of a highly demanding character expressed in CE and WSJM. 
These two different views give rise to two entirely different sets of implications. The 
former view gives rise to a democratic political order where civil and political rights 
are protected as part of the constitution. The latter view includes both a democratic 
order and fundamental rights, but moves far beyond these in two important respects. 
First, justice restricts the content of generally applicable laws and, in effect, this means 
that justice puts significant limits on what counts as a legitimate reason in politics and 
legislation. Second, justice has implications for social policy and social rights, and 
social justice is not merely the stuff of politics, but is also the stuff of justice in a way 
that goes beyond the account in justice as impartiality. 
 One might say that these two views arise because of inconsistencies in justice 
as impartiality or between the theory and its application. For example, the discussion 
of the a priori and empirical method and the difficulty in moving from the general to 
the particular reveal that these two views are part of the theory from the outset, and it 
is therefore not surprising to find that there are inconsistencies between the theory and 
its application. Central to the theory‟s intention is to suggest a framework for 
resolving disagreement between different conceptions of the good. However, the 
empirical method goes further and wants to investigate and compare the general and a 
priori principles with the actual practices of a given society, and seek to bring the 
practices into line with the principles. The latter approach is more ambitious and seeks 
to arrive at definite answers as to what justice requires. In contrast, the former seems 
less ambitious, and leaves a wider range of questions to be settled through democratic 
decision-making. The tension arises from the fact that while the former approach relies 
on democracy to settle disputes, the latter assumes that the theory itself can settle 
many such disputes. In essence, the latter assumes a wider scope of justice than the 
former. Obviously, the theory cannot at the same time both claim that justice is 
restricted to constitutional essentials and that it can deliver answers that go far beyond 
the scope of constitutional essentials. 
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 Another way of putting this point is to say that the empirical approach 
presupposes that convergence can be reached on a wider set of issues than the 
interpretation associated with the a priori approach. The a priori method yields 
general principles, but leaves wide scope for their implementation in accordance with 
social and historical contingencies. In this respect, it accepts a diversity of reasons and 
a wide range of possible outcomes. The empirical method, in addition to the general 
principles, offers a more limited interpretation of them and leaves a narrow scope for 
their implementation. Instead of relying on proceduralism to resolve what justice 
requires, it limits the range of outcomes and requires convergence on what is 
reasonable. The contrast between the a priori and the empirical method can be 
distinguished in the following way. The a priori approach holds that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of what justice requires include fundamental rights and a 
democratic order. While the empirical method goes further and claims that the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of what justice requires include fundamental 
rights, a democratic order and significant substantive implications for multiculturalism 
and social justice.  
This leads us to ask which of the two interpretations is most plausible - the 
modest one or the ambitious one. This question can be re-formulated in the following 
way: does liberal justice require convergence or divergence of reason? The intentions 
of the theory and the a priori approach emphasize divergence, while the empirical 
method emphasizes convergence. What makes this into a question of great importance 
is that this is not only a question of significance for justice as impartiality, but as we 
saw in the previous chapter, it is also a question that is important for the understanding 
of contemporary liberal theorizing in general. Thus, it seems that justice as 
impartiality runs into exactly the same problems as the theories discussed in the 
previous chapter, and represents no improvement on the theories examined there. If it 
is not possible to make progress in any way on this issue, it seems that the notion of 
reason within contemporary liberal theories is not suited to satisfy the conditions of 
both liberal legitimacy and pluralism.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I outlined the central tenets of justice as impartiality and the underlying 
contractual theory on which it is based. From this framework, justice as impartiality 
has two main requirements: (1) justifying a set of fundamental rights, and (2) a 
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democratic order. In addition, the theory relies on two important distinctions. First, the 
theory distinguishes between first-order and second-order impartiality. Second, it 
distinguishes between the a priori and the empirical method. The a priori approach 
justifies general and abstract principles, while the empirical method goes further and 
justifies detailed policies and a limited scope for exemptions and group specific rights. 
The general impression to take away from the discussion of justice as impartiality is 
that it is a theory that leaves wide scope for democratic decision-making and is 
without many substantive and detailed substantive implications. Effectively, this limits 
the scope of justice to fundamental rights and a democratic order. 
 However, this promising impression was partly undermined when the alleged 
political implications were taken into account, and if this is the only way to understand 
the theory there are few reasons to be optimistic about the prospects of developing a 
liberal constitutional order satisfying liberal legitimacy and pluralism. Although the 
situation does not look promising for developing a liberal constitutionalist framework, 
I believe justice as impartiality contains many useful elements for building a liberal 
constitutional framework, such as the emphasis on proceduralism, the wide room for 
participation and deliberation, and the firm protection of fundamental rights. In the 
next chapter, I will investigate the possibilities of re-interpreting some of the 
controversial implications discussed in this chapter in a weaker and more modest way. 
If that investigation proves promising, the possibility of developing a liberal 
constitutionalist order satisfying liberal legitimacy and pluralism might have a better 
chance of succeeding. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Impartiality: Convergence or Divergence? 
 
If citizens deliberate when adequately informed… the general will would always result 
from the great number of slight differences, and the resolution would always be good. 
 
Jean Jacques Rousseau
16
 
 
Unfortunately, by now it should be clear that things are not as easy as Rousseau wants 
us to believe. What it means to be „adequately informed‟ depends on the stance we 
take on convergence and divergence of reason, and we have seen that both the ideas of 
„informed‟ and „reason/reasonable‟ easily escape clear and precise definition. The task 
of this chapter is to apply the insights from the analysis in the previous chapter to 
specify a more precise understanding of these terms in relation to justice as 
impartiality. If this can be accomplished it will strengthen the possibility for 
developing a liberal constitutional order satisfying liberal legitimacy and pluralism. I 
will start with a discussion of reason in justice as impartiality, and argue that 
understanding reason in a weaker and more modest way will guide us towards a more 
plausible interpretation of the theory. This means that the strong and uncompromising 
implications discussed in the previous chapter are not required by the theory. 
I will argue in section two that it is necessary to distinguish between what 
justice requires and what is consistent with justice. What justice requires are 
fundamental rights and a democratic order. The implications discussed in the previous 
chapter can be consistent with justice under certain circumstances, but are by no 
means required in the same way as fundamental rights and democracy. By invoking 
this distinction – the distinction between what justice requires and what is consistent 
with justice – the notion of reason is weakened and brought back in line with the 
modest and procedural emphasis that was an attraction of justice as impartiality in the 
first place. In section three, I will elaborate on the distinction between first-order and 
second-order impartiality. This distinction is vital if we are to place limits on the use 
of political power and to ensure that justice does not require impartiality in every 
situation. An important point regarding this distinction is that the way it is drawn aims 
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 The Social Contract, p. 173 
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to leave wide scope for individual discretion, which in turn emphasizes the weak 
aspects of justice as impartiality. Furthermore, a crucial implication of this is that 
democracy is assigned an important role in the theory.  
 It has been objected against the weak interpretation I advance in this chapter 
that it is too weak to do the work it is supposed to do (Pettit: 2000). Pettit‟s critique of 
contractualism aims to show that the weak interpretation is unpersuasive because it is 
unable to accommodate consequentialist intuitions when they are plausible. I argue in 
section four that contractualism is able to arrive at plausible conclusions regarding 
consequentialist intuitions. If this conclusion can be sustained, then this chapter will 
have developed an understanding of reason that can serve as a useful starting point for 
developing a liberal constitutionalist order, and the first of the three main issues of this 
thesis will have been resolved. 
 
1. Reason and Contractualism 
In this section I ask: what counts as a reason in contractualism? The uncompromising 
notion of reason displayed in CE and WSJM does not fit well with Barry‟s 
interpretation of what informed agreement involved. To spell out the different 
understandings of reason I will briefly recap some of the main points from the 
previous chapter. Recall first that informed agreement for Barry required that the agent 
be able to comprehend different competing policies and understand the way in which 
they would affect him. In addition, the entire point of justice as impartiality was 
precisely not to take a position on the content and truthfulness of different doctrines, 
and instead leave it to democratic decision-making to decide which doctrine to 
implement. 
However, what Barry is doing in WSJM and CE is to apply a narrow 
conception of reason and impartiality, which blurs the distinction between impartiality 
and the evaluation of substantive doctrines. The position in WSJM and CE is 
strikingly different from the outline of justice as impartiality in many ways, but the 
position in WSJM and CE share similarities with the empirical method. The point of 
the empirical method was to investigate empirically whether the actual institutions and 
laws in a particular society complied with impartiality. The conclusions in WSJM and 
CE can to some extent be understood as examples of how the empirical method is 
supposed to work.  
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If that is correct then there seems to be a tension between the a priori and the 
empirical method in justice as impartiality. The difficulty of moving from the a priori 
to the empirical method was pointed out in the previous chapter. It was clear that it 
was relatively easy to see what the abstract and general principles of the a priori 
method required, but as with the example with gender equality, it was not so clear 
what gender equality actually required in terms of policies and institutions. Reserved 
seats for women in parliament may or may not be reasonable; the answer depends on 
social and historical circumstances. In WSJM and CE, Barry argues that justice 
requires not only a strong understanding of equal opportunity and a minimal scope for 
group exemptions, and he also suggests specific policies and institutions.  
In making these claims, Barry does not take into account that justice, 
impartiality, and equality can be achieved through different means. Different policies 
and institutions can realize the ideals and principles of justice, and the mistake I will 
argue Barry makes is to be insensitive to this crucial practical side of social justice. 
More specifically, the mistake Barry commits is to give the impression that injustices 
can be eradicated through only one set of policies and institutions (i.e., a strong 
understanding of equality of opportunity and limited room for group rights). The 
empirical method as it was outlined in the previous chapter did not say anything about 
the specific policies and institutions that justice requires. The point of the empirical 
method was more to identify injustices than to describe a political programme.  
Nonetheless, the tone in WSJM and CE is strikingly different. There, unjust 
practices are not only pointed out, but a wide range of policies and institutions are 
prescribed to remedy these injustices. This is not necessarily problematic in itself. It is 
legitimate to propose ways of realizing social justice, but the problem is when these 
remedies are described as necessary for justice. Recall that Barry argued that justice 
required equalization of children‟s environments as early as possible and as much as 
possible to realize equality of opportunity. Given certain social and historical 
contingencies in a particular society, such policies and the institutional framework for 
carrying them out might be consistent with justice. But, importantly, I think it is 
wrong to argue that justice requires this policy. The interpretations of what justice 
requires in both WSJM and CE goes beyond the framework of justice as impartiality, 
and the interpretations put forward there cannot be said to be supported by the theory 
as necessary for the realisation of justice.  
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What justice as impartiality requires is not a set of detailed policies and a 
specific set of institutions to deal with social justice, but instead the theory prescribes 
the ground rules of the political system. The distinction between first-order and 
second-order impartiality and the „list‟ of constitutional essentials both contribute to 
defining these ground rules. In justice as impartiality the scope of justice was confined 
to constitutional essentials (the workings of the political system and civil and political 
rights), while all other issues were the „stuff of politics‟. When an issue is the „stuff of 
politics‟ it is up to the democratic assembly to make the decisions on the issue, and 
justice does not prescribe a specific policy or institution (although it will, of course, 
limit the range of acceptable policies or institutions). This supports the conclusion that 
the framework in justice as impartiality embodies a weaker notion of what justice 
requires than is suggested in WSJM and CE.  
Now, through this examination of some of the central points of the previous 
chapter, we can now see that the conclusions in WSJM and CE would require 
convergence of reason on a wide set of premises and propositions, and that they 
therefore rely on a problematic notion of reason from the perspective of liberal 
legitimacy and pluralism. What justice as impartiality requires is convergence of 
reason on the justifiability of democracy and a set of civil and political rights. This is a 
weaker notion of reason with more room for accommodating both liberal legitimacy 
and pluralism. The scope of politics is wider; a wider set of issues is up for grabs. This 
gives concessions to pluralism as a wider diversity of reasons is acceptable in politics. 
Furthermore, civil and political rights ensure that the political system avoids the 
problems associated with politics as coordination (such as the use of threat advantage). 
The framework of justice as impartiality is strong enough to avoid the disadvantages 
of politics as coordination. Simultaneously, it is weaker than the consensus-oriented 
models suggested by Habermas and Rawls. The number of propositions that require 
convergence of reason are fewer in justice as impartiality than in the theories of Rawls 
and Habermas. Justice as impartiality thus represents a model that is balancing the 
need for convergence on the basic ground rules of the political system with the need to 
accommodate diversity and pluralism. 
This weak understanding of the role of reason in justice as impartiality is 
supported by some of the later developments of Scanlon‟s thinking on reasons. 
Scanlon is interested in a specific type of reason, more precisely, „whether it is a good 
reason – a consideration that really counts in favor of the thing in question‟ (Scanlon: 
 104 
1998: 19, original emphasis). This type of reason ought to be contrasted with what 
„could be someone‟s operative reason‟, which refers to the actual reason a person 
might have (Scanlon: 1998: 19). The first type of reason describes the „attitudes that 
an ideally rational person would come to have whenever that person judged there to be 
sufficient reasons for them‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 20). These judgements are called 
„judgement-sensitive attitudes‟ as they are sensitive to the judgements made by 
rational deliberators.  
A rational person is „a reasoning creature – one who has the capacity to 
recognize, assess, and be moved by reasons, and hence to have judgment-sensitive 
attitudes‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 23). In contrast, irrationality „occurs when a person 
recognizes something as a reason but fails to be affected by it in one of the relevant 
ways‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 25). This does not mean that one is automatically irrational if 
one recognizes the force of a reason, but fails to act on it, as there are situations with 
limited time for deliberation, and sometimes one‟s reasoning is based on mistaken 
assumptions. In such situations, one is not irrational, but „open to rational criticism‟ 
(Scanlon: 1998: 25-27).  
Between „the minimum standards marked out by the idea of irrationality and 
the ideal of what it would be (most) rational to believe or do, there are the notions of 
what is reasonable and unreasonable‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 32). These „judgments about 
what it is or is not reasonable to do or think are relative to a specified body of 
information and a specified range of reasons, both of which may be less than 
complete‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 32). Reasonableness is a less demanding understanding of 
what the most rational thing to do involves, and hence is adapted to how actual 
decisions are made.  
An important element of this notion of reasonableness is the idea  
 
that we have a general method for thinking about reasons for action in the right 
way… that is stable in its results, and supports wide interpersonal agreement 
on a significant range of conclusions. All of this taken together provides ample 
ground for saying that judgments about reasons for action are the kind of 
things that can be correct or incorrect, even though there are many cases in 
which we may continue to disagree.  
 
(Scanlon: 1998: 70) 
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Taken together these ideas can be summarised in the following way: 
contractualism is concerned with what constitutes good reasons (in the standard 
normative sense) for certain attitudes (judgment-sensitive attitudes), and not with 
empirical and causal phenomena. Rationality means the ability to be moved by 
judgement-sensitive attitudes, while irrationality means an agent is failing to conform 
to his own judgment-sensitive attitudes. Between these two extreme notions comes the 
notion of the reasonable, which means what is the most rational thing to do given the 
available information at the time of decision-making. This method of reasoning is able 
to reach correct judgments and to provide wide agreement on these judgements. 
Scanlon holds on the one hand that some reasons can yield wide interpersonal 
agreement and that reasons must be evaluated with regard to the available information 
at the time a decision is made. Furthermore, there is a method for reasoning giving 
stable and correct answers. The crucial question is then how far the convergence of 
reason can be extended. I will argue that it extends to the a priori approach discussed 
in the previous chapter. That means that the method of reasoning can yield 
interpersonal agreement only on questions such as slavery and apartheid. On more 
particular matters, the notion of reasonableness implies that different answers can be 
given to the same question because the different parties have different available 
information at the time of decision-making, and even with the same available 
information it is possible for people to disagree as different weight is attached to 
different arguments (Rawls: 1996: 54). In addition, this view fits with the idea that 
different social and historical conditions lead to different requirements.  
Thus, the understanding of reason in Scanlon‟s contractualism gives some 
support to the weak interpretation of reason that I defend in this chapter. This should 
further undermine the strong interpretation put forward in WSJM and CE. In the rest 
of this chapter I will develop and defend the plausibility of this interpretation. An 
important aspect of this effort is to show how the a priori approach can be aligned 
with the empirical method. The a priori understanding of reason gives rise to abstract 
and general principles and is crucial in justifying a set of civil and political rights and 
in justifying a democratic order. These are general principles that can be reached 
through reasoning alone, and thus are subject to wide interpersonal agreement, while 
when it comes to most actual political decisions, these decisions rely on a multitude of 
social and historical factors where the same extent of interpersonal agreement is not 
possible. Different people will attach different weight to many of these different social 
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and historical contingencies and in addition, there might exist several equally plausible 
policies to realize, for example, social justice. Under any circumstances, the 
conclusions are not universally valid or required by justice as suggested in WSJM and 
CE.  
To sum up the argument of this section, the weak understanding of reason 
requires convergence on civil, political rights and democracy, while accepting 
divergence on all other political issues. This is how justice as impartiality attempts to 
balance the convergence and divergence of reason. This model avoids the pitfalls of 
politics as coordination, and the demandingness of politics as consensus. If this 
interpretation of justice as impartiality can be sustained, it represents an attractive 
understanding of reason that satisfies liberal legitimacy and pluralism. On this 
interpretation, civil, political rights and democracy are defined as universal values, 
while other political issues are relative to context. The next section seeks to elaborate 
this distinction and to show how it supports the weak interpretation of justice as 
impartiality.  
 
2. Universalism and Relativism 
The distinction between universalism and relativism in Scanlon helps us to identify 
where convergence is required and where divergence is plausible. Through an 
examination of how this distinction applies to justice, I will argue that this give rise to 
a distinction between what justice requires and what is consistent with justice. This 
distinction builds on the distinction between a weak and strong understanding of 
reason as developed above, but aims to develop this distinction further and arrive at a 
more precise interpretation of it. Distinguishing between what justice requires and 
what is consistent with justice gives a solution to the challenge of how convergence 
and divergence can be balanced in liberalism. 
Contractualism holds that some actions or principles are universal. Examples 
of practices that could reasonably be rejected under any circumstances are slavery, and 
killing and torturing people just for fun. In addition, there exists a „domain of 
judgments of right and wrong that depend on reasons for rejection that people have 
under certain social circumstances‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 348).17 Examples of such issues 
                                                 
17
 In fact, Scanlon mentions a third domain in addition to the universal and context-dependent domains 
based „on the idea of what we owe to others but on the appeal of particular values that we may share‟ 
(Scanlon: 1998: 348-349). This domain refers to the idea that if we join an association or an activity 
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are „abortion, the treatment of nonhuman animals, standards of social justice, and the 
extent of our duties to aid others‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 357). So far, this distinction does 
not tell us much, but it is notable for a discussion of what justice requires that both 
abortion and standards of social justice are thought by Scanlon to be context 
dependent and not matters subject to universal principles. 
More specifically, there are two main ways in which context influences what 
can, and cannot, be reasonably rejected. First, there are those cases „in which there is a 
need for some principle to govern a particular kind of activity, but there are a number 
of different principles that would do this in a way that no one could reasonably reject‟ 
(Scanlon: 1998: 339). This gives rise to a principle Scanlon calls the Principle of 
Established Practices, which holds that in situations where a specific principle is 
accepted in a community, it is wrong to violate it just because it is convenient to do so 
(Scanlon: 1998: 339). This principle cannot reasonably be rejected because some 
principle is needed and one is established by custom. It is not necessary to have 
unanimous support for the principle for it to be binding, as there will always be 
dissenters.  
An important point related to the Principle of Established Practices indicates 
one of the ways contractualism differs from relativism. Contractualism can in this way 
explain why a generally, but not unanimously, accepted principle can be binding on 
all. Scanlon holds that these cases are not cases of relativism at all, but cases of 
universalism because „the moral force of these variable practices is explained by 
appeal to a single substantive moral principle‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 340). This is a 
significant point regarding the status of political obligations. The Principle of 
Established Practices shares some similarity with the conception of politics as a 
coordination game, and both seek to defend the idea that an outcome can be legitimate 
even if it does not enjoy universal consent. Here the resemblance ends though, because 
contractualism is not based on the idea that a coordination point is justified merely 
because of mutual advantage. What is important to notice is that The Principle of 
Established Practices points out how citizens may have political obligations to obey 
the law, even if they disagree with the current legal order.  
                                                                                                                                                        
requiring the following of certain moral rules we have obligations to our co-members to follow these 
rules. A typical example would be the expectations members of a religious community have that the 
other members will follow the religious doctrines on which their faith is based. These obligations do not 
apply to non-members and are not relevant to my analysis of justice and democracy. 
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The second way in which context influences rejectability is that different 
societies may have different generic reasons for rejecting or accepting a principle or 
practice. In individualistic societies people might think differently about the need for 
privacy than in family and community oriented societies. People in the former type of 
societies will have different generic reasons „for wanting forms of protection of the 
sort that rules of privacy provide‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 341). In such cases „what matters, 
in deciding whether a principle can reasonably be rejected for application to a certain 
society, is whether, in that society, people in the positions that the principle describes 
have good reason to want a certain opportunity or a certain form of protection‟ 
(Scanlon: 1998: 340).  Notice here that what matters is not what people actually think 
(their operative reason), but what they have good reason to think. People in the actual 
situation might not think of a certain principle as rejectable because their social 
circumstances have shaped their beliefs in such a way that they have come to accept 
certain practices even if they have good reason to object to such practices. An obvious 
example is how many women throughout history accepted an inferior status to men as 
natural or legitimate. Although they did not think that such an inferior status was 
objectionable at the time, contractualism holds that they still had a good reason for 
rejecting their inferior position. This, importantly, points out the way in which 
contractualism differs from relativism, since contractualism rejects the idea that what 
people actually think gives us good and valid reasons for rejecting or accepting certain 
practices.  
There are two important points to observe about the relationship between 
universal and relative principles. First, although the contractualist account holds that 
there are moral principles of universal validity, it does not specify a fixed list of those 
principles. The job contractualism is doing is to offer a framework to test moral 
principles and the extent to which they can be rejected or not. Second, it is not the case 
that social meanings always decide what is right or wrong. What matters are the 
reasons the involved persons have. Applying this account of universalism and 
relativism to questions of justice can help us to identify how to balance convergence 
and divergence of reason.  
Firstly, in a given situation, there might be several alternative practices 
satisfying a universal principle. As discussed in previous chapters, gender equality 
might be achieved in different ways, for example, by having, or not having, reserved 
seats in parliament. What justice requires is the treatment of men and women as 
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equals, not a reserved seat system per se. Supposing then, that a reserved seat system 
is feasible and a practical way of realizing treatment and representation between men 
and women as equals, the important point is that reserved seats may be one of two 
proposals that are consistent with what justice requires. If so, both schemes can realize 
equality, but neither is a requirement of justice. Thus, both are within the range of 
justice, and can be implemented to realize what justice requires. I take it that this is a 
vital insight of the Principle of Established Practices; that often there are a range of 
justifiable practices, and the adoption of one of them is required with regards to the 
need of coordination, but which of them is to be adopted depends on the context (for 
example, social, economic and historical contingencies). According to the Principle of 
Established Practices, if a democratic assembly decides to implement a reserved seat 
system for women, those who reject reserved seats for women in parliament in favour 
of some other arrangement that enhances women‟s rights are still bound to accept 
reserved seats as legitimate and to respect the legal obligations such a policy might 
require. 
Secondly, distinguishing between first-order and second-order impartiality is a 
way to distinguish between universal and relative principles. As Scanlon noted above, 
individualistic and communitarian societies might think differently about questions of 
privacy. Similarly, individualistic and communitarian societies might think differently 
about how to distinguish between first-order and second-order impartiality. In 
communitarian societies where people share the same conception of the good the 
scope for first-order impartiality might be wider. Because they share the same 
conception of the good, and the society therefore enjoys wider agreement on questions 
of personal morality, there might be wider scope for first-order impartiality and fewer 
questions will be left to individual discretion. Although this opens up the possibility of 
drawing the line between first-order and second-order impartiality differently in 
communitarian and individualistic societies, this is limited to recognizing what good 
reasons people might have to think differently about how to distinguish between the 
first- and second-order. If there are certain features in a communitarian society, such 
as providing wide support and care for extended family members, it is thinkable that 
such considerations might count as good reasons for drawing the distinction between 
first-order and second-order impartiality differently compared with more 
individualistic societies. 
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Some might object that this puts significant restrictions on what can count as 
non-rejectable principles and is thus not sufficiently sensitive to be able to 
accommodate different conceptions of the good. However, given the understanding of 
reason suggested in the previous section, I will hold that it should be wide enough in 
scope to accommodate different views on this issue. Moreover, the point of a theory of 
justice is not to accommodate everything; the point is to define certain principles and 
practices as just or unjust. Precisely because of this point, it should not be a surprise 
for anyone that a theory of justice simply rules out certain practices as unjust. The 
attempt is rather to strike a balance so that objectionable practices can be ruled out, but 
still leave ample scope for accommodating diversity and individual discretion. The 
understanding of reason discussed in the previous section together with the distinction 
between what justice requires and what is consistent with justice together explain how 
justice as impartiality seeks to respond to this challenge.  
To apply these distinctions to the two cases discussed in chapter three – the 
interpretation of group rights and equality of opportunity – I will argue that both 
interpretations are consistent with justice, but neither is required by justice. To say that 
both schemes are consistent with justice means that whether they accord with justice 
depends on the social, economic and historical contingencies that obtain in a particular 
society. The Principle of Established Practices might be a reason for understanding 
exemptions for groups in a restrictive way that is consistent with justice, and in a 
society where the principle of equality of opportunity is of great concern, more 
intrusive means can be justified to realize this principle. Therefore, the status of group 
rights and equality of opportunity is that justice does not require an implementation of 
them exactly along the lines of Barry‟s strong interpretation, but the strong 
interpretation is not categorically ruled out either. The essential idea is that different 
societies and different schemes might realize justice through different means.  
In this section, we have seen how the distinction between what justice requires 
and what is consistent with justice can fruitfully be combined with Scanlon‟s 
distinction between universalism and relativism. This distinction shows how one can 
balance the competing claims of convergence and divergence of reason. The 
discussion of this balance in this section has mainly been general. To show that this 
distinction is plausible, the next section will discuss how justice as impartiality has 
some advantages in balancing the competing demands from convergence and 
divergence compared to the coordination and consensus theories that were discussed 
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in chapter two. A central idea in justice as impartiality is the distinction between first-
order and second-order impartiality and my discussion in the next section will 
concentrate on how this distinction relates to the distinction between universalism and 
relativism and the convergence and divergence of reason.  
 
3. The Right Level of Impartiality 
A common criticism of impartialist morality is that it requires universal first-order 
impartiality (Williams: 1981, Bubeck: 1998). Although, I do not doubt that it is 
possible for justice as impartiality to draw a distinction between first-order and 
second-order impartiality, it is not clear how this distinction is to be drawn. In 
deciding this, I will argue that this line ought to be drawn in such a way that the two 
unattractive features of politics as coordination can be avoided (that there were no 
strict limits on political power, and relative bargaining power was permitted to 
influence outcomes).  
I will start by presenting briefly the three main arguments against universal 
first-order impartiality from the perspective of justice as impartiality. The first 
argument revolves around the necessity of having control of one‟s own life. A 
legitimate political order marked by diversity and pluralism requires that enough space 
is left for people to pursue their own conceptions of the good. Otherwise, those who 
do not have an opportunity to pursue their own conception of the good have good 
reason to object to such a political order.
18
 Therefore: „regardless of our conception of 
the good, we all want some ability to control our own corner of the world, and in 
return for that we are prepared to relinquish the chance of exerting control over others 
in their corner of the world‟ (Barry: 1995: 200-201). Universal first-order impartiality 
would be incompatible with the idea that people would be left with discretion to 
pursue their own conceptions of the good and so can be reasonably rejected.  
The second argument is called the problem of coordination. The rules of justice 
adopted by a society regulate the members‟ behaviour. The more detailed the 
regulations are, the closer society is to universal first-order impartiality.  
 
A society with a norm of universal impartiality, however, would be one in 
which everybody was supposed to show equal concern for all. It would be 
                                                 
17
 Certainly, those conceptions of the good which rely on practices in conflict with fundamental rights 
cannot expect to be accommodated, and those who hold such a conception cannot legitimately claim the 
same right to pursue their conception of the good. 
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regarded in such a society as wrong to show special concern for the welfare of 
oneself or those close to one…it is apparent that such a society would throw up 
horrendous problems of coordination, simply because everything would be 
everybody‟s business.  
 
(Barry: 1995: 204) 
 
Furthermore, in practice it would be impossible to enforce strict universal first-order 
impartiality. Because such strict coordination is both undesirable and impractical, the 
solution is to leave a considerable number of considerations to the members of society. 
The third argument relates to compliance with first-order impartiality. A 
system of universal first-order impartiality would need a strict and efficient system of 
enforcement. 
 
In an attempt to secure strict impartiality in all areas of life a huge number of 
decisions that are now left to private judgement would have to be turned over 
to public officials; and all decisions left in private hands would be open to 
scrutiny and censure on the basis of the hypertrophied positive morality of 
society. 
 
(Barry: 1995: 205)  
 
This would create an enormous bureaucracy, and it would also imply suspicion of 
citizens‟ judgement, and an ability on the part of the authorities to make decisions 
about how citizens should live their lives. As with the arguments from control and 
coordination, compliance has several undesirable side-effects which show that first-
order impartiality is incompatible with justice as impartiality. 
The parties in the original position (I use this term to describe the Scanlonian 
choice situation) would reject a social order where they did not have the chance to 
pursue their own conception of the good. Furthermore, they would reject the idea that 
every aspect of their lives would be subject to scrutiny by public officials. We see 
from these arguments that justice as impartiality clearly rejects universal first-order 
impartiality, but that it does not rule out the possibility that first-order impartiality 
applies in some contexts. The crucial point to decide here is where the distinction 
between first-order and second-order impartiality is drawn. However, the three 
arguments above help us to see where this distinction can be drawn. 
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In essence three considerations are important. (1) Almost everyone‟s life goes 
better when a wide range of decisions is left to individual discretion. (2) There are 
legitimate limits to government interference. (3) Government interference and first-
order impartiality are important in coordinating people‟s behaviour, but this is 
restricted by (1) and (2). Clearly, this takes justice as impartiality in the direction of 
the weak understanding of the implications of justice. In fact, these three arguments do 
not look very different from politics as coordination. Both accounts emphasize 
coordination, and that legitimacy is gained through a political order where it is 
possible for each individual to pursue their own conception of the good.  
Despite these similarities, justice as impartiality and Waldron‟s account differ 
on some crucial points. Firstly, justice as impartiality holds that there are strict limits 
to what a government can do. Secondly, a justifiable political order requires more than 
merely coordination. According to justice as impartiality, people can legitimately 
reject a political order that places a heavy burden on them, even if this political order 
offers mutual advantage. These two differences give rise to an important feature that is 
not present in Waldron‟s account, namely a set of fundamental individual rights. Thus, 
from the Scanlonian original position a set of constitutional essentials is derivable. 
These are the civil and political rights associated with liberalism. Such rights aim to 
protect the basic interests of a person such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, 
the integrity of the person, freedom of association and equal political rights. These 
rights are derived from concern for control over one‟s own life and they specify limits 
to government interference (including interference from other agents with an interest 
in controlling individual behaviour). Adopting equal civil and political rights is a way 
to ensure these basic interests. We see that the focus on fundamental individual rights 
turns justice as impartiality into a much stronger conception justice, relying on a more 
substantive notion of reason, than is found in Waldron‟s account.  
The attempt here is to create a balance between the strong and weak elements 
of reason so as to make sure that there is room for individual discretion in those areas 
where it is important, and first-order impartiality where this is required. Barry 
formulates this concern succinctly when he says that: 
 
what justice as impartiality calls for is…neither too much first-order 
impartiality nor too little first-order impartiality but just the right amount ... 
What is required is a set of rules of justice (including, it should be recalled, 
both legal and moral norms) that provide everybody with a fair opportunity of 
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living a good life, whatever their conception of the good may be, while leaving 
room for the kind of discretion in shaping one‟s life that is an essential 
constituent in every conception of the good life.  
 
(Barry: 1995: 206-207) 
 
The driving concern here is that both first-order and second-order impartiality are 
necessary to create a just order. In fact, to some degree first-order impartiality is 
demanded by justice in certain areas of life, as it seeks to offer protection to 
individuals‟ basic interests. 
 The distinction between first-order and second-order impartiality supports the 
conclusion reached in the previous section that the weak interpretation of justice as 
impartiality ought to be maintained. Justice as impartiality holds that a legitimate 
political order is based on a set of fundamental individual rights and a democratic 
order. These are the two main implications of the theory. Fundamental rights protect 
the basic interests of the person; a democratic order ensures a fair and legitimate 
procedure for making public decisions. Both schemes from the perspective of justice 
as impartiality seek to realize the equal moral worth of each person and to secure 
impartiality regarding different conceptions of the good.  
These two elements show the contours of how justice as impartiality responds 
to liberal legitimacy and pluralism. Individual rights make the conception of justice 
stronger than Waldron‟s weak notion, and seek to avoid the problems associated with 
his approach. Justice as impartiality requires convergence of reason concerning these 
rights, but on my weak interpretation this is still much weaker than the consensus 
required by Habermas and Rawls. Because justice as impartiality does not require that 
decisions ought to be made by consensus, and it does not require the objectivity of 
political judgements, the theory occupies a middle position between coordination and 
mutual advantage theories and consensus theories such as those offered by Habermas 
and Rawls. The combination of a strong concern for fundamental rights and the need 
for a strong democratic order offers, according to justice as impartiality, a political 
order justifiable to everyone. Thus, liberal legitimacy and pluralism are satisfied by an 
account with an emphasis on rights and with few other substantive implications. 
Instead, democracy is called upon to resolve most disputes about justice. This is 
legitimate against a background where the democratic procedure satisfies certain 
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requirements such as equal voting rights and a process with equal possibilities for 
influencing the outcome and so on.  
This weak interpretation of reason that support this strong emphasis on 
democracy and fundamental rights has been criticized for being too weak. I will 
discuss the strength of this objection in the next section. 
 
4. Is the Weak Interpretation too Weak?  
Much of the discussion so far has centred on whether liberal theories of justice have 
strong or weak substantive implications. I have been critical of both Reformation and 
Enlightenment liberalism, and instead have advanced justice as impartiality as a 
plausible way of balancing the competing demands of liberal legitimacy and 
pluralism. It has been argued against this way of understanding contractualism that it 
is too weak to serve as a foundation for the principles it seeks to justify. Pettit admits 
that the weak understanding is plausible in itself, but to the question of whether it can 
be endorsed as persuasive he answers that it is not persuasive because „the theory is 
bound to violate consequentialist intuitions, as Scanlon himself insists. As someone 
who wishes to preserve such intuitions, therefore, I [Pettit] must reject the 
contractualist theory‟ (Pettit: 2000: 163). Scanlon‟s thinking on consequentialism is 
complex and it is true that many consequentialist policies are ruled out on his account, 
but he aims to include many consequentialist conclusions where they appear plausible 
(Scanlon: 1998: 229-241).  
There has been an intense debate over whether Scanlon‟s contractualism deals 
successfully with aggregation.
19
 At the heart of the issue is the question of whether 
contractualism blocks aggregation when aggregation is plausible. I will now discuss 
one example where contractualism appears to get the right answer concerning 
consequentialism. If this example is sound, it will constitute a counter-example to 
Pettit‟s objection above and undermine the force of his objection. This does not mean 
that contractualism offers the right answer to all questions of justice, but it is an 
important example because it concerns the relationship between democracy and 
fundamental rights.  
The example I will discuss takes issue with how it is possible for 
contractualism to reach plausible conclusions regarding two political schemes of 
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 See Reibetanz (1998), Otsuka (2000), Kumar (2001), Hirose (2001), Hooker (2003) Raz (2004), 
Parfit (2004). 
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consequentialist character: judicial review and plural votes. Both judicial review and 
plural voting are consequentialist schemes in that they are both usually justified by 
their good consequences. Given this shared feature, Richard Arneson has argued that 
judicial review and plural voting come together as a package because the underlying 
thinking behind both schemes is the same.
20
 Judicial review is here understood as the 
right of the judiciary to overrule legislation enacted by a democratically elected 
assembly or government. According to Arneson, this is essentially the same as vesting 
political power in the hands of unelected judges and deprives democracy of the ideal 
of equal political power. This scheme resembles the underlying thinking expressed in 
Mill‟s idea of providing educated elites with plural votes, which is also problematic 
from a democratic perspective as it seemingly undermines the ideal of political 
equality. Crucial here is that both schemes are justified in so far as they lead to 
superior consequences when compared with the outcomes of strict political equality. 
The conclusion that follows, according to Arneson, is that those who accept judicial 
review are bound to accept plural voting.  
Justice as impartiality supports a principle of judicial review (chapter three), 
although the judiciary does not play a dominant role in the theory. In addition, the 
theory gives rise to strong support for democratic equality, and democracy as 
understood by justice as impartiality is incompatible with plural voting. For 
contractualism to reach plausible conclusions on issues of a consequentialist character, 
it is important for the theory‟s coherence that judicial review can be justified without 
that justification applying to plural voting. The question is: is there any way justice as 
impartiality can endorse judicial review without endorsing plural voting? 
I believe this dilemma is resolvable for justice as impartiality, and that 
contractualism offers a solution that is both sensitive to consequences and outcomes, 
but yet able to reject plural voting while justifying judicial review. Thus the 
contractual solution endorses consequentialism when it is plausible (judicial review) 
and rejects it when it is implausible (plural voting). This does not mean that 
contractualism will necessarily endorse consequentialism when consequentialism 
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seems plausible, but it at least means that contractualism does not reject 
consequentialist thinking in the way Pettit argues it does.  
Contractualism is based on what is rejectable from the perspective of the 
individual and this view is apparent in its concern for fundamental individual rights. 
To see how important the individual is in contractualism consider the following 
example from Scanlon:  
 
Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the transmitter room of a 
television station. Electrical equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot 
rescue him without turning off the transmitter for fifteen minutes. A World 
Cup match is in progress, watched by many people, and it will not be over for 
an hour… Should we rescue him now or wait until the match is over? Does the 
right thing to do depend on how many people are watching?  
 
(Scanlon: 1998: 235) 
 
Contractualism suggests that it is wrong to wait regardless of the number of viewers, 
because „if one can save a person from serious pain and injury at the cost of 
inconveniencing others… then one must do so no matter how numerous these others 
may be‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 235). Analogously, contractualism holds that it is wrong to 
violate an individual‟s fundamental rights regardless of the benefits gained by the 
majority. We are obliged to protect the fundamental rights of every individual, even if 
this goes against what the majority may favour. Such obligations undeniably 
inconvenience the majority, and on an aggregative view, the benefits associated with 
the majority may outweigh the benefits associated with protecting an individual‟s 
rights. Nevertheless, the rights of the individual must be protected because a person 
who experiences his rights being violated can reasonably reject any scheme that 
permits such a violation. If judicial review protects individual rights in this way, 
judicial review is justified by contractualism. Notice here that although a contractualist 
justification of judicial review focuses on the outcome, it does not focus on the 
aggregative aspects of the situation. The crucial idea is that of protecting each and 
every individual‟s fundamental rights not that the overall benefits achieved legitimates 
judicial review. 
Instead of focusing on the aggregative aspects of the situation, Scanlon‟s 
contractualism proceeds from the assumption that „all the grounds for rejecting a 
principle… arise from generic reasons that an individual would have who occupied a 
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certain position in the situations to which that principle applies‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 229). 
The only aggregation allowed on this account is aggregation within „each person‟s 
life‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 237). This means that contractualism holds that the justifiability 
of a moral principle depends only on the reasons that an individual can have for 
rejecting a principle, and hence contractualism can reject utilitarianism and other 
forms of consequentialism (aggregation) (Scanlon: 1998: 229). This assumption is 
important in seeing why contractualism rejects plural votes. 
Reformulating the principle of plural voting in a contractualist way we arrive 
at the following: „no one can reasonably reject a system of voting where the best 
qualified have more votes than those less qualified, because this system will produce 
superior decisions and produce the fairest outcomes‟. Why is this principle reasonably 
rejectable? Firstly, because underlying plural votes is the idea that even if political 
equality is eroded or denied, the benefits achieved from plural voting are greater than 
any losses because the outcomes of democratic decision-making will be more just. 
Because the outcomes of the state with plural votes are more just then, on an 
instrumental justification, a state with plural votes is justified. When the benefits and 
disadvantages of these two states are compared and weighed, plural votes are justified 
if the benefits outweigh the disadvantages. In this respect the justification of plural 
votes is aggregative; it mandates that we choose the state of affairs that on an 
aggregative view is more just. On the purely instrumental view taken by Arneson, the 
most beneficial is taken also to constitute what is most just.  
Contractualism, in contrast, rejects the view that what produces most benefits 
is also most just. Even if consequential thinking is allowed to play an important role in 
contractualism, the role it plays is always from the perspective of the individual. Thus, 
consequential concerns are constrained by what is reasonably rejectable from the 
perspective of the individual. This qualification is not always co-extensive with what 
is most beneficial, as the individual also has other concerns than what is most 
beneficial. The problem with a straightforward comparison of end states is that it does 
not take the perspective of the individual into account. This is to aggregate across 
lives, instead of within lives. As the discussion above revealed, this is precisely the 
kind of aggregation contractualism rules out and it can therefore explain why a 
principle proposing plural votes can reasonably be rejected. 
However, perhaps this is not enough to reject plural votes. On one reading of 
the contractualist re-formulation above it might be argued that the proposed principle 
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appeals to the kind of reason an individual may have because plural votes benefit even 
the individual who does not have them. That is, Arneson might argue in favour of 
plural votes on the grounds that such a scheme is justifiable even to those deprived of 
plural votes because those individuals will benefit from living in a society where 
democratic decisions conform more closely to justice. Interpreted in this way, it seems 
that plural votes cannot be so easily rejected, because it can be argued that it 
aggregates within lives and not merely across lives. In other words, plural votes are 
justifiable to others, even to those who will be without them. Nevertheless, what 
contractualism „takes as fundamental is not what people actually think or want, but 
what they have reason to want‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 341). Thus, the question is therefore: 
do people have reason to want plural votes?  
 A system of plural votes is rejectable also because the procedures themselves are 
unfair. Scanlon holds that „a person could reasonably reject a principle on the grounds 
that it treated him or her unfairly… even if this treatment did not make the person 
worse off‟ (Scanlon: 1998: 229). If a system of plural votes leads to a more just 
society, the well-being of the persons denied plural votes is likely to improve, as it is a 
good for everyone to live in a just society. However, the means for bringing about 
justice treats some individuals unfairly, and those treated in this way have good 
reasons to reject such treatment. The unfairness of plural votes is that political power 
is distributed unequally, which is not to treat persons as equals. 
 This brief discussion shows that contractualism is able to derive the right answers 
in relation to consequentialism at least in the cases of judicial review and plural 
voting. In these cases, contractualism gives proper weight to both consequential 
concerns and the interests of persons. Contractualism asks how judicial review and 
plural votes affect the individuals within the scheme in order to assess their merits and 
de-merits. This example is significant because judicial review is controversial because 
of its potential conflict with equal political rights, and the comparison with plural 
voting suggests even more that the idea of judicial review is dubious from the 
perspective of democracy. Instead of showing how both plural voting and judicial 
review are rejectable, contractualism is able to distinguish between the two schemes 
and arrive at plausible conclusions. The conclusion is that consequentialist intuitions 
are plausible in the case of judicial review, but not in the case of plural voting. This, of 
course, does not fully answer Pettit‟s objection that contractualism rules out 
consequentialist intuitions when they seem plausible. Rather it suggests that 
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contractualism is a sophisticated theory that can yield plausible answers to questions 
of a consequentialist character. 
 To sum up the discussion in this section: the weak interpretation of justice as 
impartiality and contractualism can be maintained because the objection that 
contractualism rules out consequentialist intuitions when plausible can be rejected. 
Instead, the discussion in this section shows that it is possible to combine democracy 
and fundamental rights without conflict. This is an important, and controversial, 
insight. One of the most important aims of the next three chapters is to see what 
implications a combination of these two features yields. A conception of political 
justice based on these two features is controversial among both political and 
democratic theorists, and it is still far from sure that the implications this approach 
yields are sustainable, even if they seem to yield plausible answers in cases of 
consequentialism and aggregation. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Section one argued that Scanlonian contractualism and justice as impartiality have an 
overlapping understanding of reasons and emphasize the a priori approach to justice. 
This undermines the strong substantive implications present in, for example, CE and 
WSJM. In sections two and three, I emphasized the plausibility of this understanding 
by discussing how a distinction between what justice requires and what is consistent 
with justice points out how the strong and weak elements in liberalism can be ordered 
so as not to conflict. It is important to notice that the balance between convergence 
and divergence of reason that follows from this interpretation avoids the problems 
associated with politics as coordination, but does not rely on the many controversial 
elements associated with politics as consensus. This interpretation of how to balance 
convergence and divergence of reason is an attempt to satisfy the liberal principle of 
legitimacy and aims to offer a political order justifiable to all citizens in conditions of 
pluralism. The main conclusion from this chapter is that the weak understanding of 
reason is strengthened as a plausible interpretation of what justice requires where what 
justice requires is limited to fundamental rights and a democratic order. 
All these points also have important implications for the scope of 
contractualism. Effectively, they mean that the weak interpretation of reason also 
describes the limits of contractualism. What this means is that contractualism on this 
account is circumscribed to the derivation of fundamental rights and to the 
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justification of a democratic order. Contractualism can be interpreted more 
expansively and with a wider scope, but in a political context like the one surrounding 
liberal constitutionalism – where pluralism and liberal legitimacy are crucial premises 
for political theorizing – it is neither desirable nor possible to derive a much stronger 
understanding of contractualism. 
 After arriving at this conclusion about how to understand reason in liberal 
constitutionalism, we have an answer to the question asked in the Introduction about the 
role of reason in liberal constitutional thought. This answer also serves as a starting 
point for developing a liberal constitutional framework, and for answering the two next 
questions identified in the Introduction. They concerned what democratic order liberal 
constitutionalism required and how to square democracy with substantive rights. The 
next chapter aims to show what a democratic order based on this understanding of 
reason will look like. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Democracy Between Aggregation and Deliberation 
 
Votes count, but resources decide. 
 
Stein Rokkan
21
 
 
Votes matter in democracies, but often power and resources matter more. It is not 
unusual to observe that the democratic process is tainted by powerful groups using 
their superior resources to determine political outcomes to their own advantage. One 
of the central ideas informing justice as impartiality is precisely the thought that 
resources ought not determine the outcome of the political process. Instead, a central 
thesis is that of equal concern for the interests of the different groups of society. An 
unequal distribution of resources should not be allowed to influence the democratic 
process. For a democracy to be justifiable, this requirement must be satisfied. 
 The challenge for a theory of democracy is that it must be both morally 
justifiable, and serve as a framework for a workable political order. An unjustifiable 
democratic order lacks legitimacy, and the unfairness of the system can gradually 
undermine the democratic order. Overly demanding procedures leave democracy 
unable to respond adequately to urgent and pressing political problems, and they 
ultimately undermine the efficiency of democracy by comparison with alternative 
forms of government. These competing demands put democratic theories to a hard, but 
necessary test.  
In this chapter, I start by describing three ideals of liberal democracy. I then 
apply these ideals to two influential theories of democracy – pluralism and 
deliberative democracy – and analyse how these theories realize liberal constitutional 
ideals, and how they accommodate the competing ideals referred to above. In the final 
section, I discuss the epistemic value, and the scope, of democracy. 
 
1. Three Ideals of Liberal Democracy 
We have seen (perhaps unsurprisingly) that justice requires democracy, but we have 
yet to see what justice requires of democracy. In this section, I will suggest some 
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answers to this question. What justice requires from democracy can be summarized 
under three subheadings. First, justice requires from a political order that it reflect the 
moral equality that follows from the original position, which eventually justifies equal 
political rights. Second, impartial procedures and state neutrality are required to ensure 
a legitimate political process. Third, democracy is a form of government that enhances 
and gives expression to the citizens‟ liberty. That means the protection of liberal 
freedoms, like the ones included in the constitutional essentials discussed in chapter 
three, and ensuring the ideal of popular sovereignty. This section seeks to elaborate 
these three ideals of liberal constitutional democracy. 
To start with the question of why justice requires equal political rights. In the 
Scanlonian original position, no one would accept less than equal political rights. The 
underlying idea is the assumption of the equal moral worth of persons. Moving from 
this assumption to politics „it is hard to see why anybody of sound mind should be 
asked to accept less than equal political rights‟ (Barry: 1995: 109). Given the equal 
moral worth of the person, it is unreasonable to propose inferior rights for certain parts 
of the demos, and equally unreasonable for those who are offered inferior rights to 
accept them. Equal political rights here means that every adult of sound mind ought to 
have the same rights to vote and to be elected, and to participate in political activity. 
Also included are essential rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of 
association. In Rawls‟ words, it requires „that all citizens are to have an equal right to 
take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that 
establishes the laws with which they are to comply‟ (Rawls: 1999a: 194). Despite the 
fact that the idea of equal political rights is deeply embedded in contemporary 
democratic thinking to the extent that it almost is superfluous to discuss it in detail, it 
is clear that this ideal is easily guaranteed formally, but is harder to realize in actual 
democratic practice. As Rawls observes „historically one of the main defects of 
constitutional government has been the failure to insure the fair value of political 
liberty. The necessary corrective steps have not been taken, indeed, they never seem to 
have been seriously entertained‟ (Rawls: 1999a: 198). Because of the central role 
political equality plays in justifying democracy it is essential that it plays a crucial role 
in shaping a liberal constitutional political order.  
Second, justice requires that the democratic process is impartial. This 
requirement is related to political equality in an important way. If the political process 
is partial and offers certain parts of the electorate advantages or increased influence, 
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this represent a breach with political equality, as political power is then unequally 
distributed among the electorate. This seriously taints the political process and 
undermines the legitimacy of the political system because those who find themselves 
at the losing end have good reason to reject both a biased political process and the 
outcomes of such a process. Moreover, there is good reason to remember that „even if 
people are unhappy with a decision, they are much more likely to accept it if they 
perceive it as having been taken in a fair way‟ (Barry: 1995: 111). Thus, an important 
element of impartiality is not only that the outcome matters, but also that it came about 
in a fair way. 
Impartial procedures are built around two principles. The first is that the 
political process ought to be constructed by fair and just procedures and, second, that 
the state ought to be impartal between different conceptions of the good and 
competing interests such as, for example, the competing interests between unions and 
employers. Fair and just procedures means a system honouring equal political rights 
where, for example, each vote has roughly the same importance, or more precisely a 
political system where wealth and social background do not affect the weight of the 
vote. Furthermore, elections must be fair and free, and held at regular intervals. A 
second important element is that the state is impartial between, for example, different 
religions and other competing interests in society. This means that the constitution and 
the political system do not favour certain ethnicities, religions and social backgrounds 
(among other factors). These factors are not relevant when deciding upon public 
policy. The basic idea of impartiality is that these concerns ought not to be taken into 
account when forming public policy or new laws. Furthermore, impartiality does not 
mean that the outcomes of the democratic process necessarily have to be impartial 
with respect to everyone affected by a policy or law, i.e., burdens and benefits may 
affect different groups of the population differently (I will discuss this issue further in 
chapter seven). Instead, what it requires is that the process leading up to a decision is 
impartial so that all sides have a chance to influence the outcome. Importantly, the 
outcomes cannot violate fundamental civil rights such as, for example, freedom of 
religion. 
Now, this takes us to the third requirement, liberty. This requirement has two 
sides, one negative and one positive. I will start with the negative side, which is 
strongly related to how the distinction between first-order and second-order 
impartiality restricts the scope of politics. As this distinction has been interpreted in 
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this thesis it leaves a wide scope for individual discretion to organize one‟s life in the 
way one sees best. This concern has perhaps received the clearest expression in Mill‟s 
words:  
 
But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to 
another creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own 
benefit what he chooses to do with it… The interference of society to overrule 
his judgement and purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on 
general presumptions… In the conduct of human beings towards one another, 
it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order 
that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person‟s own 
concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled free exercise… All errors which 
he is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the 
evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem is good. 
 
           (Mill: 1991 [1859]: 84-85) 
 
As a way of ensuring individual discretion over the course of one‟s life, the individual 
is equipped with a set of civil rights aiming to protect basic interests such as the 
integrity of the person, freedom of religion, and so on. These rights are outside the 
reach of ordinary politics, and they protect the individual against oppressive and 
intrusive laws and policies. This aspect I call the negative side of liberty as it seeks to 
protect the individual against infringements of basic interests and the potential tyranny 
of the majority. Also, it ensures, as Mill was keen to emphasize, the importance of 
ensuring that individuals can live in accordance with their own ideas about what is 
right and wrong (although within certain limits). The protection of the individual 
against the tyranny of the majority has been a longstanding concern for liberalism. In 
liberal constitutionalism, this protection is achieved through the set of fundamental 
civil rights. 
 The positive side of how liberty relates to democracy is through the importance 
of popular sovereignty. The idea is that the people are the final moral authority and an 
important aspect of liberty is to live under laws enacted by the people themselves. The 
demos are the author of the laws under which they live. Equal political rights give 
every adult of sound mind an equal share of political power and an equal opportunity 
to participate in politics. The exercise of political rights is an important aspect of being 
free in the sense that one has influence over the outcome of elections. In large-scale 
modern democracies one vote has minimal influence, and the exercise of this right is 
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highly indirect through the system of representative democracy. Still, this right makes 
the people the ultimate authority of political power as the power vested in the hands of 
representatives is derived from the people, and thus the people are in some sense 
responsible for the laws and polices enacted by the parliament.  
 This section has outlined three ideals of liberal democracy: equal political 
rights, impartiality, and liberty. These are the principal ideals of a constitutional liberal 
democracy. With these ideals in place a democratic society will satisfy the 
requirements of liberal justice. Over the next two sections I will discuss two influential 
types of democratic theories and ask how they fit with the liberal constitutional 
democratic ideal discussed in this section. 
 
2. Democracy as Process 
The industrial revolution led not only to dramatic technological and economic changes 
in most Western societies, but also had profound political implications. For the most 
part these implications put into doubt the plausibility of realizing the ideals of liberal 
democracy articulated above. Perhaps the strongest articulations of these councils of 
despair over the prospect of democracy are expressed in the writings of Max Weber 
and Joseph Schumpeter. Briefly stated, Weber is concerned with how modern 
industrialized states are more and more governed by a rationalized bureaucracy which 
undermines the possibility for citizens to flourish as free and equal individuals. This is 
a threat to the ideals of liberal democracy, not only created by a powerful state, but 
also from private corporations getting increasingly powerful and dominating 
individuals in modern life (Weber: 1978). Democracy was said by Weber to be a 
counterweight to the dominating role of the state and corporations. On his view, 
democracy served as a training ground for breeding strong leaders who could balance 
the power of the state and capital. Consequently, democracy on this view has a 
strongly elitist character in that it emphasizes how democratic leaders can counter the 
power of state and capital. The role of the people here plays an inferior role and 
politics is centred around how different elites work together or against each other. 
Even if democracy can counter-balance some of the challenges posed by the state and 
capital, it is disappointing for the prospects of realizing political equality, impartiality 
and liberty under modern conditions.  
Schumpeter was equally pessimistic about the prospects of democracy and 
took issue with how passive and politically paralyzed the electorate were in many 
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mass-democracies. The masses could be manipulated through targeted advertising and 
sophisticated marketing, according to Schumpeter. He also emphasized how great a 
distance there is between ordinary citizens‟ lives and the life of politics. Ultimately, on 
his view, democracy is merely a procedure to change government and to avoid 
corruption and unsuitable leaders (Schumpeter: 1976). As with Weber, the prospects 
for realizing the ideals of liberal democracy must be said to be meagre if Schumpeter‟s 
account of democracy is accurate.  
Both these views have exercised great influence on democratic thinking over 
the last decades (Held: 2006: 125). Unsurprisingly, these bleak prospects for 
democracy provoked responses that challenged both their empirical claims about the 
poor prospects of democracy under modern conditions, and their normative ambitions 
of thinking of democracy in limited and elitist terms. The school of thought that 
presented the most penetrating critique of elitist competitive democracy was the 
widely influential group of pluralist theorists (Held: 2006). Among these theorists, 
perhaps the most influential and sophisticated was Robert A. Dahl who argued that the 
governing elites consisted of numerous diverse groups who between them bargained 
over political power (Dahl: 1956). Furthermore, pluralism held that the plurality of 
interest groups and other representatives adequately represented the different and 
diverse interests in society.  
Based on these findings, Dahl articulated a theory of democracy – one that still 
enjoys widespread influence – around the idea of democracy as a procedure and 
process. The essence of Dahl‟s theory can be expressed in the following five general 
requirements: 
 
(1) Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have 
an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their 
preferences as to the final outcome. They must have adequate and equal 
opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons 
for endorsing one outcome rather than another. 
 
(2) At the decisive stage of collective decision-making, each citizen must be 
ensured an equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted as equal 
in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen. In determining 
outcomes at the decisive stage these choices, and only these choices, must be 
taken into account. 
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(3) Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering 
and validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice 
on the matter to be decided that would best serve the citizen‟s interests. 
 
(4) The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are 
to be placed on the agenda and which matters that are to be decided by means 
of the democratic process. 
 
(5) The demos must include all adult members of the association except 
transients and persons proved to be mentally defective. 
         
(Summarizing Dahl: 1989: 106-134) 
 
A process following these requirements can legitimately be called democratic, 
according to Dahl. These requirements emphasize the importance of political equality 
because it includes all adult members of sound mind and emphasizes the importance 
of equal opportunities to influence the political process. This notion of equality also 
goes a long way towards securing impartial procedures. In these respects democracy 
as process satisfies the liberal ideals of equality and impartiality.  
However, on two important counts democracy as process departs from liberal 
democracy. The first departure is that democracy as process rejects fundamental (pre-
political) rights. Second, democracy as process relies on a controversial understanding 
of majority-rule because of its reliance on utility-maximization achieved by 
aggregating preferences. When these differences are taken into account, we can see 
that democracy as process falls short of satisfying liberal democracy and an alternative 
model for a legitimate political order must be sought. I will now briefly discuss these 
two problematic features with pluralism from the perspective of liberal 
constitutionalism.  
To start with the issue of fundamental rights, according to (4) above the people 
have an exclusive right to decide which questions to put on the political agenda. This 
rules out from the outset a set of individual rights that cannot be altered through 
democratic decision-making. Dahl believes such rights undermine the sovereignty of 
the demos and calls it a form of „guardianship‟ that expresses the view that some 
theory or positions have an exclusive access to what is right or true (Dahl: 1989: ch. 
6). Although Dahl ultimately endorses the idea of a „quasi-guardianship‟, which limits 
the set of individual rights to those necessary for the democratic process itself (Dahl: 
1989: ch. 13), this concession falls short of guaranteeing those fundamental civil 
rights, such as freedom of religion, the integrity of the person and so on, prescribed by 
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liberal democracy. Therefore, from the perspective of liberal constitutionalism this 
feature of Dahlsian pluralism must be rejected. Nevertheless, the issue raised 
regarding guardianship is of great importance and the next chapter will discuss in 
more detail how liberal constitutionalism seeks to combine fundamental rights and 
democracy without constituting a form of guardianship. 
Because pluralism rejects important liberal civil rights, majority rule plays a 
dominating role in this theory of democracy. Dahl endorses four principal arguments 
in favour of majority rule: 
 
(1) Maximizing self-determination. Majority rule maximizes the numbers of 
citizens who live under their own laws, which is an important principle for 
many understandings of democracy. 
 
(2) Majority rule is the consequence of reasonable requirements. A democratic 
decision rule ought to be decisive, provide anonymity, neutrality with respect 
to the alternatives and that the decision rule ought to be positively responsive. 
Only majority rule satisfies these four criteria. 
 
(3) Majority rule is more likely to produce correct decisions. This argument 
relies on Condorcet and states that if a person is greater than 51% likely to 
make the correct decision, then the probability that the majority makes the right 
decision increases as the size of the electorate increases.  
 
(4) Majority rule maximizes utility, because it is plausible to assume that by 
applying majority rule, this will on average maximize the benefits to the demos 
as it is assumed that the majority will receive certain gains that outweigh the 
losses felt by the loosing minority. 
 
(Summarizing Dahl: 1989: 135-153) 
 
Although Dahl pays attention to self-determination in (1), the emphasis on utility-
maximization, and the way the utilitarian framework drives the argument, means that 
democracy is in the end merely an aggregation of the voters‟ preferences. Thus, even 
if the argument pays attention to the importance of self-determination, this is 
undermined by the emphasis on utility. 
Eventually, majority rule aggregates citizens‟ preferences and makes 
democratic decision-making into a process where numbers matter more than 
arguments. The formal conception of pluralism emphasizes the importance of equal 
opportunities to influence the process. However, when democracy is seen as a device 
for maximizing utility the theory does not take seriously the view that an important 
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aspect of public decision-making is about what the demos (or at least the majority) 
think is right, rather than merely the possible utilities derived from aggregating 
preferences. We see from this discussion of the role of individual rights and the role of 
majority-rule in pluralism that these two features are at odds with the understanding of 
democracy found in justice as impartiality. 
Nonetheless, there is one attractive feature of pluralism that liberal 
constitutionalism seeks to incorporate into its understanding of democracy. This is 
pluralism‟s rejection of the idea that democratic politics can reveal the common good. 
This feature is not surprising since pluralism emphasizes how society is dominated by 
competing interests advanced by different elites. Given diverse and plural societies, 
Dahl rhetorically asks, how can citizens experience the common good, and what is the 
substantive content of the common good? (Dahl: 1989: 298). Dahl doubts that these 
questions can be answered adequately in societies characterised by diversity and 
pluralism. Instead, he suggests an alternative; namely, the common good as „process‟ 
(1989: ch. 21). This idea suggests that the common good is not the substantive 
outcome of democratic decision-making, but instead the common good is the process 
of democratic decision-making itself.  
In diverse societies there is often disagreement about what is the right decision 
to make. In such an environment, the process of democratic decision-making 
represents a reasonable solution to how such disagreement can be resolved. Therefore, 
Dahl argues, the citizens agree on procedures for public decision-making and 
democracy itself constitutes the common good. The rejection of a strong notion of the 
common good is a plausible and realistic condition in diverse and plural societies. 
What is particularly valuable is that it points out how a working democratic order is 
possible without relying on a contentious conception of the common good. Thus, 
Dahl‟s alternative is an example of the necessary minimum for a working democratic 
order. Justice as impartiality endorses a similar notion of the role of the common good, 
where the democratic order itself is viewed as the common good, instead of the actual 
outcomes of democratic decision-making. 
The attraction of pluralism is that it offers a reply to Weber‟s and 
Schumpeter‟s view that under modern conditions democracy is dysfunctional. 
Through different group interests, the interests of most citizens are adequately 
represented and it suggests that even if politics is mainly carried out by relatively 
small elites, these elites are fragmented and do not undermine the liberal ideals of 
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political equality, impartiality and liberty. Despite its attractiveness, we have seen that 
its strong emphasis on democracy as utility maximizing and its hostility towards 
fundamental rights causes problems for incorporating this understanding of democracy 
into a liberal constitutionalist framework. The fact that the theory justifies an elitist 
democracy, indicates that it does not pay enough attention to the quality of the 
democratic process. Furthermore, it seems inadequate to ensure that political debate 
focuses on arguments and the reasons for and against different alternatives. Instead, 
pluralism appeals to citizens‟ preferences rather than the substantive reasons and 
arguments in each case. Before discussing in more detail the merits and demerits of 
pluralism (which will be done in the final section) I will in the next section assess the 
merits of a democratic order that seeks to improve the quality of the democratic 
process by emphasizing the importance of deliberation in politics. 
 
3. Deliberative Democracy 
Although, deliberative democracy has been formulated in a variety of different 
versions my discussion of this type of democracy will mainly focus on Joshua 
Cohen‟s work. Cohen emphasizes many of the features typical of deliberative 
democracy such as a concern for representation and participation, and the idea of a 
search for a common good. An interesting point related to the focus of this thesis is 
that his theoretical foundation is derived from the two dominant philosophical sources 
of this strand of democratic thinking: Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. This mixed 
origin makes Cohen‟s work particularly interesting when considering the relationship 
between justice and democracy.  
Deliberative democracy, as formulated by Cohen, is based on the following 
five ideas:  
 
(1) A deliberative democracy is an ongoing and independent association, 
whose members expect it to continue into the indefinite future.  
 
(2) The members of the association share (and it is common knowledge that 
they share) the view that the appropriate terms of association provide a 
framework for or are the results of their deliberation. 
 
(3) A deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association. The members have 
diverse preferences, convictions and ideals concerning the conduct of their 
own lives. 
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(4) Because the members of a democratic association regard deliberative 
procedures as the source of legitimacy, it is important to them that the terms of 
their association not merely be the results of their deliberation, but also be 
manifest to them as such. 
 
(5) The members recognize one another as having deliberative capacities, i.e. 
the capacities required for entering into a public exchange of reasons and for 
acting on the result of such public reasoning. 
 
(Cohen: 2002: 91-92, original emphasis) 
 
 In addition to this formal framework, deliberative democracy focuses „on the 
common good‟, where „the interests, aims and ideals that comprise the common good 
are those that survive deliberation, interests that, on public reflection, we think it 
legitimate to appeal to in making claims on social resources‟ (Cohen: 2002: 95). The 
foundation for these statements is to be found in the liberalism of John Rawls. More 
specifically, the only valid demands in the political sphere are those „argued for 
openly by reference to a conception of public good‟ (Rawls quoted in Cohen: 2002: 
88). Deliberative democracy also „aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus‟, 
if consensus cannot be reached, „then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to 
some form of majority rule‟ (Cohen: 2002: 93, original emphasis). 
Furthermore, deliberative democracy is guided by the idea that only the force 
of the better argument has weight (Cohen: 2002: 93). If the better argument is 
endorsed, the quality of the decision and democracy is secured. If this is correct and 
the common good can be equated with the better argument, then it is reasonable that 
the common good trumps the losing minority‟s conception of the good.  
However, the problem with this position is that it reflects a highly idealistic 
understanding of the character of political decision-making. It assumes that the 
outcomes of political decision-making constitute a common good for the demos. In 
reality, it is difficult to envision such a conception of political decision-making. 
Rather, many political issues are disputes over the weight of different moral values. 
Consider, briefly, abortion: different conceptions of the good provide different 
answers to what is the right decision on this issue. It is not a decision where arguments 
alone provide a conclusive answer. The answer is given by the moral weight given to 
the arguments. For example, as briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, Rawls holds 
that even if people have access to the same information disagreements are possible (or 
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even likely to occur) because people attach different weight to different arguments 
(Rawls: 1996: 54). Forging a strong link between reasons and the common good has 
two consequences. Firstly, it puts members who disagree in a difficult moral dilemma. 
They have to choose between their own convictions and what the association has 
decided upon as the common good. Secondly, it implicitly states that those who are 
not swayed by a majority decision are unreasonable because they are not swayed by 
the better argument.  
By emphasizing how politics is about the common good, deliberative 
democracy effectively avoids the conclusion that politics is merely about aggregating 
preferences and maximizing utility. Instead, reason is doing the hard work. The 
problem is that equally reasonable conceptions of the good will yield different answers 
to many political questions. Consider again a democratic association discussing 
abortion: Christians and, for example, non-believers are likely to reach different 
answers on this issue. That does not mean that one of these groups is automatically 
unreasonable. Labelling the losing side as unreasonable can be seen as an unintended 
side-effect of Cohen‟s theory of deliberative democracy. Putting this strong emphasis 
on reason and the common good creates problems it is difficult for deliberative 
democracy to resolve without giving up either the idea that the members endorse 
different conceptions of the good, or the strong conception of the common good.  
The reliance on both the idea that the members of the demos endorse different 
conceptions of the good and that the demos is focused around a strong conception of 
the common good implies that the range of reasons permissible in the public domain is 
limited. This is because, if public reason is to be acceptable to all, it cannot originate 
from within a specific conception of the good. Deliberative democracy is committed to 
a strong conception of the common good because of the special status the common 
good has in the theory. Cohen‟s theory of deliberative democracy considers the 
outcome of the deliberative process as the common good. A controversial 
consequence of this is that even those who disagree with the outcome must 
acknowledge it as the common good.  
The solution to this problem, I suggest, is a weaker conception of the common 
good. Instead of understanding the outcome of the deliberative process as the common 
good, the democratic system and the deliberative process itself should constitute the 
common good along the lines discussed in the previous section. This view leaves room 
for invoking a wider range of reasons, and avoids the problem of labelling reasonable 
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conceptions of the good (for example, one or other of Christianity and Atheism) as 
unreasonable. On this model, the outcome of the deliberation is not constituted as the 
common good, but as what the majority think is the right decision. This condition is 
weak enough to avoid the unintended side-effect associated with Cohen‟s theory, but 
still strong enough to ensure stability and a lasting democratic order. That the political 
process ought to centre on reasons and the better arguments is still acknowledged. The 
crucial difference is that the range of acceptable reasons is extended, and that the 
outcome no longer constitutes the common good. Given the existence of pluralism, 
and a desire to let reasons and arguments be influential, weakening the understanding 
of the common good and the role of reason means that the aims of deliberative 
democracy are still achievable, but without the undesirable implications that follow 
from Cohen‟s more substantive account. 
However, there is a second problem associated with deliberative democracy 
from the perspective of liberal constitutionalism. That is the claim that „there is of 
course no reason to expect as a general matter that the preconditions for deliberative 
democracy will respect familiar institutional boundaries between „private‟ and „public‟ 
and will all pertain to the public arena‟ (Cohen: 2002: 97). Cohen does not elaborate 
on this claim apart from briefly mentioning that re-distribution of wealth might be 
necessary to ensure equality between the members of the association. Re-distribution 
of wealth to ensure equality is not problematic for a liberal constitutional conception 
of democracy as a principle. What is worrying from the perspective of justice as 
impartiality is that deliberative democracy threatens the critical distinction between 
first-order and second-order impartiality. The worry is that deliberative democracy, by 
not respecting a distinction between private and public, endorses a model of 
democracy with fluid boundaries for the limits of public decision-making. This opens 
the way for potentially intrusive and detailed policies that regulate citizens‟ lives in 
great detail. From the Scanlonian original position such policies can be reasonably 
rejected, and the general civil and political rights granted by liberalism aim precisely 
to protect against the implementation of such schemes.  
Clearly, Cohen does not have in mind a political system that is totalitarian or 
oppressive, and it might be objected that as long as a certain principle or policy is 
invoked as the outcome of deliberation, it is legitimate. The members ought to be free 
to decide upon more detailed and intrusive policies if they believe those policies to be 
in the common good. Furthermore, Cohen thinks this move is legitimate and that it 
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will not lead to oppressive practices because the procedures of deliberation will focus 
on reason and argument. Hence, if the best argument sways the majority, the outcome 
is the common good and will not go against the interests of the citizens individually. 
The obvious problem with putting this much faith in reason is that it supposes 
that deliberative democracy cannot err, or make wrong decisions. That is to value 
human reason and citizens‟ ability to deliberate too optimistically. Human reasoning is 
bound to fail and to make mistakes. Partly for this reason, justice as impartiality 
defends a set of rights to protect against potentially oppressive policies that may 
emerge from deliberation.   
Against this, Cohen can argue, first, that it is not just deliberative democracy 
that relies on infallibilism, because when liberals claim to know the basic interests of 
the individual, and how to protect them, it too claims certainty over an inherently 
uncertain matter. Second, Cohen can argue that the fact of equality between the 
members of the democratic association will ensure that the policies chosen will not be 
oppressive. 
To start with the first reply: for an outcome to be legitimate, deliberative 
democracy seeks to construct an ideal speech situation, where deliberation takes place 
on equal terms. If such an ideal situation can be constructed, then the outcome is 
bound to be legitimate. In principle, justice as impartiality accepts that claim, but 
holds that constructing such an idealized situation for political deliberation is highly 
unrealistic. Therefore, it is instead necessary to re-create a hypothetical situation 
where actual claims and principles can be tested.  For justice as impartiality, the 
Scanlonian original position serves as an approximation that re-creates this ideal. 
More precisely, the idea is captured in the following way:  
 
Let us suppose that a certain positive morality is in place in society and that, 
because of its unequal impact on different sections of the community (men and 
women, blacks and whites, for example), it could reasonably be rejected in a 
Scanlonian original position. If all the members of the society were debating 
what content their positive morality should have, this one would not emerge as 
an agreed outcome. But since the occasion for such a debate never arises in 
real life, a positive morality that would not survive a process of Scanlonian 
collective decision-making may nevertheless prove very resistant to 
modification.  
 
(Barry: 1995: 209) 
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The reasoning behind the Scanlonian original position has the advantage that it is 
possible to derive some ground-rules for how the political system ought to operate and 
to treat citizens. Hypothetical reasoning like this is a more secure and efficient 
procedure to ensure that the outcomes are reasonable (not rejectable). One can reason 
hypothetically at any time, but creating similar situations in real democracies can only 
be done at great cost, if at all.  
Although the hypothetical reasoning behind contractualism might appear 
idealized and unrealistic in a way that renders it liable to similar criticisms to those 
made above of deliberative democracy, it is important to notice that the Scanlonian 
original position differs from deliberative democracy in three significant ways. First, it 
does not prescribe any first-order principles, but is instead describing the conditions 
that must be satisfied to create non-rejectable outcomes. This feature acknowledges 
the importance of taking social and historical contingencies into account, so that 
different societies can choose different institutions and endorse different positive 
moralities, and still be considered just. Second, contractualism only endorses 
procedures, and does not claim that the outcomes of these procedures represent the 
common good in any strong sense. Finally, third, contractualism seeks to defend a 
weaker notion of reason than is found in theories of deliberative democracy.  
These three additional features of contractualism show that it relies on weaker 
assumptions than those that ground deliberative democracy. In the next chapter I will 
discuss the relationship between contractualism and deliberative democracy in more 
detail and defend a limited analogy between the two views. As part of that discussion I 
will also suggest that the scope of contractualism is limited, but immensely important. 
 The crucial difference here is that deliberative democracy does not 
acknowledge any precise limits on how far reaching are the policies that can be 
endorsed. It relies on an idealistic and unrealistic assumption of political decision-
making and the possibilities of creating an ideal situation for political deliberation. 
Justice as impartiality holds that the basic rights and liberties it defends cannot be 
rejected because almost any conception of the good will go better with these in place 
(Barry: 1995: 86-88). The defence of such rights represents an important advantage of 
justice as impartiality.  
Recall that the second reply available to Cohen mentioned above was that the 
equality of the participants in deliberative procedures would guarantee that the 
outcomes of deliberative democracy would not be oppressive. Although equality is 
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one of the foundations of liberal constitutionalism it is difficult from a liberal 
constitutionalist perspective to see how equality can be realized without formally 
securing basic rights and liberties. An obvious example is the role justice as 
impartiality ascribes to the interests of the weakest members of society.  Justice as 
impartiality holds that a moral principle can only be accepted if no effected party can 
reasonably reject its implementation. However, although this applies to all relevant 
parties, we have reason to pay special attention to those who do worst under a 
principle because they have the strongest reasons to reject it. In the end, if consensus 
cannot be reached, deliberative democracy resorts to majority rule. In order to protect 
minority groups who might lose out in a vote, basic liberal rights seek to ensure that 
those who do worst under some policy do not suffer any injustice and, in particular do 
not do worse just so that the majority can do better. With a set of liberal rights in 
place, this might increase the legitimacy of democracy and it might be easier for the 
losing minority to accept a defeat, as they know their basic interests are always 
guaranteed. Thus, in fact, the guarantees offered by justice as impartiality actually 
support democratic legitimacy rather than undermining it.  
This points to an important implication of justice. Ultimately, liberal 
democracy provides strong protection for the rights and interests of those who find 
themselves in the minority at moments of democratic decision. The important insight 
of this position is that legitimacy is not only dependent upon making the political 
process “more and more” democratic, but also upon how the political process is 
constrained. With these constraints in place one can expect more wholehearted support 
from marginal and minority groups for the democratic process as not only are the 
interests of the majority secured but also those who find themselves on the losing side 
of democratic decisions. Thus, the objection against liberal democracy made by many 
democrats such as, for example, Dahl that liberal rights are undemocratic and damage 
the legitimacy of democracy is undermined. Because these rights play an important 
role in protecting those who are likely to constitute the minority, liberal rights can play 
an important role in justifying and legitimating democracy.  
The aim of the present discussion has not been to reject deliberative democracy 
as a theory wholesale. Instead, the aim has been to provide a critical assessment of 
some of its central tenets which relate to justice as impartiality, and to draw attention 
to where deliberative democracy departs from liberal democracy. I believe the two 
main problems raised in this section are issues deliberative democrats ought to take 
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seriously, but at the same time, liberal democracy finds many of the points offered 
through the formal framework to be attractive starting places for democratic 
theorizing. The main point is that liberal democracy draws on elements from both 
deliberative democracy and Dahl‟s pluralistic theory of democracy, and I will now in 
the next and final section of this chapter discuss how these two approaches to 
democracy offer both attractive and problematic features for liberal democracy.  
 
4. Defining the Scope of Democracy 
The discussion in the two previous sections has given us some idea of how the scope 
of democracy has been defined by two of the currently most influential theories of 
democracy. Neither of these theories seems entirely adequate from a liberal 
perspective. In particular, two issues need to be defined more clearly. The first is the 
status of democratic decision-making. This issue is raised by both pluralism and 
deliberative democracy. In different ways both these theories claim that the outcomes 
of democratic decision-making enjoy a special status. Dahl‟s pluralism claims that 
democratic decision-making has a high probability of making correct decisions. In 
Cohen‟s deliberative theory the outcomes of democratic decision-making constitute 
the common good in a relatively strong sense. A second issue concerns the scope of 
democratic decision-making. It is not clear which institutions are included in 
democratic decision-making. Does democracy require, for example, workplace 
democracy, or that religious and voluntary associations ought to be governed 
democratically, or is democracy restricted to the political process? The purpose of this 
section is to answer these questions and thus to arrive at a clearer understanding of the 
scope of democracy. 
Starting with the status of democracy, in diverse and pluralistic societies it is 
difficult to attach a strong epistemic value to the outcomes of democratic decision-
making. Epistemic value here means that democracy is a method for decision-making 
that is able through deliberation to improve the quality of the decisions compared with 
alternative forms of government. I will now expand on why only a weak sense of 
epistemic value can be attached to contemporary accounts of democracy. The 
strongest justifiable formulation of the epistemic value of democracy, I argue, is to 
hold that the outcome of democratic decision-making is an expression of what the 
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majority think is the right decision.
22
 This does not mean that the outcome must be 
endorsed as an expression of the truth about the matter at hand, or even that it needs to 
be endorsed as „correct‟. Furthermore, this weaker understanding of the epistemic 
value of democracy rejects the idea of democracy as utility-maximization since it 
focuses only on what the majority think of as right, and not on the utility they attach to 
the outcome. Thus, this formulation also avoids the complex issue of the relationship 
between utility-maximization and how different conceptions of the good can translate 
their views into an inter-personal utility calculus to compare the utilities attached to 
different proposals.  
 A second point to mention in relation to the epistemic status of democracy is 
that in actual democratic politics a newly elected government often repudiates the 
decisions made by its predecessors. If democratic decision-making led to qualitatively 
superior decisions it would put democracy in a strange light. Because, if, for example, 
a newly elected government changes the economic policy from a socialistic oriented to 
a market-oriented policy, and both policies are invoked through the democratic 
process, then the implication of this is that both the opposing policies are endorsed by 
democracy and are in some sense „quality assured‟. Famously, Margaret Thatcher 
changed the United Kingdom‟s economic policy dramatically when she gained power 
in 1979. Both the economic policies of her predecessor and her own economic policy 
were enacted by parliament following „free and fair‟ elections, and it would be strange 
to claim that each of these policies was qualitatively the best at the time of 
implementation. It is a more sensible position to maintain that democratic decision-
making expresses what shifting majorities think of as right at a certain time, not that 
the quality of the outcomes are necessarily ensured.  
Against my weak understanding of the epistemic status of democracy it might 
be claimed that it is not inconsistent to hold that two incompatible policies 
democratically enacted can both be said to express the best decision because they were 
enacted at different times and under different conditions. Perhaps each was correct at 
the time. This is, of course, conceptually possible, but it is of only limited application. 
The example of the shift from a socialistic policy to a more market-oriented policy 
represents a shift not of emphasis, but of a more principled kind. It is odd to think that 
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 This view is nonetheless significantly weaker than David Estlund‟s (2008) recent theory of epistemic 
proceduralism that states that the process of democratic decision-making improves the quality of the 
outcomes. According to Estlund, this view does not involve the claim that democratic decision-making 
arrives at the truth or at objectively correct outcomes. 
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in the United Kingdom socialism was correct before 1979, while wrong in principle 
after 1979. More principled shifts of policy, such as the one represented by the 
Thatcher take-over in the UK in 1979, warn us against attaching any strong epistemic 
status to the process of democratic decision-making. The weak understanding of the 
epistemic status of democracy avoids taking a position on such questions, and this 
solution is more in line with the idea that justice as impartiality offers a framework for 
making public decisions when people disagree strongly over what is the right choice 
and the right decision to make. 
 Deliberative democrats may object to this argument and say that if the 
democratic process is carried out in accordance with the ideals of deliberative 
democracy the situation will be different. If the process is entirely impartial and 
properly represents the various views on the issue, and citizens approach the issue in 
an impartial and reasonable way, then it is possible to arrive at democratic decisions 
that express the truth. In addition, they might argue that it is wrong to compare the 
decisions made in actual democracies tainted by class-interests (as in the UK perhaps) 
and poor procedures (as, again, in the UK) with the ideals of deliberative democracy 
and conclude that deliberative democracy fails. 
 My reply to this argument is that given diversity and pluralism it is difficult to 
see how consensus is either possible or desirable in the strong sense suggested by 
Cohen‟s deliberative theory. Contractualists would agree that if complete equality and 
impartiality were possible, then there would be no need for a set of fundamental rights, 
but since it is highly implausible to realize these circumstances, contractualism offers 
an alternative that is more practicable. To create the ideal of deliberation demanded by 
deliberative democrats seems unrealistic from the perspective of liberal 
constitutionalism. Because of the difficulties involved in realizing these ideals, liberal 
constitutionalists hold that there is room for thinking hypothetically about what it 
would be reasonable to choose in a situation where these conditions were present. 
Hypothetical reasoning helps in articulating the necessary principles and ground-rules 
necessary to realize an impartial and equal political order. Liberal constitutionalists 
and deliberative democrats thus share some of the same ideals: a political order based 
on equality and impartiality, but they disagree with respect to the extent to which such 
a political order can be realized (or not). 
 This does not mean that the procedures of deliberative democracy are not 
important. On the contrary, they are important in ensuring political equality and 
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impartiality. They are crucial in ensuring that all have equal opportunities to voice 
their concern and influence the democratic process. These procedures also help to 
ensure that the process is, as far as possible, impartial between both different 
conceptions of the good and opposing interests. Procedures ensuring these goals play 
an important role in legitimizing the democratic system and, as pointed out earlier, a 
fair and impartial process makes it easier for the loosing party to accept the outcome. 
However, in the end, there are limitations on how far the ideals can be 
implemented in actual democracies and thus there is scope for the hypothetical 
reasoning found in contractualism when the actual deliberations of democratic politics 
fall short of institutionalizing impartiality and equality.
23
 To sum up, we have good 
reason to adopt deliberative procedures, but also good reason to accept a role for the 
hypothetical reasoning underpinning contractualism. 
After denying that the outcomes of democratic decision-making constitute the 
common good and redefining the epistemic status of democracy, a second question 
needs to be answered concerning the scope of democracy. This question can be 
formulated as: „What institutions ought to be governed by democratic procedures?‟. Is 
it only political institutions like parliament, city councils and so on, or must 
democracy be extended to corporations, religious associations and other associations 
of more voluntary character? Bringing such associations under democratic control 
could realize an ideal of equality and deter potential injustices carried out by 
corporations and other associations. If these measures are warranted they would prove 
to be an effective way of curbing, for example, exploitation of employees and illiberal 
religious practices, but are they really warranted? 
There are two arguments in favour of this position, both linked to whether 
democracy has intrinsic or instrumental value. The first says that democratic 
deliberation has value in itself as a process because it is realizing an ideal of equality. 
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 Paul Weithmann (1995) argues that contractualism and deliberative democracy share the same 
concern for realizing impartiality and equality in the political sphere. He even claims that this puts into 
question the distinctiveness of these two approaches to democratic theory. However, drawing such an 
analogy is controversial and has been subject to criticism most notably from David Estlund (2003 and 
2008). I will address this issue in more detail in the next chapter, but will here point out that Cohen‟s 
theory of deliberative democracy (which is explicitly derived from Rawls and Habermas) is easier to 
square with liberal constitutionalist understandings of impartiality and equality than other theories of 
deliberative democracy (such as Dryzek‟s version which seeks to dissociate deliberative democracy 
from influence from the liberal tradition). Even if there are competing understandings of liberal 
impartiality and equality among deliberative democrats, I do not think this closes off the possibility of 
drawing a limited analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism as I do in the next 
chapter. 
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The second argument says that every citizen ought to have an equal say over decisions 
that strongly affect his or her opportunities and wellbeing. The first argument sees 
democracy as intrinsically valuable. The process of democratic deliberation is an ideal 
in itself as it realizes the ideal of equality. The second argument sees democracy as 
valuable for the good effects it has on people‟s life; democracy is here more an 
instrument rather than something of value in itself. Thus, these two arguments 
represent democracy as, respectively, intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. 
Cohen is a representative of the first view as he sees democracy as a practice 
valuable in itself because involvement in political debate „shape[s] the identity and 
interests of citizens in ways that contribute to an attachment to the common good‟ 
(Cohen: 2002: 96). Through involvement in political debate, it is possible for the 
citizens not only to realize a common good or an ideal of equality, but also to shape 
their own and others‟ interests. Thus, the process of deliberation in itself is valuable, 
since the process itself has a profound effect on the participants. One might say in 
other words that deliberation is a virtue. Given that Cohen‟s theory rejects the idea of 
distinguishing between private and public, corporate democracy would be legitimate 
on his version of deliberative democracy. 
Dahl represents the instrumental view. His position is that corporations and 
„work life‟ exercise immense influence on citizens. He notes that „work is central to 
the lives of most people. For most people, it occupies more time than any other 
activity‟ (Dahl: 1989: 327). Combine this with how work influences self-respect, 
health, income, leisure, family life and a range of other aspects of life, and it is clear 
that work strongly affects citizens‟ opportunities. Democratic procedures would 
provide workers with an equal say in the organization of their workplace. Thus, 
corporate democracy would be justified because of its good effects. 
Interestingly this shows that both pluralism and deliberative democracy accept 
workplace democracy, but what is liberal democracy‟s position? In general, 
employees are adults of sound mind who join organizations and associations 
voluntarily. They also have the chance to withdraw if they wish to do so. Given these 
two premises, one can ask why, for example, citizens should not be able to work at 
non-democratic run workplaces if they wish to do so? In a free society, citizens ought 
to be free to do so. This means that liberal constitutionalism does not demand that 
workplaces ought to be governed democratically. There are strong reasons in favour of 
private discretion and individual liberty to let workers and employers sort out by 
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themselves how a corporation ought to be organized. Workers are not forced to work 
for a specific employer and have the right to leave if they wish. 
However, undeniably working life contains many examples of coercion, 
exploitation and unequal power relations between workers and capitalists. How can 
liberal constitutionalism address these issues? The answer is that these issues can best 
be addressed by legislation that makes such practices illegal combined with an 
institution that oversees the implementation of employment legislation. It would be an 
absurd consequence if democracy required that all workplaces had to organize their 
business around democratic ideals. Similarly, liberal constitutionalism rejects the view 
that religious and other voluntary organizations have to organize their associations 
around democratic procedures. This presupposes that the two provisos mentioned 
above must be in place, and that the general legislation reflects workers‟ concern 
adequately. 
To summarise the points discussed in this section: it is clear that from the 
perspective of liberal constitutionalism that democracy only has weak epistemic status. 
The status of the outcomes of democratic decision-making express what the majority 
think of as the right decision. Wide deliberation improves the quality of the 
democratic process by ensuring that all significant views and opinions are represented 
and voiced in the process leading up to the decision, but it does not necessarily 
improve the quality of the outcomes. In addition, we have seen that liberal 
constitutionalism thinks of the scope of democracy as confined to the sphere of 
politics. Workplace democracy as understood by Cohen and Dahl is not demanded by 
liberal constitutionalism (workplace democracy is compatible with liberal 
constitutionalism, but cannot be said to be a requirement of it as this would limit the 
right to freedom of association). The democratic organization of voluntary 
organizations, such as religious associations, is also rejected as a requirement of 
liberal constitutionalism. This means that the liberal constitutionalist understanding of 
the scope and status of democracy differs from the way in which these are understood 
by both pluralism and deliberative democracy; thus neither of the latter two theories 
proves entirely satisfying for a liberal constitutionalist. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The discussion in this chapter leads to two important conclusions. Firstly, that the 
process of egalitarian democratic decision-making is the strongest conception of a 
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common good at which it is possible to arrive in diverse and plural societies. 
Secondly, the necessary scope of democracy extends only to politics, but can be 
extended further to include workplaces and other associations if the members choose 
to do so; these institutions may be or may not be democratically organized. In 
addition, we have seen that liberal constitutionalism is built around the ideals of 
equality, impartiality and liberty. These ideals serve as the foundation for constructing 
a liberal constitutional political order. The analysis in this chapter has taken us 
somewhat closer to an answer to the second challenge outlined in the Introduction 
regarding what type of democracy liberal constitutionalism requires. Liberal 
constitutionalism rejects both pluralism and deliberative democracy in their pure 
forms, but borrows elements from both of them. From pluralism, liberal 
constitutionalism borrows the idea that the strongest conception of a common good in 
democracy is to think of the democratic system itself as the common good. From 
deliberative democracy, liberal constitutionalism borrows the emphasis on wide 
deliberations to ensure that all views and perspectives on an issue are adequately 
represented in the process. These features will be incorporated further in a distinct 
liberal constitutionalist political order in Chapter seven, but before pursuing that task I 
will discuss in the next chapter what justice requires in terms of fundamental rights 
and how these rights can be squared with the understanding of democracy deployed in 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Rights Question 
 
[A] people that can do what it wants to is not wise. 
 
Niccolo Machiavelli
24
 
 
Famously, a majority can make unjust or oppressive decisions. A central liberal 
constitutional concern is to build in constraints that rule out decisions which harm or 
oppress vulnerable minorities. The most important liberal strategy to protect 
minorities is a set of equal civil and political rights. These rights are outside the reach 
of ordinary politics and in a sense mean that a people cannot do everything it might 
want. The set of constitutional rights constrains the majority in what they can do or not 
do. Liberal constitutional theorists believe that this is a wise device to avoid harmful 
and oppressive practices being sanctioned by democracy. However, this view is 
controversial among many democratic theorists: we saw in the previous chapter how 
Robert A. Dahl opposed this move, and we have in earlier chapters seen that Jeremy 
Waldron and others share the same worry about the undemocratic character of 
constraining democracy in this way. If the critics of constraining democracy through a 
set of civil rights are right in their criticism then the hope for a liberal constitutional 
order evaporates and seems untenable. It is therefore an important question for liberal 
constitutionalists to what extent civil rights can be squared with democracy. In the 
present chapter, the aim is to assess whether it is possible to mount a liberal 
constitutional defence of constraining democracy with a set of fundamental civil and 
political rights.  
 I begin with a discussion of what is at stake here, what the objectors oppose and 
what the defenders of substantive rights seek to defend. The aim is to arrive at a clear 
understanding of the issue that divides the protagonists. After presenting the different 
views in this discussion, I will in sections two and three discuss two arguments in 
favour of substantive rights in the constitution. The first argues that the procedural 
rights associated with democracy and the substantive rights associated with liberalism 
are in fact justified for the same reasons. That is, the reasons that justify procedural 
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rights are broadly the same as the reasons that justify substantive rights. This means 
that they are derived from the same origin and cannot be so easily separated as some 
of the critics of substantive rights argue. This is supported by the view that although 
the procedural rights associated with democracy set the process of public decision-
making, they are nevertheless substantive moral principles. Thus, they cannot be 
separated from the substantive rights defended by many liberals.  
 The second argument takes issue with the demandingness and impracticality of 
deliberative democracy. It states that if it were practically possible to create ideal 
speech situations and to implement the procedures sought by deliberative democrats, 
the electorate would not violate the basic interests of individuals because the actual 
political process would be impartial and would focus on the better argument rather 
than narrow self-interest. However, I argue that it is unrealistic to believe that ideal 
speech situations and the ideal of deliberation put forward by many deliberative 
democrats can actually be realized in real democracies. Because the ideals of 
deliberative democracy are difficult to realize, there is a need for hypothetical 
reasoning and for an additional set of liberal civil rights that seek to offer adequate 
protection to citizens‟ basic interests.  
 In addition, I argue that deliberative democrats ought to be less sceptical of this 
move than they often are, because there is an important analogy between deliberative 
democracy and contractualism. Both seek to defend a political order where biases are 
denied influence in the political process. That does not mean that impartiality and 
equality play the same role in deliberative democracy and contractualism, but it means 
they share some of the same concerns and can benefit from each other perspectives. 
Deliberative democrats who are persuaded by the virtue of actual deliberations ought 
to be less sceptical of the hypothetical reasoning used in contractualism because 
contractualism seeks to constitute hypothetical ideal speech situations that express the 
equality and impartiality many deliberative democrats seek to realize through their 
emphasis on ideal speech situations and deliberative practices.   
 This idea of an analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism is 
controversial and has been subjected to robust criticism. In the final section of this 
chapter I will try to show that this criticism fails and that it is possible to think in terms 
of an analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism. So, in the end, my 
conclusion is that it is possible to defend the idea that substantive rights can be 
squared with democracy without undermining popular sovereignty and political 
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equality. 
 
1. What is Wrong with Substantive Rights? 
Briefly stated, the problem is that constitutionally embedding a set of fundamental 
rights is claimed to be undemocratic for one (or both) of two reasons. (1) It 
undermines popular sovereignty and political equality. (2) Given that modern politics 
is defined by diversity and disagreement, there is no basis for agreement on which 
rights are fundamental, and so any given set of rights will not be justifiable to all. 
Before discussing how liberal constitutionalists respond to (1) and (2), I will explain 
them in more detail.   
 Starting with (1): Dahl worries that fundamental rights constitute a form of 
guardianship similar to Plato‟s rule of the wise. Against the worry that the people need 
protection against themselves in the form of fundamental rights Dahl believes that: „an 
adequate level of moral competence is widely distributed among human beings, and in 
any case no distinctively superior moral elite can be identified or safely entrusted with 
the power to rule over the rest‟ (Dahl: 1989: 59). In fact, „the insistence that 
substantive results take precedence over processes becomes a flatly antidemocratic 
justification for guardianship and “substantive democracy” becomes a deceptive label 
for what is in fact a dictatorship‟ (Dahl: 1989: 163). However, in the end, the conflict 
between process and substance is, Dahl thinks, not really a conflict between 
substantive justice and democracy. „On the contrary, it reflects a failure of the 
democratic process. That conclusion is not merely of theoretical significance. It‟s of 
practical importance for it informs us that the solution may not be to impose limits on 
the democratic process… The solution may be instead to improve the operation of the 
democratic process: to make it more truly democratic‟ (Dahl: 1989: 174).  
 What Dahl objects to is primarily that constitutionalizing fundamental rights 
breaks with both the principle of popular sovereignty and the principle of political 
equality. The principle of popular sovereignty states that the people are the highest 
political and moral authority in a democracy. Popular sovereignty is not only an 
important element in contemporary democratic theory, but has been acknowledged as 
crucial by liberals at least since Locke (1689) and Rousseau (1762). Thus, we see the 
tension between process and substance is not only a tension between democrats and 
liberals, but is a tension that runs within liberal theory as well. Invoking substantive 
rights effectively means that these rights trump the authority of the people and this 
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violates the principle of popular sovereignty. Similarly, the principle of equal political 
rights is violated through the usual liberal adoption of judicial review (or other extra-
democratic measures to oversee the constitution), because this effectively means that 
political power is vested in the hands of unelected judges, and hence these judges have 
more political power than other citizens. In the end, Dahl acknowledges that the 
democratic process can be tainted by the rule of the majority, but he says that 
acknowledging this fact should not lead us to embed substantive rights in the 
constitution. Instead, as we have seen, he argues that the democratic process itself 
must be improved to remedy the problem of potential violations of weak minorities.  
 A version of (2) is put forward by Jeremy Waldron whose argument revolves 
around the impossibility of agreement on the content of a set of fundamental rights to 
be included in a modern democracy. Recall from earlier chapters Waldron‟s claim 
about how deep disagreement runs in modern societies marked by diversity and 
pluralism, and the question Waldron asks based on acknowledging this is, given 
disagreement, how should political decisions be made? As it is, „we are left in a 
legitimacy-free zone in which the best we can hope for is that a legitimate democratic 
system emerges somehow or another‟ (Waldron: 1999: 300). This means that in the 
political order prescribed by Waldron everything is up for grabs, „including the rights 
associated with democracy itself‟ (Waldron: 1999: 303). However, Waldron can safely 
re-assure us that this does not mean that politics is completely self-interested or „civil 
war carried out by other means‟ (MacIntyre: 1981: 253). He tells us that: 
 
The proper alternative to the self-interested model is a model of opinionated 
disagreement - a noisy scenario in which men and women of high spirit argue 
passionately and vociferously about what rights we have, what justice requires, 
and what the common good amounts to, motivated in their disagreement not by 
what‟s in it for them but by a desire to get it right. 
 
(Waldron: 1999: 305) 
 
A difference between Dahl and Waldron is that Dahl is strongly committed to 
upholding an ideal of moral and political equality, and equal political rights constitute 
a cornerstone in his thinking about democracy. Thus, for Dahl, procedural rights 
securing equal political rights are of great importance. By contrast, Waldron not only 
rejects substantive rights, but also argues that procedural rights must be rejected. All 
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we have left and must rely on is that citizens will approach politics reasonably and 
impartially, which is perhaps not particularly reassuring for marginalized ethnic and 
religious minorities. For all its boldness, there is one thing to be said in defence of 
Waldron and that is that his description is certainly realistic concerning the level of 
disagreement in most societies, and that modern democracies rest on a weak 
foundation in that they require the active support of the people to be sustained.   
 We now see the main contours of the criticism of substantive rights as being in 
tension with democracy. These two views ought to be contrasted with what the 
defenders of substantive rights argue in favour of their position. I will here discuss 
three justifications of substantive rights. The first two views argue from the 
perspective of contractualism, while the third view is non-contractual. Taken together 
these three perspectives offer different arguments as to why substantive rights may be 
justifiable.  
 Social contract based defences of substantive rights start from the democratic 
assumption of the people as fully sovereign understood as equals. From a contractual 
perspective these assumptions will give rise to equal political rights, and a democratic 
order. „But in order for these considerations to be convincing to free and equal rational 
persons, certain background conditions must be sustained. At the level of constitutional 
choice, their representatives will want to insure that the ordinary procedures for making 
laws do not compromise anyone‟s sovereignty by endangering the rights and liberties 
necessary for free persons‟ pursuit of their good‟ (Freeman: 1990: 352). One way to 
protect these rights is through judicial review as discussed in Chapter four, and in this 
situation „free and equal sovereign persons might rationally agree to... a constraint upon 
majority legislative processes, to protect the equal basic rights that constitute democratic 
sovereignty‟ (Freeman: 1990: 353). From a social contract view, substantive rights form 
part of a democratic order, and are important in maintaining the democratic character of 
the political system.  
  A second argument and an important idea implicit in constitutional liberalism is 
the idea that democracy is more than strict majority-rule. This idea is succinctly 
expressed in the following way: „nobody but a moral imbecile would really be prepared 
to deliver himself over body and soul to the majority principle‟ (Barry: 1989: 38). 
Although, this formulation is quite strong, I take it that what is meant here is that an 
adequate conception of democracy cannot be merely majority-rule. Barry‟s point is that 
it is not at all obvious that in a political order based on popular sovereignty majority-
 150 
rule is the only legitimate institution. 
  A third, non-contractual, alternative is available that might rest on less 
controversial assumptions than the social contract ideas above. This argument starts 
with questioning whether it is fairer to resolve disagreements over political principles 
through democracy or through extra-democratic institutions such as judicial review. 
Ronald Dworkin argues that leaving all decisions to majority-rule has a flavour of 
making „the majority judge in its own case,‟ and this „seems inconsistent and unjust‟ 
(Dworkin: 1977: 142). This makes him conclude that: „principles of fairness seem to 
speak against, not for, the argument from democracy‟ (Dworkin: 1977: 142). Although, 
he acknowledges that leaving decisions over basic rights to extra-democratic institutions 
is far from a guarantee against rights violations, it is at least an insurance against the 
majority‟s potential abuses of their power (Dworkin: 1977: 143-144). Dworkin worries 
that whilst „of course the comfort of the majority will require some accommodation for 
minorities‟, this will only be „to the extent necessary to preserve order; and that is 
usually an accommodation that falls short of recognizing their rights‟ (Dworkin: 1977: 
146). What Dworkin draws attention to here is that bare majority-rule may end in a 
modus vivendi situation where the majority only accommodates the minority as much as 
is required to ensure order. In other words, the majority may use their superior 
bargaining power to constrain the minority to accept outcomes leaving them perhaps 
better off than with no outcome at all, but far from securing for them the same gains 
from social cooperation as are enjoyed by the majority. Majority-rule thus embodies an 
element of mutual advantage. 
 From this discussion of the adversaries in the debate over substantive rights we 
now have a clearer idea of what the critics attack and what the proponents defend. 
There are two main claims made against embedded substantive rights. These are: (1) 
they denigrate democratic equality understood as political equality, and (2) given 
widespread disagreement over the existence and significance of different rights it is 
impossible to defend a certain set of rights as fundamental in a way that is justifiable 
to all reasonable citizens. Although, Dworkin‟s counter-argument against (1) is not a 
knock-down argument, it does undermine the claim that democracy as majority-rule is 
the only just and fair conception of democracy. In the next section I will present an 
additional argument concerning the co-originality of procedural and substantive rights 
to further undermine (1). 
 With respect to (2), I think this is a stronger argument against substantive rights. 
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Importantly, it puts into question not only the idea of substantive rights, but also 
contractualism more generally, because it seems to reject the possibility of deriving, 
for example, a set of fundamental rights from contractualism. The argument presented 
by Waldron contains an element of moral scepticism in that it questions the possibility 
of attaining any sort of moral convergence or agreement. My purpose in this thesis is 
not to argue against moral scepticism and I will not aim to offer an argument against 
this sceptical position. Instead, I will offer in section three a more modest argument 
that might be convincing at least to deliberative democrats who defend an impartial 
and untainted political process. More specifically, I will argue that there is an 
important analogy between contractual reasoning and deliberative democracy in that 
both perspectives share some of the same ideals, but they differ in how to realize these 
ideals. If deliberative democrats are persuaded by the analogy I draw between these 
two perspectives, they will simultaneously have good reason to be less sceptical about 
the element of hypothetical reasoning expressed in contractualism.  
 
2. The Co-originality of Procedural and Substantive Rights 
I want to draw attention to two things in this section. First, to the fact that even the 
procedural and relatively limited account of democracy offered by Dahl requires wide 
acceptance of a number of moral assumptions. The significance of these assumptions 
is that Dahl requires them to be embedded in the political culture of society. By 
contrast, liberal constitutionalists demand that substantive rights ought to be protected 
by the constitution and not merely be dependent on a democratic culture. The second 
claim I want to make is that in the end both procedural and substantive rights are 
derived from the same theoretical sources. Therefore, it is difficult to rely on a strict 
separation between them, and misleading to label them procedural and substantive as 
if they were completely different kinds of rights.  
Dahl accepts that „even a just process might sometimes produce an unjust 
outcome‟ (Dahl: 1989: 163). Despite acknowledging this, he maintains (as we saw 
above) that with embedded rights „substantive democracy becomes a deceptive label 
for what is in fact dictatorship‟. This is a strong claim, but what underlies this fierce 
rejection of substantive democracy is the idea that for democracy to be possible at all 
there must be a democratic culture. Or, as Dahl puts it, „the democratic process isn‟t 
likely to be preserved for very long unless the people of a country preponderantly 
believe that it‟s desirable and unless their belief comes to be embedded in their habits, 
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practices, and culture‟ (Dahl: 1989: 172). Instead of relying on constitutional barriers 
and reviews of legislation, Dahl instead requires that the citizens actively endorse the 
idea of democracy and that the ideals of democracy are deeply rooted in society‟s 
culture. If this condition is fulfilled, then democracy will be stable and it will not 
seriously harm the interests of a minority, or violate any group of individuals‟ 
fundamental interests. Dahl‟s theory of democracy therefore emphasizes a process of 
procedures for public decision-making where the people is sovereign, and any extra-
democratic institutions are neither legitimate nor necessary because the theory 
presupposes that the electorate is reasonable.  
This kind of proceduralism is therefore not as limited or minimal as it might 
seem. It requires that the people endorse many substantive moral principles, such as 
equal political rights, taking other people‟s interests in to account, and approaching 
political questions fairly. All these are substantive moral requirements, so it is wrong 
to think of proceduralism as not embodying thick moral standards. The crucial 
difference between liberal constitutional democracy and proceduralism is that 
constitutional democracy requires a set of formal constraints on democracy, while 
proceduralism requires that these be embedded in the culture of society instead. The 
difference between constitutional democracy and proceduralism is therefore a 
difference of degree rather than of kind, as both positions require some of the same 
constraints, but disagree over how these are to be integrated into the overall account of 
democracy. 
 It would still be legitimate for proceduralists to claim that constitutional 
democracy represents guardianship since a constitution with a set of fundamental 
rights is top-down, in contrast to when the same constraints are invoked bottom-up 
through a democratic culture. In the latter case the people are the source of the 
constraints and voluntarily limit themselves. That is a legitimate move as it 
corresponds with the ideal of political equality and the equal intrinsic moral worth of 
each person. In contrast, critics of liberal constitutionalism (like Dahl) claim that 
liberal constitutionalism represents a breach with political equality, because 
constraints can be invoked without the consent of the people. This is equivalent to 
disrespect for the democratic ideal itself. So, in a sense both constitutional democracy 
and procedural democracy presuppose some of the same constraints, but disagree over 
what constitutes a legitimate implementation of these necessary conditions for a 
working democratic order. Liberal constitutionalists hold that invoking constraints 
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top-down through contractualism can be legitimate, while democrats like Dahl hold 
that constraints are only legitimate when invoked bottom-up.  
The critics suppose that procedural and substantive rights are entirely different 
types of rights. However, I want to challenge this view and argue that both procedural 
and substantive rights share some of the same concerns. Hence, the implementation of 
the constraints of democracy become less of a battleground as the opposition between 
procedural and substantive rights is not as stark as the critics assume. 
The reason it is not obvious that there is such a strict distinction between the 
substantive and procedural elements of democracy is because the „fundamental 
justifications for having democratic procedures lie essentially in the same realm as 
arguments for social justice‟ (Dowding: 2004: 25). More specifically: 
 
Democracy is procedural, but then so is justice. Systems of justice may be set 
up for specific distributional or social reasons, but those systems are 
constituted of procedures for ensuring that the distributional and social 
consequences result. Similarly, democracy is a procedure, but if that procedure 
leads to injustices then we cannot expect reasonable people to accept those 
procedures indefinitely… What I have in mind is the simple contractual 
analogy. We enter into a contract to form a set of rules to govern our 
democracy. Some of the rules are set up to ensure we have entered a society 
that is just. We assume that those signing the contract did so willingly, and 
there was no domination of one group by another.  
 
(Dowding: 2004: 32-33) 
 
The crux of Dowding‟s argument is that in the end what is appealing about democracy 
is that it is just and fair. Following on from that, one can argue that there is no strict 
distinction between the rights necessary for upholding the democratic process and the 
additional rights advocated by constitutional democrats.  
This line of thinking is explored further by thinking that procedural rights and 
substantive rights (freedom of religion, integrity of the person and so on) are co-
original.25 Co-original can here mean either that procedural and substantive rights 
historically developed from the same concerns and in this way are hard to distinguish 
or that they are philosophically derived from the same sources. In this thesis I am 
mainly concerned with the latter understanding (although these two understandings are 
obviously connected). In Rawls, for example, the co-originality of procedural and 
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Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 259. 
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substantive rights is manifest through „the Rawlsian ideal of the person‟ (Gutmann: 
174: 2003). Both procedural and substantive rights are necessary to offer conditions 
under which a person‟s interests are sufficiently protected. However, the co-originality 
„does not answer the question of how the value of political freedom compares with 
that of personal freedom when they come into conflict‟ (Gutmann: 2003: 174). 
Political freedom and personal freedom here roughly correspond to procedural and 
substantive rights respectively. That the co-originality thesis does not explain how 
procedural and substantive rights ought to be reconciled if they conflict might seem 
like a weakness of liberal constitutional democracy, but I think instead it points out 
how difficult it is to separate completely the procedural and substantive aspects of 
democracy.  
Acknowledging the co-originality thesis leads to endorsement of some kind of 
deliberative democracy because although disagreements are accepted, thinking of 
procedural and substantive rights as co-original opens up a „view of democratic 
politics as an arena of argument rather than a competition for power, fair aggregation 
of interests, or of expression of shared cultural commitments‟ (Cohen: 2003: 102). The 
critical point here is that democracy is seen as a deliberation over how to find the best 
resolutions to questions of public affairs. 
Effectively, this reply plays down the conflict between democracy and justice, 
which the critics of liberal constitutionalism emphasize. This observation is supported 
by the discussions in earlier chapters of the role of reason and the conflict between 
diversity and autonomy. The critics emphasize how diversity makes it difficult to 
reach solutions endorsed by everyone. The defenders of constitutional democracy and 
fundamental rights stress that the character of procedural and substantive rights are not 
so different in the end. So, if procedural rights are acceptable (or even required), then 
why not also accept substantive rights as these are derived from the same foundation? 
The critics also stress that convergence of reason is an illusion and in a world marked 
by nothing but diversity, and thus that politics must be based on a weak understanding 
of what is reasonable. Anything other than a weak understanding would undermine the 
authority of the people and fail to acknowledge the importance of people‟s notions of 
identity and self-respect. In contrast, constitutional democracy focused on deliberation 
stresses that democracy is not merely a competition or mechanism for aggregating 
preferences, but concerns something far more serious, namely, how public affairs can 
be arranged given disagreement. 
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 Although aligning liberalism with deliberative democracy is tempting, aligning 
constitutional democracy too close to deliberative democracy contains some highly 
problematic elements for liberals. We have seen in the previous chapter that 
deliberative democracy relies on a controversial notion of the common good and 
threatens the distinction between first-order and second-order impartiality. Therefore, 
the endorsement of deliberative democracy is a qualified one. Among other things, 
this underlines the importance of the position defended in the previous chapter of 
adopting deliberative practices and perspectives into constitutional democracy, but at 
the same time endorsing the less controversial notion of the common good as 
expressed in the procedures of democratic decision-making themselves. 
 The significance of the first argument is to point out that the theory of democracy 
advanced by Dahl – a stout critic of substantive democracy – rests on the premise that 
a democratic culture must be deeply embedded in the electorate. The people must 
strongly believe in the desirability of a democratic system. Furthermore, if this belief 
in the desirability of democracy is deeply embedded, as Dahl requires, then it works as 
a safeguard against possible violations of the interests of weak and marginalized 
minorities. The problem is simply that if such beliefs are the only protection of 
marginalized minorities then this is insufficient as the weak and marginalized have 
few means to back up their claims.  
 Furthermore, if these beliefs are supposed to be strong enough to guard against a 
majority abusing its superior bargaining power, then this requires an electorate of 
saints, not fallible and sometimes self-interested human beings. The point is not that 
human nature is always or mainly self-interested, but that under certain circumstances 
self-interest may be dominant. Therefore, to safeguard against fallibility and occasions 
of self-interest, protection of basic rights through embedded substantive rights is 
important. This does not mean that judicial review or any other institution responsible 
for reviewing legislation is able to detect and avoid all abuses of power (indeed, for 
many years, the Supreme Court of the USA upheld systematic racial discrimination). 
Rather, the point is that judicial review serves as a safeguard. There is „no procedural 
alchemy whereby a majority bent on injustice can be made to pursue justice instead‟ 
(Barry: 1995: 101), but that is not a reason not to implement the best procedures 
possible. 
 The second argument deployed in this section highlights that the concern for 
procedural fairness embedded in democratic theory has the same origin as the concern 
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for substantive rights (such as freedom of religion, the integrity of the person, and so 
on). Both equal political rights and substantive civil rights are based on the same 
premise of the equal intrinsic worth of each person. Therefore, democratic theorists 
should not discard substantive rights as easily as they do. At least not strong 
proceduralists such as Dahl, as his account of democracy presupposes that the ideals 
of democracy are deeply embedded in the society‟s culture. Waldron, though, poses a 
different challenge given that he does not acknowledge the importance of procedural 
rights. For him, as we have seen, everything is up for grabs, even the democratic 
procedures themselves. Given his rejection of the somewhat weaker and less 
controversial idea of procedural rights, Waldron is bound also to reject substantive 
rights. 
 To sum up, this section has identified some important connections between 
democracy and justice that will be valuable for the argument in the next section, which 
is about the analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism. First, the 
difference between proceduralists and substantive democrats is not as deep as first 
assumed by the critics. Second, liberal constitutionalists support deliberative 
democrats in believing in the importance of incorporating deliberative practices into 
the democratic decision-making process. Both these points underline the claim that 
there are important links between democratic theory and liberalism, and that there is 
an analogy between the underlying thinking expressed in contractualism and in 
theories of deliberative democracy. 
 
3. The Analogy between Contractualism and Democracy 
The argument that there is an analogy between contractualism and deliberative 
democracy has three main steps. First, I hold that contractualism shares many of the 
same ideas and is informed by the same underlying thinking as deliberative 
democracy. Second, that evidence for the analogy can be found in the discussion 
between Rawls and Habermas. Third, and finally, this leads us to see that the 
theoretical positions of contractualism and deliberative democracy are much closer to 
each other than is commonly assumed, which means that we can conclude that they 
mutually inform each other and contribute toward realizing the same ends. This 
conclusion does not necessarily mean that deliberative democracy and contractualism 
can be fully reconciled, but I will argue that it means that contractualism contributes to 
democratic thought.  
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 What is appealing about the version of deliberative democracy advocated by, for 
example, Cohen is that it tries to secure procedures and methods for making political 
decisions that are abstracted from biases such as partiality and socio-economic 
inequalities. The theory describes procedures for how equal political rights can be 
upheld under actual political deliberations. Searching for such procedures is an 
important part of realizing the ideals of equality and impartiality. The appeal of 
contractualism lies in the same terrain. It is a useful device to check institutions as it 
too attempts to avoid biases such as partiality and inequality tainting the political 
process. Furthermore, contractualism says something about how to distribute goods by 
upholding certain principles and rights. The conditions envisioned in the original 
position are conditions of equality and conditions in which the parties are equally 
motivated to reach non-rejectable agreements. Both deliberative democracy and 
contractualism think that an ideal political order would be one where partiality and 
inequality does not affect the outcome of the political process. Thus, both deliberative 
democracy and contractualism to some extent seek a political order based on 
impartiality and equality. Therefore, some of the same aspects that we find appealing 
about deliberative democracy are the same aspects we find appealing about 
contractualism.  
 Indeed, contractualism and deliberative democracy share not only the same ideals 
– impartiality and equality – but they also share some of the same underlying thinking. 
Both are engaged in realizing a political order that is justifiable to all reasonable 
people. Deliberative democracy‟s emphasis on consensus gives a person objecting to a 
proposal a veto-power (at least in theory) so long as their objection is reasonable. 
Similarly, the contractual emphasis on reasonable rejectability allows those affected 
by a given proposal the power to offer reasons as to why it should be defeated. In 
short, contractualism and deliberative democracy rely on some of the same underlying 
thinking. This is not to say, of course, that they are essentially the same, only that they 
both share some important aspects. Yet, this is an important point as it means that 
contractualism can be relevant to the way we think about democracy. 
 Despite the shared ideals and underlying thinking, there are important differences 
between these two perspectives that it is necessary to bear in mind as well. First, there 
is the matter of whether or not it is possible to realize ideal deliberations in actual 
democracies. Deliberative democrats argue in favour of the possibility of actually 
realizing a political order based on ideal deliberation. Typically, deliberative 
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democrats argue that a political process based on equal representation, equal 
opportunity to participate, and where none of the participants have any advantages 
relative to others, will yield outcomes that are justifiable to everyone.  
 Contractualists agree that a political process of that kind would yield just 
outcomes, but they reject the premise that realizing such a process is actually possible, 
at least to the degree necessary to protect the basic interests of each person adequately. 
Contractualists claim that the requirements imposed by deliberative democracy are too 
demanding in the real world. In actual political deliberations citizens sometimes act 
according to their self-interest. This does not mean that they are unable to be impartial 
and reasonable, but they are not always impartial and reasonable. This is a more 
pessimistic (and realistic) view of the possibilities of actual democratic institutions 
than that of deliberative democrats.  
 Given the difficulties of actual deliberations, contractualists argue in favour of 
safeguarding the interests of the individual through a set of constitutional rights. This 
move gives rise to a second difference between the two positions. Since a 
Habermasian ideal speech situation is difficult to realize and actual democratic 
deliberations are fallible and sometimes self-interested, contractualists ask the 
hypothetical question: „what would reasonable and impartial citizens agree to under 
ideal circumstances?‟ The answer to this question is that a political order that is 
justifiable to everyone is one based on equal representation, equal opportunities to 
influence the political process, and where citizens have „a sense of justice‟ (Rawls: 
1999a). With these conditions in place, the outcomes will be acceptable to everyone, 
and the political order will be properly just. Nevertheless, given the imperfections of 
democratic decision-making, even just procedures may produce unjust outcomes. 
Therefore, in contractualism a need to protect against these shortcomings arises. From 
these assumptions contractualists argue that impartial and reasonable persons will 
choose a set of rights that protect the integrity of the person, freedom of religion and 
so on.  
 The main differences between contractualism and deliberative democracy are 
therefore derived from a different conception of the possibilities of democratic 
decision-making. Contractualists have a more pessimistic view of politics, while 
deliberative democrats have a more optimistic view of the possibilities of actual 
deliberations. 
 From a brief review of the exchanges between Habermas and Rawls I believe both 
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the similarities and differences between contractualism and deliberative democracy 
can be appreciated. Rawls is a good example here as contractualism as he understands 
it defends a set of fundamental rights. Likewise, Habermas is a good example of an 
adherent of deliberative democracy. As we have seen in earlier chapters, he argues in 
favour of the importance of actual deliberations. Comparing these two theorists helps 
us to identify both the similar intentions and how the same underlying thinking 
influences both perspectives.  
 First, Habermas in his remarks on Rawls‟ Political Liberalism asserts that he 
„shares its [Political Liberalism‟s] intentions‟ and that his disagreement with Rawls‟ 
project is „within the bounds of a familial dispute‟ (Habermas: 1995: 105). Clearly, 
Habermas also acknowledges the similarities that exist between the two perspectives. 
Recall from the discussion of both Rawls and Habermas in Chapter two that both 
theorists put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of consensus. The role of 
consensus is that if a principle or a political order is supported by a consensus, then 
that means that it meets the conditions for legitimacy. Furthermore, both theories 
emphasize the importance of avoiding a situation in which relative bargaining power 
and brute force can affect the political process.  
 At this point one of the major differences between the two positions becomes 
apparent. Rawls allows for hypothetical reasoning to bind the citizens, while 
Habermas holds that every issue ought to be discussed through actual deliberations. 
This difference is significant for the present discussion, as it points out how they differ 
when it comes to the way in which they constrain the political process to ensure 
legitimate outcomes. Rawls believes that the set of fundamental rights has priority 
over the outcome of democratic decision-making and ought to be outside the scope of 
ordinary politics. This is necessary to avoid the possibility that the political process 
itself will lead to intolerable injustices. So, in this respect democracy is inferior to 
liberal rights on Rawls‟ view. In contrast, Habermas instead aims to create an ideal 
speech situation, along the lines described in Chapter two, where none of the parties is 
coerced and where the participants have equal opportunities to express themselves and 
influence the outcome. In so far as the process actually matches this description the 
outcomes will be justifiable and legitimate. 
 Briefly summarized, Rawls and Habermas agree on the ideal of a legitimate 
political order. It should emphasize equality and impartiality, and ensure that the 
political decision-making process is not tainted by biases. However, they disagree 
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about how these ideals can be achieved. Although both acknowledge that the political 
process must be constrained, they have different answers as to how this ought to be 
done. Rawls argues in favour of constraints through contractualism and hypothetical 
reasoning, and Habermas through constraints on the process of actual democratic 
decision-making. 
 This discussion has several important implications for the scope of both 
contractualism and democracy. I believe that to the extent that the actual democratic 
process is impartial and realizes the ideal of moral and political equality there is no 
need to resort to the hypothetical reasoning found in contractualism. However, the 
process will not always be perfect, and to ensure the basic interests of the citizens it is 
necessary to embed a set of fundamental rights the content of which is derived from 
contractualism. Contractual thinking only informs the democratic process on these 
issues; on all other issues there is no need to resort to the contract (to hypothetical 
reasoning). This shows that the scope of contractualism is specific and limited. 
Because of its limited scope, it cannot be said that contractualism undermines the 
importance of political deliberations in any significant way. This view is supported by 
the fact that deliberative democrats and contractualists share some of the same 
underlying thinking and ideals. Thus, the hypothetical reasoning in contractualism 
should sound familiar to deliberative democrats concerned with the importance of 
equality and impartiality. 
 But now, why should deliberative democrats be attracted by the contractual 
account? I think there are two reasons. First, the contractualist view of the actual 
conditions informing democratic decision-making in real democracies is more realistic 
than the view of democratic institutions in deliberative democracy. Contractualism 
includes measures against the fallibility of democratic institutions and the electorate‟s 
sometimes self-interested behaviour in the form of protection of citizens‟ basic 
interests and this should be appealing to deliberative democrats as well. The second 
reason why deliberative democrats ought to find contractualism attractive appeals to 
the shared commitments to avoiding biases and to the importance of equality and 
impartiality in democracy. These important similarities between contractualism and 
deliberative democracy should make deliberative democrats open to the idea that 
contractualism can contribute to our thinking about democracy. 
 Even if there is an analogy between contractualism and deliberative democracy, 
this, of course, does not mean that they are identical. Instead, it means that the 
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differences between these two perspectives are smaller than is commonly assumed. 
Contractualism tells us to ensure that actual deliberations are carried out without 
causing harm to weak and marginalized minorities. This is a concern shared by 
deliberative democrats. Deliberative democracy also informs contractualist thinking, 
by pointing out that when the conditions are impartial enough, then there is no need to 
resort to contractual thinking. So, in this respect deliberative democracy is important 
in defining the scope of contractualism. On this view, deliberative democracy and 
contractualism mutually supplement each other and work in tandem in the design and 
maintenance of a legitimate political order.  
 The discussion of the analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism 
contributes to the discussion between substantive and procedural democracy. If the 
argument for the analogy between these two perspectives is sound, it supports the case 
for thinking that substantive democracy and procedural democracy are closer to each 
other than their respective adherents would have us believe. However, it has been 
argued that the analogy between contractualism and deliberative democracy fails, and 
if that were true then this would similarly undermine the argument for the closeness of 
substantive and procedural accounts of democracy. Thus, it is important to consider 
the counterargument, which is the task of the next section.  
 
4. Defending the Analogy 
The objection I discuss in this section seeks to reject the view that there is „a 
democracy/contractualism analogy, in which justice is understood along contractualist 
lines (explained below), and then outcomes of proper democratic arrangements are 
held to track justice (call this the Tracking Claim), and to do so because they have a 
structural similarity to the hypothetical choice situation posited in contractualism‟ 
(Estlund: 2003: 387, original emphasis).
26
 The crux of the objection is that actual 
democratic practices are unable to realize contractual justice, and because of this it 
makes no sense to claim that they are analogous. In short, the structural similarities 
and shared underlying thinking together do not amount to an analogy between 
contractualism and deliberative democracy. Thus, deliberative democracy does not 
serve as an approximation of contractualism. If correct, this is a fatal objection to the 
analogy presented in the previous section. However, the analogy I defend can be 
                                                 
26
 See Estlund (2008) for another and more detailed (although quite similar) discussion of this objection. 
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maintained independent of the tracking claim and is significantly different from the 
type of analogy which is the object of Estlund‟s criticism. Therefore, I believe that 
even if deliberative democracy does not track justice it is still possible to maintain that 
there is an analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism that can 
illuminate the way we think about democracy.  
Before elaborating on this claim I will explain briefly what the analogy 
between deliberative democracy and contractualism is often taken to be. The analogy 
can be briefly summarized thus: „proper democracy produces justice because it 
structurally resembles the hypothetical choice situation that is central to 
contractualism‟s account of justice or right‟ (Estlund: 2003: 388). The analogy starts 
from the idea that the procedures of contractualism and deliberative democracy share 
certain similarities. We saw above that both deliberative democracy and 
contractualism agree on the importance of avoiding a situation in which the political 
process is tainted by biases such as partiality and unequal relative bargaining power. 
The analogy draws on this similarity and it can be formulated in this more formal way: 
„an actual choice procedure will tend to track justice if it is sufficiently like the 
hypothetical choice procedure contractualism employs to explicate the content of 
justice‟ (Estlund: 2003: 390). Given the procedural similarity, the claim is that „a 
tendency of actual democratic procedures to produce outcomes that are right by 
contractualist standards can realistically be pursued by promoting the similarity (in 
certain respects) of actual procedures to the procedure in the hypothetical 
contractualist situation‟ (Estlund: 2003: 390). This is the position that Estlund seeks to 
criticise and in doing so he takes on those liberal constitutionalist theorists who hold 
that there is this sort of relationship between actual and hypothetical choice 
situations.
27
 
 For example, John Rawls holds that „political justice has two aspects… First, the 
constitution is to be a just procedure satisfying the requirements of equal liberty; and 
                                                 
27
 It might seem paradoxical that the previous section emphasized the similarities between 
contractualism and deliberative democracy and that the present section seems to suggest that 
contractualism and deliberative democracy are not as close as is sometimes assumed. However, the 
claim in the previous section was aimed at those democratic theorists (like Dahl and Waldron) who 
refuse to acknowledge that contractualism can play a role in democratic thinking, while the present 
argument is directed towards those who perhaps over-interpret the similarities between contractualism 
and deliberative democracy. Thus, the arguments of the previous and present sections are directed 
towards different opponents. In addition, I claim there is an analogy between contractualism and 
deliberative democracy, but a weaker analogy than has been defended by some of the other theorists 
participating in this debate. 
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second, it is to be framed so that of all the feasible just arrangements, it is the one 
more likely than any other to result in a just and effective system of legislation‟ 
(Rawls: 1999a: 195). The idea expressed here is that justice requires a political society 
to adopt those procedures that will lead to justice, and the procedures realizing this 
ideal are those „which mirror in that structure the fair representation of persons 
achieved by the original position‟ (Rawls: 1996: 330). The procedures of democracy 
must to some extent resemble those of the original position to realize justice. It is 
claims of this kind that Estlund targets under the heading of the „Tracking Claim‟.  
 Brian Barry deploys a similar argument. With respect to the Scanlonian 
contractualism on which his theory rests, he argues „it is possible to set out procedures 
of a kind familiar within many liberal democratic political systems that will produce 
an empirical approximation of a Scanlonian original position by making it harder for 
rules that can reasonably be rejected to be adopted‟ (Barry: 1995: 104). The claim here 
is that the more the actual practices of democratic decision-making resemble the 
conditions of contractualism, the more likely it is that the actual outcomes will be 
substantively just and will accord with the account of justice that would emerge from 
the hypothetical reasoning in an original position.  
 It is important for the argument of this thesis to notice that Estlund is explicit in 
identifying the contractualism of Barry and Scanlon as his target. He emphasises this 
when he writes that „by “contractualism” I will mean a Scanlonian version‟ (Estlund: 
2003: 394). Given that Barry and Scanlon are the targets of his objection, and the 
subject of much of this thesis, it is therefore of the first importance to show that 
Estlund‟s objection fails to undermine the analogy I presented in the previous section.  
 According to Estlund, a devastating objection to the analogy between deliberative 
democracy and contractualism is that „contractualism ensures that even a single 
reasonable rejection is fatal to a proposal, the contractors operate, in effect, under a 
veto rule‟ (Estlund: 2003: 404). This is devastating because „actual democratic choice 
procedures do not, and should not, operate under a veto rule‟ (Estlund: 2003: 404). 
The essence of the objection as it is formulated here is that contractualism presupposes 
entirely different conditions than any deliberative democratic practice seeks to 
embody. Because of this discrepancy between contractualism and both the practices 
and ideals of deliberative democracy, the analogy between contractualism and 
deliberative democracy does not stand up to scrutiny. 
 This objection as it stands is fairly obvious, and one may ask how contractualists 
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can have overlooked this point, and why they have committed themselves to the 
structural similarity of deliberative democracy and contractualism. Estlund suggests 
two possible reasons: first, „they seem to have interpreted contractualism in a way that 
makes it more similar to the democratic arrangements they endorse than Scanlonian 
contractualism actually supports‟ (Estlund: 2003: 411). Second, there has been „a 
failure to distinguish between a tendency of actual procedures to produce decisions 
similar to those produced by the hypothetical procedure on one hand… and a 
structural similarity between hypothetical and actual procedures on the other‟ 
(Estlund: 2003: 412). Because of these two errors, contractualists have failed to see 
that „without public-interested voting and participation, it is hard to see how justice 
could be systematically promoted (as if by an invisible hand), since in democracy - 
both as it is and as it should be - victims have no veto‟ (Estlund: 2003: 412). In short, 
contractualists have committed themselves to the deliberative 
democracy/contractualism analogy by a combination of over-interpreting the 
similarities, and failing to appreciate that just procedures may produce unjust 
outcomes.  
 Despite the force of Estlund‟s argument, I believe it is possible to maintain that 
there is an analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism. To substantiate 
this claim I will discuss the arguments presented above to see how they affect the 
analogy I drew in the previous section. 
 First, Estlund claims that contractualists have over-interpreted the similarities 
between deliberative democracy and contractualism by claiming that deliberative 
democracy (when properly designed) tracks contractual justice. This has led them 
wrongly to draw an analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism. The 
crucial aspect of Estlund‟s objection is that the analogy between contractualism and 
deliberative democracy is not sufficient to support the tracking claim. It is important to 
bear this in mind both because this is the central claim made by Estlund and because the 
analogy made in the previous section can be maintained without the tracking claim. 
Estlund‟s objection and my analogy target different aspects of the relationship between 
contractualism and deliberative democracy. In the following, I aim to substantiate this 
claim and to show that it is meaningful to defend an analogy between contractualism 
and deliberative democracy even if deliberative democracy does not necessarily track 
contractual justice. 
 One significant difference between Estlund‟s target and my analogy is that 
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Estlund‟s argument is aimed at a much stronger analogy than the one I seek to defend. 
Estlund attacks the view that deliberative democracy necessarily tracks contractual 
justice. Crucially, in actual democracies no one can veto a proposal in the same way as 
in contractualism and hence the analogy breaks down because veto-power is necessary 
to realize contractual justice. The analogy I defend is in relation to a different aspect of 
the link between contractualism and deliberative democracy. Liberal constitutionalism 
has been criticized for being undemocratic because of its insistence on including 
substantive rights in the constitution; rights which are thus outside the reach of ordinary 
politics. Now, the previous section pointed out that some of the underlying thinking in 
both liberal constitutionalism and deliberative democracy is similar. Deliberative 
democracy is not only concerned with describing the democratic process, but also with 
justice (avoiding that the democratic process is tainted by biases and partiality). 
Likewise, liberal constitutionalism is not only concerned with justice, but also has a 
strong commitment to the democratic process. Therefore, the kind of thinking found in 
liberal constitutionalism is not entirely alien to deliberative democracy. This is not to 
say that they are the same. Nevertheless, it is enough to show that unless one is 
unshakably dedicated to majoritarianism one should be open to the kind of thinking 
informing liberal constitutionalism and contractualism (embedding rights into the 
constitution). 
 Comparing the claim rejected by Estlund and the analogy I advance we can see 
that these take issue with different aspects of the relationship between contractualism 
and deliberative democracy. Estlund attacks the view that deliberative democracy tracks 
justice, while I claim only that the thinking in contractualism ought to have some appeal 
to deliberative democrats. Estlund attacks the view that deliberative democracy 
necessarily realizes contractual justice. This claim is not necessary to the analogy I 
advance. My analogy seeks to uphold the weaker claim that the thinking in 
contractualism is to some extent familiar to deliberative democrats and that they ought 
to be able to share with liberal constitutionalists the concern for safeguarding certain 
fundamental rights. It would of course make the analogy between contractualism and 
deliberative democracy even stronger if it were necessarily true that deliberative 
democracy tracked contractual justice (in such a case, of course, embedded rights would 
become redundant). However, what was said in the previous section does not depend on 
this much stronger claim. All that my argument claims is that the structural similarities 
between contractualism and deliberative democracy ought to make deliberative 
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democrats open to some of the claims made by liberal constitutionalists.  
 It is therefore possible to argue that even if deliberative democracy does not track 
justice, there is an analogy between the way contractualism and deliberative democracy 
work. One might say that it is precisely because deliberative democracy is not 
guaranteed to track justice that deliberative democrats ought to be open to protecting 
fundamental rights. Because democracy alone cannot protect fundamental rights there is 
an argument for paying attention to the liberal constitutional claim that fundamental 
rights ought to be embedded in the constitution.  
 That is to say, in drawing the weak analogy between contractualism and 
deliberative democracy in the way that I did in the previous section, I was clearly aware 
of the discrepancies between the two positions. It was importantly because deliberative 
democracy could not always be relied on to deliver justice analogous to a contractual 
original position that I argued deliberative democrats should take the hypothetical 
reasoning of contractualism into account. Deliberative democracy and contractualism 
share the same underlying thinking and the same ideals, however, actual deliberations 
are not always able to deliver just outcomes. Fundamental rights derivable from the 
original position serve as a protection against the shortcomings of actual deliberations. 
My point was that because deliberative democracy and contractualism share the same 
underlying thinking and the same ideals, accepting the importance of fundamental rights 
should not be too high a hurdle for deliberative democrats. Thus, it is clear that the 
analogy I drew in the previous section does not deny that there are discrepancies 
between the original position and actual democratic deliberations. Estlund‟s first 
critique, then, does not apply to my argument because the analogy on which my 
argument depends is weaker than the one that Estlund attributes to Rawls and 
Barry/Scanlon. 
 Aware of the possibility of this reply, Estlund argues against the possibility of 
even a weak analogy between the two positions on the grounds that still „there would be 
a veto gap: proposals that are rejectable in the contractual situation might yet win in 
actual democracies‟ (2008: 255). This is obviously true, but this is where the set of 
fundamental rights plays an important role. These rights will serve as a “filter” aiming 
to detect proposals that are rejectable from the original position. This filter will of 
course not be perfect, but contractualism and liberal constitutionalism do not aim for 
perfection. Perhaps more important, Estlund‟s opposition to the deliberative 
democracy/contractualism analogy is premised on a strong interpretation of 
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contractualism. An important part of the argument of this thesis has been to argue for a 
weak understanding of reason and for the limited substantive implications of 
contractualism. In the previous section, I argued that the role contractualism played in 
liberal constitutionalism was merely to derive a set of fundamental rights and to set the 
procedures for decision making. All other issues are the „stuff of politics‟ and can be 
dealt with politically, rather than through hypothetical contractual reasoning. This view 
is consistent with the weak interpretation of contractualism that was defended in 
Chapter four. The veto gap between contractualism and actual democratic decision-
making, if it exists, appears only given a robust interpretation of contractualism, which 
this thesis has resisted. Thus, the version of contractualism defended here is 
substantively weaker than that posited in Estlund‟s paper. Furthermore, another 
important part of the argument of this thesis is that liberal constitutionalism and 
contractualism require democracy, and a natural consequence of this position is to take 
the authority of democracy seriously.   
 This discussion has aimed to establish that the objection against the 
contractual/deliberative democracy analogy does not apply to the analogy outlined in 
the previous section. The crucial elements in rejecting this objection are to acknowledge 
the apparent differences between the contractual original position and the realities of 
actual democratic process, and to claim that a liberal constitutional order with a set of 
fundamental rights embodies an element of veto-power. It is also clear that the analogy 
in the previous section is weaker than the analogy as understood by Rawls and 
Barry/Scanlon (and thus Estlund). Nevertheless, it is still meaningful to maintain that 
there is an analogy between contractualism and deliberative democracy. One way to 
summarize the essence of the analogy drawn in the previous section is to say that the 
analogy between contractualism and deliberative democracy is not such that deliberative 
democracy tracks justice, but that democracy ought to take contractual insights, such as 
fundamental rights, into account. 
 Since we have seen from the discussion in this section that Estlund‟s objection 
does not threaten the analogy made in the previous section a major obstacle for making 
a convincing analogy between deliberative democracy and contractualism is overcome. 
This should provide deliberative democrats with an additional reason to appreciate 
contractualism when non-ideal conditions make it difficult to realize a process marked 
by impartiality and equality. Moreover, the argument of this section underlines the main 
claim in this chapter that the difference between substantive and procedural democracy 
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is smaller than is commonly assumed and that the differences that still remain ought not 
to be exaggerated in conceptualizing a legitimate political order. 
 
 5. Concluding Remarks 
The starting point of this chapter was the stark contrast often drawn between substantive 
and procedural democracy. We saw how this constituted a major obstacle to reconciling 
liberal constitutionalism with other influential strands of democratic thought. I then 
developed two arguments against thinking of the differences between substantive and 
procedural democracy as impossible to surpass. The first argument stated that the origin 
of both procedural and substantive rights tends to be the same. Also, it is difficult to 
make a firm distinction between these two set of rights. The distinction between 
substantive and procedural rights seems to be more artificial than real, and accepting 
procedural rights at least gives an additional reason for accepting more substantive 
rights, too. The second argument drew an analogy between contractualism and 
deliberative democracy and emphasized how both these strands of democratic thinking 
stress the importance of a political process abstracted away from biases and partiality.  
 Moreover, these two ways of thinking about democracy share many of the same 
ideals and underlying thinking and thus, I argue, can complement one another rather 
than be seen as two opposed extremes. Furthermore, drawing the analogy between 
contractualism and deliberative democracy leads us to define the scope of 
contractualism more sharply. However, when the ideal circumstances of deliberative 
democracy resist realization (which they always do to some extent), then there is room 
for the hypothetical reasoning found in contractualism (and thus for embedded 
constitutional rights). Therefore, the scope of contractualism is confined to situations 
and questions that cannot be adequately answered through actual deliberations. This 
account of the scope of contractualism also establishes that contractualism offers a 
smaller threat to deliberative democracy than often assumed. We have also seen in the 
last section that the analogy can be sustained even if there is an important difference 
between actual deliberation and the ideal conditions of contractualism. One might want 
to say that it is exactly because of this difference that deliberative democracy and 
contractualism can complement each other and work in tandem, rather than being bitter 
adversaries.  
 At this stage of the argument we have arrived at an understanding of reason in 
liberalism and contractualism. We have also arrived at an understanding of what justice 
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requires of democracy, and we have finally seen, in this chapter, that substantive rights 
of the kind required by contractualism are not a decisive obstacle to a democratic 
political order. Therefore, the next step of the argument is to arrive at a precise 
formulation of how these three elements can be combined to constitute a legitimate 
political order, and in the next chapter, I will try to draw the contours of how a 
democratic order and rights together constitute a legitimate political order.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A Liberal Democratic Order 
 
Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can 
be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his 
own Consent. The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, 
and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite 
into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst 
another, in a secure Enjoyment of Properties, and a greater Security against any that 
are not of it… When any number of Men have so consented to make one Community 
or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick, 
wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest. 
 
John Locke
28
 
 
The central ideas of liberal constitutionalism are not the invention of the 20th or the 
21st Centuries. Rather, the seeds were sown in the philosophy of John Locke. One 
reason for introducing this chapter with this famous passage from Locke is that in an 
important respect what concerned Locke (and what has been an important strand in 
liberal thought ever since) is why a legitimate political order is also a democratic 
order. This underlines what has been pointed out earlier in this thesis, namely that the 
relationship between liberalism and democracy is an intimate one, and that liberalism 
has been important in developing moral justifications for a democratic order. I want to 
draw attention to these influential strands of thought in this chapter as the crucial task 
of the chapter is to develop an understanding of this link between liberalism and 
democracy by outlining how the two requirements of justice – a democratic order and 
fundamental rights – can be combined to constitute a legitimate political order. 
 The first section of the chapter sets out the characteristics of this order, called 
deliberative proceduralism, and expands on their different implications. In section two 
I revisit the two cases discussed in Chapter three – equality of opportunity and group 
rights – and show how the democratic order developed in section one can deal 
adequately with these two cases. This assessment will give an idea of how deliberative 
                                                 
28
 Two Treatises of Government, p. 330-331. 
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proceduralism works when applied to actual political questions. Although, the 
discussion of these two cases aims to show that the model‟s solutions to these issues 
are adequate, that does not mean that the model is beyond criticism or that objections 
cannot be levelled against it. What I aim to show is more the plausibility of a liberal 
constitutional framework that can be subject to further refinement rather than claiming 
that it is beyond criticism. Sections three and four seek to answer two objections that 
can be levelled against the model defended in this chapter. The first objection holds 
that the liberal democratic order advanced here is too weak because of its soft stance 
on social justice and weak notion of public reason. The second objection argues that it 
is impossible to move beyond a political order based on mutual advantage and that the 
framework put forward in this thesis is unable to have any chance of being realized in 
any actual society. 
 
1. A Model of Democracy: Deliberative Proceduralism 
Balancing the principle of liberal legitimacy with the competing demands from 
diversity requires impartial procedures, political equality, and a set of political and 
civil rights. Even with these requirements in place, that does not mean that all the 
actual decisions made by a democracy will necessarily conform to a substantive theory 
of justice. Nevertheless, impartial procedures and a strong notion of political equality 
should ensure that unequal power relations will not affect the political process 
unfairly. I believe this model offers a framework for public decision-making that is 
procedurally just and simultaneously protects the basic interests of the individual, 
which is precisely what justice requires.  
From an ideal perspective the following three conditions must be fulfilled to call a 
political process fully democratic from the position of liberal constitutionalism: 
 
1. Impartial democratic procedures: it is necessary that the democratic process at all 
stages is based on impartial procedures, which do not provide any citizen, groups 
of citizens, or parties, with unfair advantages. Impartial procedures are taken to 
mean that an unequal distribution of resources (understood as, for example, 
financial, intellectual, and cultural resources) cannot be translated into political 
power that can determine the outcome of public decision-making.  
2. Political equality: each citizen ought to have an equal opportunity to influence the 
political process leading up to and at the actual decision-making stage. Equal 
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opportunity here also includes an equal opportunity to be elected to public offices. 
This principle is grounded on the equal intrinsic worth of a person. An equal 
opportunity means that each citizen ought to have real equality of opportunity to 
influence the political process if he or she chooses to engage in the political 
process. 
3. Basic civil and political rights: every citizen is entitled to an extensive set of civil 
and political rights. This set of rights must guarantee the necessary political rights 
for active participation in the political process on equal terms. This set of rights 
must also protect the basic interests of the person such as integrity and freedom of 
the person. This set of rights defines the legitimate limits of political interference.  
 
As formulated here, these conditions sound extremely strong and demanding. One 
might think that it would be impossible to realize these conditions in actual democratic 
societies and hence that this model is liable to the same criticisms as those levelled 
against „politics as consensus‟ in Chapter two. I agree that the formulations of these 
three conditions are ideal and demanding, but I will now elaborate on what they 
actually require in practice to show that these conditions constitute a middle ground 
between coordination and consensus theories. It is reasonable to assume some room 
for civil disobedience, and that the citizens do not have to accept the outcome as the 
common good or as maximizing utility. All they are asked to accept is that a given 
outcome is the legitimate outcome of a fair political process. 
Starting with impartiality, a democratic order requires impartial procedures for 
decision-making, because it is unjust that those with access to more resources can 
determine the outcome of political decision-making. Where those with more resources 
are able to do this, that undermines the idea of the equal intrinsic value of each person, 
and it might result in the implementation of principles that could reasonably be 
rejected in a contractualist thought experiment. Furthermore, the state and the political 
system must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. The basic 
requirement is that the state and the democratic process should not be built around or 
presuppose support of a specific moral, philosophical, political or religious ideal. The 
purpose of the state should not be to promote certain values, religions or philosophical 
views. In addition, this ought to be implemented in the workings of the political 
system, implying that ethnic, religious and political groups are not discriminated 
against by the majority, or by influential minorities. 
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To see more clearly what this means I will now discuss two cases in relation to 
religion. It is clear that impartial procedures rule out that a fully democratic society 
can have an established or official church promoting a particular religion. Obviously, 
this creates some hard cases, such as the UK and Norway, which both have established 
churches. As it happens, the state does not particularly promote Christianity in either 
of these countries, and both offer reasonable opportunities for other religions and 
churches to flourish. That is, even if these countries nominally have established 
churches, their actual practices do not depart much from those that would obtain were 
there not an established church. Thus, although established churches – such as those in 
the UK and Norway – are ruled out in principle by the ideal of impartial procedures, 
given the practices in these two countries formally separating the state and church 
might not be an urgent political demand. In societies where an established church or 
religion is promoted in more „evangelical‟ ways a separation of the state and religion 
obviously becomes much more urgent. 
Of course, even if an established religion is ruled out, that does not mean that 
certain laws and policies may affect different religions differently. For example, the 
fact that one religious group has its holy days recognized as public holidays whereas 
another group does not, does not necessarily mean that the state is partial. Deciding 
upon public holidays is a question of the coordination necessary to make society work 
smoothly, and it can in principle be organized in a wide range of different ways. In 
order to make society work more smoothly it is not unreasonable to recognize the 
holidays of the majority religion as public holidays. The critical point is that the 
justification for organizing public holidays in this way must appeal to public reasons 
and not, say, to the truth of the religious doctrine that underwrites those holidays. 
Having Christmas day as a public holiday because the vast majority of citizens happen 
to be Christians (and many of those who are not nevertheless wish to enjoy the 
Christmas season as a secular holiday) is very different from having it as a public 
holiday because the state recognizes the birth of Christ and endorses the claim that His 
birth should be celebrated.  
It follows from this that such decisions are subject to democratic control and 
are thus liable to be changed if the majority religion changes or a different, better, 
solution to the coordination problem presents itself. One might object that there is no 
principled difference between an established church and recognizing a particular 
religious group‟s holy days as public holidays and thus that if an established church is 
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rejectable, then recognizing a religion‟s holy days as public holidays must be 
rejectable too. However, there are both quantitative and qualitative differences 
between the two cases. An established church is a systematic and organized way to 
offer one religion advantages relative to other religions. The issue of public holidays is 
far less significant; it is more a question of making society work smoothly, and it can 
be organized in a wide range of different ways. As noted above, the fact that a law, 
practice or policy is not impartial in its impact on different parts of the population 
does not automatically mean that it is unjustified. To make use of Rawls‟ distinction 
between restriction and regulation of a liberty (Rawls: 1996: 295) I will say that 
recognizing one faith‟s public holidays as official holidays does not restrict freedom of 
religion, but constitutes a regulation of this important principle. The establishment of 
an official state church is qualitatively different because it is hard to see what 
justification could be given for it that would not appeal to some particular conception 
of the good. There is a (justifiable and public) reason to have public holidays, and 
given that, there are some good (and again justifiable) reasons to have them on the 
days that suit most people. There is no obvious equivalent public reason to have an 
established church. 
This discussion of the implications of the ideal of impartial procedures aimed 
to show both that the ideal of impartiality is deeply embedded in this model of 
democracy and that even if a law, practice or policy affected different parts of the 
population differently that does not necessarily make it unjustifiable as long as it can 
be understood in terms of politics (for example, the need to solve some coordination 
problem) and is the outcome of democratic decision-making. The important point is 
that the outcome of the coordination could equally well have been different and 
affected another part of the population in a negative way. Thus, different impact is not 
in itself unjustifiable.  
Moving on to political equality, real (and not merely formal) political equality 
means that votes should count roughly the same and that those with views on an issue 
ought to have ample opportunities to voice their concerns. Achieving political equality 
therefore requires a strong element of deliberation. In addition it also requires a high 
level of impartiality as outlined above. In fact, political equality is an important aspect 
of impartiality and these two ideals are connected as impartiality often requires 
equality. Consistent with the conclusion above concerning the different impact of 
laws, political equality presupposes treatment as equals, not equal treatment 
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(understood as identical treatment (Dworkin: 1977: 227)). It is also noticeable that 
deliberative practices play an important role in ensuring real political equality and not 
merely formal political equality. Formal political equality is already in place in most 
democracies, but it is uncontroversial to claim that most current democracies lag 
behind in translating formal political equality into real political equality as certain 
influential groups often have more influence than their numbers suggest they should. 
Thus achieving real political opportunity is therefore a challenge for most current 
democratic societies. 
Even with impartial procedures and political equality in place, the outcome of 
the political process might violate citizens‟ civil and political rights. These rights play 
an important role in trying to ensure that unequal bargaining power between different 
groups in society is not translated into differences in political power. Civil and 
political rights also seek to protect vulnerable minorities in cases where a majority 
might violate some of their fundamental interests. Furthermore, a set of civil and 
political rights is important also because even if the political process seeks to be 
impartial and realize political equality through extensive deliberations these ideals will 
always be realized in imperfect ways. A set of civil and political rights may serve to 
protect individual rights in cases where the political process fails to be impartial and to 
uphold the ideal of political equality. Finally, a set of civil and political rights sets 
some limits to public decision-making and seeks to ensure that individuals have 
opportunities to pursue their conceptions of the good and have a sense of control over 
their own lives.  
It is important to see the important role a set of civil and political rights plays 
in helping liberal constitutionalism avoid the two problems associated with politics as 
coordination: mutual advantage and no limits on public decision-making. It is also 
noticeable that apart from a set of civil and political rights this model of democracy 
puts few restrictions on the democratic process and public reason. There is no demand 
for consensus and no controversial notions such as a strong understanding of the 
common good or of the objectivity of political judgements. From this it is clear that 
the liberal constitutional model advanced here is substantively weaker than politics as 
consensus but also substantively stronger than politics as coordination. We can also 
see from the discussion in this section that the actual content of the democratic process 
is closer to deliberative democracy than pluralism, but the rejection of a strong 
understanding of the common good and the establishment of civil and political rights 
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ensures that many of the controversial aspects of deliberative democracy are ruled out. 
This model thinks of democracy first and foremost as a process of impartial 
procedures where wide deliberation and participation are emphasized. Thus, we can 
call this model of liberal constitutionalism, deliberative proceduralism.  
Deliberative proceduralism constitutes a middle ground between the competing 
democratic theories of pluralism and deliberative democracy. Occupying a middle 
position in this way is how liberal constitutionalism seeks to satisfy the liberal 
principle of legitimacy and the demands that emerge from pluralism and diversity. The 
demands from pluralism are satisfied through a wide scope being left for democratic 
decision-making, by applying few constraints on the notion of public reason, and by 
rejecting a strong understanding of the common good.  
In a sense politics as coordination scores better on accommodating pluralism 
than deliberative proceduralism as it puts hardly any constraints on the notion of 
public reason, rejects civil and political rights, and does not endorse a notion of the 
common good. Similarly, politics as consensus scores better on liberal legitimacy by 
emphasizing the importance of consensus in the political order. However, the 
constraints built into making a political order legitimate are difficult to square with the 
competing demands of pluralism. Hence, politics as coordination is too weak, and 
politics as consensus is too strong, and the challenge is thus to find a middle way that 
builds on the best of both of these theories whilst avoiding the different pitfalls into 
which each slips. If such a theory can be found, that seems a plausible solution for 
liberal constitutionalism. What I have tried to do in this thesis is to articulate precisely 
such an alternative, and deliberative proceduralism as outlined in this section is the 
result of trying to articulate an alternative to coordination and consensus. In the rest of 
this chapter I will try to defend the plausibility of this model.  
In the next section, I will revisit the two cases discussed in Chapter three – the 
issue of group rights and equal opportunity – to see more clearly how deliberative 
proceduralism works when applied to real cases. These two cases do not completely 
determine how the model works in all possible cases, but they are both highly 
controversial cases in contemporary political philosophy and if plausible answers can 
be offered on these two issues, then that means at least that this model is relevant for 
how we think about some of the basic questions of justice.  
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2. Equal Opportunity and Group Rights Revisited 
We saw in Chapter three that justice as impartiality appeared to have relatively modest 
substantive ambitions. An important feature of the theory was precisely that it left 
wide scope both for individual discretion – through the distinction between first-order 
and second-order impartiality – and for democratic decision-making. Given this 
emphasis on just procedures and basic fundamental rights, I argued that it was 
surprising to see the detailed implications Barry derived from his theory on questions 
of equal opportunity and group rights. The main purpose of the present section is to 
revisit these two cases from the perspective of deliberative proceduralism. As will be 
clear, the answers suggested by this model are significantly more open-ended and 
flexible than the answers to these questions discussed briefly in Chapter three. I will 
also argue that the answers I will set out on these two issues are still firm enough not 
to be in tension with the requirements of justice as defined by justice as impartiality.  
 We saw in the discussion of equal opportunity in Chapter three that socio-
economic inequalities had a potentially enormous impact on people‟s lives. Moreover, 
we saw that in response to this fact Barry argued strongly in favour of equalizing the 
environment of children as early as possible and as much as possible in order to realize 
equal opportunity. Finally, he held that this conclusion followed from the central 
tenets of justice as impartiality. I argued that although the response from Barry was 
not required by justice, it was nevertheless consistent with it. That is to say, justice as 
impartiality does not require a response of the kind favoured by Barry, but it does not 
rule out such a response as consistent with the theory under certain circumstances. So, 
if justice does not require equalizing children‟s environment as much as possible and 
as early as possible, then what does justice actually require in terms of equal 
opportunity?  
 Simply put, the answer is that deliberative proceduralism requires that the 
conditions for a just political system described in the previous section are upheld. This 
means that justice does not require redistributive schemes such as an extensive welfare 
state or universal basic income. Questions of social justice are questions dealt with in 
the political process, and deliberative proceduralism does not require specific schemes 
or policies. Part of what a just political system requires is that all citizens have equal 
opportunity to participate in politics and to influence the democratic process. 
Redistributive measures (additional school spending on schools in poor areas, etc.) can 
be invoked to ensure equal opportunity to participate in the political system, but are 
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not required to create equal opportunity as defined by Barry above. Once fundamental 
rights and equal political opportunities are guaranteed, then that is enough to satisfy 
the model of democracy I present here, and no more redistributive schemes are 
necessarily required. Therefore, we can conclude that deliberative proceduralism does 
not require specific principles to achieve social justice. Furthermore, we saw in 
Chapter three that justice as impartiality argued persuasively against leaving questions 
of social justice to be settled by the courts as that would effectively take the content of 
ordinary politics away from parliament and instead have it decided by judges. Also, it 
would mean that courts would decide the allocation of a vast amount of the 
government‟s budget, which has the same effect of taking decisions out of politics and 
placing them with the courts. The idea of leaving social justice to the ordinary course 
of politics as suggested above, is consistent with thinking that social justice should not 
be settled by the courts. 
 Against this conclusion one might object that the conditions of a just political 
order are so ideal and demanding that they cannot be realized. Instead it is necessary 
to resolve social justice through hypothetical reasoning and invoke a principle of 
strong socio-economic equal opportunity in the constitution since the political process 
itself will never yield outcomes within the bounds of justice. A second objection is 
that socio-economic equal opportunity has been one of the defining issues for 
liberalism in modern times, and simply to reject this principle in this way and to leave 
it to ordinary politics is simply to reject it as a principle. A third and related objection 
is that the answer given in this section is a blow in the face to all those who are 
disadvantaged by being denied equal opportunities, and who are disadvantaged in the 
job-market and in the educational system, because they do not enjoy the same 
advantages as other people with comparable skills and motivation. Furthermore, the 
answer I have outlined seems to undermine the seriousness of the increasing socio-
economic inequalities in contemporary Western societies. These are powerful 
objections, but I believe that they can all be answered. 
 In response to the first objection my reply is to grant that the conditions for a 
just political system set out in the previous section are demanding, and they require 
more of a democratic system than most actual democratic systems require at present. 
However, that does not mean that they are unrealistic. The conditions outlined are less 
ideal than those required by some versions of deliberative democracy – for example, 
those of both Habermas and Cohen – that have been discussed in this thesis. For 
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example, consensus is not required to make decisions. Instead it is required that the 
process leading up to a decision ought to reflect the diversity of opinions and interests 
on a certain issue and that superior economic power ought not to translate into more 
political power.  
The requirements of deliberative proceduralism are, of course, significantly 
stronger than those of Waldron‟s coordination based theory. Deliberative 
proceduralism occupies a middle ground between two relatively extreme alternatives. 
The conditions of deliberative proceduralism suggested in this thesis actually mean 
that the theory embodies weaker requirements when compared to most liberal and 
democratic theories. Therefore, the requirements are not too demanding to be realized 
in the real world. When they are realized, they should be sufficient to deliver policies 
that are consistent with justice although, of course, should they fail and proposals pass 
that violate fundamental rights, then there will be the check of the constitution to 
protect the basic interests of the citizens.  
 With respect to the second objection, it is true that socio-economic equal 
opportunity has been one of the defining features of liberal egalitarianism in recent 
times and one of the issues that has received the most attention in discussions of social 
justice. That said, to judge from the discussion of social justice in Chapter one, there is 
no consensus on what socio-economic equal opportunity actually requires, or for that 
matter, on what is required by social justice in general. What I have described are the 
contours of what a reasonably just democratic system requires, and part of those 
requirements are equal political opportunities that are not merely formal, but real. That 
in itself is a fairly strong requirement and is, in a sense, a democratic formulation of 
what equal opportunity requires.  
Recently, a wide range of imaginative proposals of how to realize social justice 
has been put forward and many of them, if not most of them, would be consistent with 
justice. Therefore, social justice is achievable not only through equal opportunity, but 
also through a range of other schemes as well. Examples of some of these schemes are 
universal basic income (Parijs: 1995) and the stakeholder society (Ackerman and 
Alstott: 1999) just to mention a couple. All these schemes would be consistent with 
deliberative proceduralism, and it is not clear why one of them should enjoy a 
privileged status. So, although, socio-economic equal opportunity has been an 
important element of liberal egalitarianism for a long time, it is not the only one, and it 
is far from clear that it should enjoy a privileged position. Thus, a principle of socio-
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economic equality of opportunity is not a constitutional essential in the same way as 
freedom of religion is a constitutional essential; there is simply no reason to think that 
equality of opportunity enjoys a privileged status compared with other schemes of 
social justice. The crucial difference between the set of civil and political rights and 
social rights from the perspective of liberal constitutionalism is that the former is 
necessary for the workings of the political system itself, while the latter is not required 
for securing a democratic order or for protecting the basic interests of a person. 
 As to the third objection, the force of the objection is that my interpretation of 
liberal constitutionalism does not offer substantive principles to answer questions of 
social justice. As it happens, I have a great deal of sympathy for the claim that 
addressing growing socio-economic inequalities is important. However, it is not clear 
that this requires us to pursue the line taken by Barry on this issue. There are two 
important concerns to bear in mind when assessing the lack of substantive principles 
in my interpretation in comparison with the line chosen by Barry. The first point is 
that realizing socio-economic equal opportunity must not violate the basic interests of 
the person or the distinction between first-order and second-order impartiality. This 
was identified above as a danger with Barry‟s interpretation of this principle in 
WSJM, which argued that equal opportunity required equalizing children‟s 
environment as early as possible and as much as possible. As was noted in the 
discussion in Chapter three, this opens up the potential for intrusive policies that 
would conflict with the importance agents give to feeling in control of their own lives. 
  In short, Barry‟s robust interpretation of the equal opportunity principle could 
have potentially intrusive effects on how upbringing and family life is organized in 
most democratic societies. Choosing such an approach would be to try to rectify one 
injustice by invoking another. Moreover, the cure may be worse than the disease. A 
second point is that the framework I suggest is one where the political process would 
be significantly different from the current practices of many Western democracies. 
This framework would offer fairer terms for political discussion and offer weak and 
marginalized groups equal and fair opportunities to raise their concerns. Therefore, 
even if a specific substantive principle is left out, that does not mean that the 
theoretical framework does not have anything to say about social justice. In addition, 
it should be remembered that this relatively soft stance on social justice is taken 
against the background of a democratic system that would be substantially different 
from current democratic practices in most Western societies. This makes a difference 
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as a more ideal political system might produce different outcomes than those produced 
by current democratic practices. 
 These replies seek to establish and defend the idea that what justice requires is 
more minimal than what is consistent with justice, and that social justice is the „stuff 
of politics‟. This is an important element in taking democracy seriously. If the 
realization of social justice required specific policies in the way defended by Barry, 
then the scope for democracy in liberal constitutionalism would be very limited. This 
would make it even harder to reconcile democracy with justice. Civil and political 
rights are difficult enough to square with popular sovereignty; extending the scope of 
justice to include social rights would put even firmer limits on the role of reason in 
liberal constitutionalism by relying on controversial ideals of social justice. The stance 
taken on social justice by deliberative proceduralism makes it easier to reconcile 
justice and democracy because it extends the scope of democracy instead of narrowing 
it. 
 Turning to the issue of group rights, we saw that the question confronting us is 
whether groups (ethnic, cultural, religious, etc.) ought to be given exemptions from 
general applicable laws. A second related question is to what extent groups ought to 
be granted group specific rights that apply only to members of the group (for example, 
specific rights given to indigenous groups to ensure the group‟s identity is protected). 
Barry‟s approach was hostile both to the granting of exemptions and to the granting of 
group specific rights, and again his claim was that this approach was derived from the 
framework found in justice as impartiality. The question to answer is: how would 
deliberative proceduralism deal with these issues? Must group sensitive rights be 
rejected or not? 
 The answer to this question is both „yes‟ and „no‟. It is „yes‟, if such rights 
violate fundamental rights or the democratic order as specified in the previous section. 
The answer is „no‟, in so far as such rights do not threaten the democratic order or 
fundamental rights. The central idea is that in cases concerning essential rights and 
essentials for the democratic system it is imperative that both exemptions from 
generally applicable laws and group specific rights are rejected. In non-essential cases, 
exemptions and group specific rights may be granted. In both cases, this decision is to 
be made by the legislative assembly, as this assembly decides the positive law of the 
country.  
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This raises an important question about how to distinguish between the 
essential and non-essential cases. It is difficult to offer specific and detailed guidelines 
or principles for how to draw this distinction, but this is where judicial review and the 
courts have a role to play in the democratic system. Assuming that the constitution 
lays out the basic rules of the political system and the set of embedded fundamental 
rights, it is the judiciary that will interpret the content of the constitution and the extent 
to which a specific law is unconstitutional (or not). This is certainly an imperfect 
procedure, but it is attractive both from a liberal constitutional and a practical 
perspective.  
Of course, this is precisely the move many democratic theorists such as Dahl 
and Waldron reject as illegitimate. However, the point from a liberal constitutional 
perspective is that judicial review is acceptable if it can protect against outcomes 
threatening to undermine the democratic system itself. The set of fundamental rights 
has a democratic role in addition to protecting citizens‟ basic interests. It serves as a 
guarantee for the minority that, whatever the outcome of the democratic process may 
be, it will not violate or threaten their fundamental interests. This function ensures 
trust and support for maintaining the democratic system even when a minority stands 
to lose. Although this means that democratically made decisions can be overridden by 
the judiciary, one point of this thesis has been to argue that this is not undemocratic 
because its main role is to protect democracy and because, on my interpretation of 
liberal constitutionalism, the role of the judiciary is modest. 
 One may object to this solution and say that this seems to give proponents of 
group rights what they want and at the same time to give liberal constitutionalists what 
they want. But in the end the entire system is tilted towards liberal constitutionalism 
and will produce liberal constitutional outcomes all the way through. Hence, liberal 
constitutionalism of the kind advanced in this thesis always has an upper hand and 
when it comes to actual decision-making it does not give much leeway to group rights 
at all. It is of course non-negotiable for liberals to compromise a just political system 
and fundamental rights, but that does not mean that liberals necessarily are committed 
to the uncompromising attitude adopted by Barry on this issue. The approach 
described above would allow for much more than mere anomalies. Furthermore, 
anchoring the decisions concerning these issues in the parliament itself would offer 
more opportunities for group sensitive rights. But, in the end, the decision would be 
left to the parliament and there are no guarantees that either side on these issues will 
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prevail, it all depends on the possibility of each side to offer reasons that are 
compelling and that will receive the support of a majority. Therefore, the possibilities 
for invoking group sensitive rights must be said to be greater than in the position 
stipulated by Barry. 
 To summarise briefly how deliberative proceduralism deals with the issue of 
group rights: group rights and exemptions can be granted as long as they do not 
threaten the democratic order or violate fundamental rights. Judicial review plays a 
(modest) role in determining whether a particular law conflicts with fundamental 
rights and undermines the democratic order. Group rights are in the end to be dealt 
with by democratic decision-making. This does not grant exemptions or group specific 
rights in itself. Instead the important point is that this is a question left to democratic 
deliberation. 
 We have now seen how deliberative proceduralism would respond to the issues 
of equal opportunity and group rights. The solutions it proffers are sensitive to both 
the importance of democratic legitimacy and popular sovereignty on the one hand, and 
to the importance of protecting the basic interests of the individual on the other. And 
that is exactly what justice requires. The theoretical framework outlined in the 
previous section and the applications of it in this section might be criticized for being 
both too weak and too strong. Too weak, because it may not be able to avoid power 
and relative bargaining power to determine outcomes; too strong, because in practical 
politics it is impossible to move beyond a political order based on mutual advantage. 
Over the next two sections I will discuss how these two objections affect deliberative 
proceduralism. 
  
3. The Liberal Dilemma I: Too Weak? 
A central concern for liberal constitutionalism is to find a notion of reason that is 
neither too weak nor too strong. If the notion is too weak, then the theory will not 
offer sufficient protection to the fundamental interests of persons, and will allow 
unequal bargaining power to influence the outcomes of public decision-making. Thus, 
if liberal constitutionalism is too weak it collapses into a mutual advantage theory and 
is essentially a version of politics as coordination. The aim of the present section is to 
discuss whether deliberative proceduralism is too weak, and thus fails to protect 
against mutual advantage and the exploitation of relative bargaining power. To see if 
the account of liberalism defended in section one meets the requirements of a liberal 
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theory it is necessary to assess the extent to which it meets the requirements of liberal 
legitimacy and pluralism.  
 To start with, there are at least four reasons for thinking that deliberative 
proceduralism is not strong enough to offer a justifiable political order. 
 
1. The political process I have outlined favours the articulate and educated over 
those who are less articulate and less educated because I emphasize how the 
political process involves extensive deliberation, which will favour those who can 
be convincing in argument. Or, to put it crudely, my account favours the middle 
class over the working class. The critic may then allege that whilst I argue for real, 
and not just formal, political equality, I endorse political practices that make it 
much harder for working class (and other marginalized groups for that matter) 
groups to voice their concerns, because educated and confident middle class 
groups will feel more comfortable on the political stage as it is defined in my 
model. Hence, talk of real equal opportunity is illusory, and the end result is mere 
formal equal opportunity. This means that the model fails on its own terms. 
2. A second criticism may be that no notion of the common good is given within my 
account. An objection might be that to leave out any notion of the common good – 
even a weak one – leaves the theory vulnerable to mutual advantage and relative 
bargaining power; without a shared common good, the bonds within society are 
not strong enough to avoid the possibility that powerful groups will use their 
superior bargaining power to skew the outcomes of the political process to their 
own advantage. My emphasis on thinking of the democratic system itself as a 
common good is too weak because it is merely procedural, and does not focus 
upon any of the substantive outcomes of the process. The substantive outcomes 
matter, because they give the actual content to the political system, and it is the 
content and the outcome that matter to people in the end.  
3. A related point is that deliberative proceduralism requires only a minimal notion 
of consensus, which focuses on the justifiability of the democratic system and a 
constitution protecting basic interests. A workable political order requires 
widespread support not only on the fundamental procedures of the political 
system, it might be said, but also on some of the substantive outcomes. If 
consensus cannot be achieved – perhaps not on all issues – but at least on some 
political issues of great national importance, then this will undermine and 
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marginalize the support for the political system from those parts of the electorate 
who believe their views are not properly taken into account. In short, a political 
system with only a limited place for consensus is inherently unstable. 
4. Finally, there are few restrictions on public reason. What counts as a public reason 
is not clearly specified and without the same strict limits as are given by Rawls 
(1996 and 1999b) and Habermas (1991 and 1996), this will be exploited by those 
who want to use populist and simplistic political language to gain support for the 
outcomes most likely to benefit their particular interests. This again opens up the 
possibility of threat advantages affecting, and of powerful groups manipulating, 
the political process to their advantage. In the long run, the political system runs 
the risk of being undermined and losing legitimacy and support among the wider 
public.  
 
 If these criticisms are sound, deliberative proceduralism is not much different 
from the theory advanced by Waldron and discussed in Chapter two. In fact, the 
similarities are striking. First, on this liberal constitutional model it is possible that 
many citizens will find themselves living under a political order with which they 
strongly disagree. Furthermore, like Waldron‟s model, my account does not include 
any substantive principles of social justice, has no strong requirements of consensus, 
or requirements in relation to the common good. These points are consistent with the 
stress on the idea advanced both by Waldron and in this thesis that disagreement is an 
important part of modern political life. Given that, the ambitions of political theory 
must be curbed to avoid reliance on premises that can reasonably be rejected by parts 
of the electorate.  
 Nevertheless, concerning 1) it seems hard to deny that the educated classes might 
have an advantage in politics as they have more training and are more articulate, and 
they also possess more of the social and cultural capital needed to succeed in politics. 
However, that seems to be the case in any political system in which deliberation is a 
part, not only deliberative proceduralism. The important point here regarding 
deliberative proceduralism is that it presupposes that all groups of the population have 
equal access to education and will be able to protect their interests. There might 
always be differences between, for example, a law professor and a heavy industry 
union leader regarding knowledge of the political system, but in so far as unions (or 
other marginalised groups in society) possess the necessary resources (rights, financial 
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and intellectual resources) to protect their basic interests, then differences and 
inequalities are permissible. Regarding 2) - 4) above, I believe they can be rejected as 
they are incompatible with the pluralism and diversity in modern Western societies. 
More communitarian societies may be compatible with a stronger conception of the 
common good, consensus and public reason. Deliberative proceduralism claims that a 
robust defence of civil and political rights will protect persons‟ interests from 
violations even in a society with weak conceptions of the common good, consensus 
and public reason. This is also one of the main dividing lines between deliberative 
proceduralism and politics as coordination, which does not offer such protections. So, 
despite some similarities with politics as coordination there are at least four important 
differences. 
 
1. The first substantial difference is that my model requires a democratic order based 
on impartiality and equality. We saw that Waldron also emphasizes the importance 
of impartiality, but his notion of impartiality is ambiguous and he fails to say how 
it should be understood. Moreover, it is clear that for Waldron even the democratic 
system itself is up for grabs. Therefore, the political system that springs out of 
Waldron‟s political theory will not necessarily be a democratic order based on 
impartiality. Regarding equality we saw that, on Waldron‟s model, coordination of 
behaviour and the advantages a person received from social cooperation were 
decisive in defining a legitimate political order. On this view relative bargaining 
power is allowed to play an important role, which leaves little scope for 
considerations based on equality. Thus, with respect to both impartiality and 
equality the account defended by Waldron is less robust than deliberative 
proceduralism. 
2. A second difference is that, on my account, there are strict limits on the reach of 
government through the distinction between first-order and second-order 
impartiality, while Waldron‟s model has no barriers against intrusive policies or 
any limits to the reach of government. In the model advanced in this chapter it is 
important that there is wide scope for individual discretion and that individuals 
have ample opportunities to live their lives in accordance with their conceptions of 
the good. These rights impose limits on the kind of policies that can be invoked 
through the political system, but no such barriers are present in Waldron‟s theory. 
Deliberative proceduralism therefore offers a substantively stronger version of 
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liberalism than Waldron‟s view of politics as coordination games.  
3. A third difference is that in deliberative proceduralism the interests of the 
individual are firmly protected in the constitution, while in politics as coordination 
no such protection is offered, because the level of disagreement in modern 
societies makes it impossible to invoke a set of fundamental rights that could be 
acceptable to every citizen. Waldron claims that it is impossible to find a set of 
rights that adequately represents and reflects the basic interests of each and every 
citizen (because there is no shared account of important interests). Although, a set 
of fundamental rights is bound to be controversial, an important feature of the 
rights granted by justice as impartiality is that they articulate a basic equality 
between the members of society and aim to treat competing interests impartially. 
This latter feature may minimize how controversial the set of fundamental rights 
is, although it is not enough to avoid the charge of being controversial entirely. 
Nevertheless, it at least points to an important difference between politics as 
coordination and deliberative proceduralism.  
4. Finally, a just democratic order limits the reach of government and the embedding 
of fundamental rights curbs the possibility of a political order based on mutual 
advantage. These measures actively aim to avoid the possibility that the political 
process will collapse into mutual advantage. An important element of this is that 
deliberative proceduralism does not think of politics as a coordination game in the 
first place. When one thinks of politics as a game, one allows notions associated 
with relative bargaining power and mutual advantage to play an important role as 
these elements are important elements of modern game theory.  Clearly, this 
perspective is rejected by justice as impartiality, and the model advanced in this 
chapter is, on all four points, significantly stronger than politics as a coordination 
game. Hence, the objection that this model is too weak fails at least in comparison 
with Waldron‟s model. 
 
 Being stronger than politics as coordination does not necessarily mean that the 
model will satisfy liberal legitimacy and respond adequately to the demands of 
pluralism. To see how deliberative proceduralism satisfies these two requirements a 
more precise answer is needed. In order to give a more detailed explanation of how the 
liberal constitutionalist model defended in this thesis satisfies liberal legitimacy and 
responds to pluralism, I will argue that these four points constitute a legitimate 
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political order that no one could reasonably reject, including the worst off in society. 
The reason for focusing on this group is not because they enjoy a special status within 
the theory, but because it is plausible to believe that this group might have stronger 
reasons than others to reject a particular order as oppressive and unjust. 
 It might be thought that the worst off can immediately object that the political 
order defended in this thesis does not contain any principles of social justice that 
ensure their interests are advanced (as they are, for example, by Rawls‟s difference 
principle). And assuming that marginalized cultural, religious and ethnic groups also 
form part of the worst off group, such groups might object that justice requires that 
they ought to be given rights to support their identity and/or culture as such rights will 
work against further erosion of their position.  
 While democratic theorists object strongly that the substantive implications of 
justice as impartiality are too strong, some liberal egalitarians hold that they are not 
strong enough. For these kinds of egalitarians, if one grants that civil and political 
rights are needed to protect the fundamental interests of the individual, then one is 
bound to endorse constitutionalising social rights as well (Fabre: 1998). In a similar 
vein it has been argued that a deliberative proceduralist conception of democracy is 
too weak because it leaves out substantive principles such as basic health care and 
equal opportunity (Gutmann and Thompson: 2004: 95). Gutmann and Thompson‟s 
argument in favour of this stance is – in addition to the well-known argument that just 
procedures can lead to unjust outcomes – that both substantive and procedural 
principles are provisional and open to systematic revision (Gutmann and Thompson: 
2004: 97). Underlying this claim is the view that procedural and substantive principles 
are not entirely separate entities and both types of principles rely on the same notion of 
reciprocity. This interdependence means that it is difficult to reject substantive 
principles such as equal opportunity and universal health care free at the point of 
provision from the standpoint of a deliberative theory of democracy (Gutmann and 
Thompson: 2004: 99). 
 Drawing on the example of Jones in the transmitter-room, discussed above in 
Chapter four (section 4), Gutmann and Thompson might argue that offering 
substantive social rights is an inconvenience for the majority, but is nevertheless 
required by justice to protect the interests of all. Just as fundamental rights and judicial 
review could be justified with reference to the transmitter-room example, so social and 
cultural rights can be as well, as they are of the same importance to potentially 
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marginalized minorities.  
 Given that I endorsed the transmitter-room example, it might be claimed that I am 
also obliged to adopt these claims and thus am forced to agree that substantive rights 
granted to marginalized economic and cultural groups follow from my model. Hence, 
the crucial question is: is deliberative proceduralism committed to constitutionalizing 
social rights after all? This is of great importance, because the issue at stake is what is 
the difference between civil and political rights that are required by justice and social 
and group rights that are not requirements of justice?  
 In replying to this question, an important point to stress is that the model I have 
advanced seeks to avoid allowing unequal bargaining power to determine the 
democratic process thus collapsing politics into mutual advantage. If this can be 
maintained, it will rule out highly exploitative policies and ensure that the worst off in 
society will have substantively better opportunities to voice their legitimate concerns 
in the democratic process than they would have in a political order underwritten by 
mutual advantage. Thus, blocking unequal bargaining power and mutual advantage 
goes a long way in itself to satisfying the concerns of the worst off regarding social 
rights. Furthermore, by defending equal democratic rights, deliberative proceduralism 
defends the position of the least well off. Finally, given reasonable disagreement over 
these rights claims, social and historical contingencies might influence what justice 
requires and these issues are difficult to settle through philosophical reasoning and are 
better suited to being resolved through politics. This conclusion does not mean that all 
social and group rights claims are unfounded and rejectable, but only that they are not 
required by justice in the same way as civil and political rights. Hence, many social 
and group rights may be consistent with justice and these may well be implemented 
democratically as part of the framework of politics, but they are not required in any 
strong sense.  
 What I hope to have established in this section is that even if the model advanced 
in this chapter does not require any social rights it is not a weak model. It may be too 
weak for those who want to constitutionalize social rights, but such a demand is 
controversial and subject to even more reasonable disagreement than the demand to 
entrench a set of civil and political rights. As for the objection concerning the 
interdependence of procedural and substantive principles, I agree with Gutmann that 
procedural and substantive principles are closely connected (see Chapter six, section 
two). The main difference between deliberative proceduralism and deliberative 
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democracy on the issue of including social rights is one of degree, and I have argued 
that this difference can be maintained. 
 However, overcoming the objection that deliberative proceduralism is too weak, 
does not yet mean that the theory fully satisfies the demands of liberal legitimacy and 
responds adequately to pluralism. A second objection is that in fact the model is too 
strong; that it belongs in the same camp as Rawls and Habermas in making the 
mistake of believing that it is possible to move beyond a political order based on 
mutual advantage. If this objection is correct, it means that deliberative proceduralism 
requires unreasonably strong conditions that are either controversial or unworkable in 
modern pluralistic societies. The next section is devoted to discussing the merits of 
this objection. 
 
4. The Liberal Dilemma II: Too Strong? 
It has been an important aim of this thesis to point out that a just political order is one 
that is based on more than mere mutual advantage. Thus, the previous section outlined 
how deliberative proceduralism differed from Waldron‟s mutual advantage theory. 
Now, that might give the impression that mutual advantage is defeated and the 
challenge from that corner of political philosophy is overcome. However, that is a 
premature conclusion as there is a second objection that can be made from the 
perspective of mutual advantage. This second objection penetrates deep into the heart 
of theories based on impartiality, and it seems hard to avoid its force. Briefly stated it 
says that liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy only work in ensuring a stable 
political order when, and because, they are to the mutual advantage of the most 
important political groups in society. 
 This is a particularly hard-hitting objection because it undermines the central 
theoretical and practical tenets advanced in this thesis in both the form advocated by 
Barry and as captured by deliberative proceduralism. We have seen how justice as 
impartiality was, to some extent, developed in response to the defects of justice as 
mutual advantage. In contrast to mutual advantage theory, justice as impartiality holds 
that liberalism, constitutionalism and democracy are justified because they champion 
impartiality and equality, and contain the tools that can offer justice to those who are 
marginalized in the wider society. Moreover, the development of justice as 
impartiality was not meant as a purely theoretical intellectual exercise, but also to 
point towards how a legitimate political order can be realized in practice. One of the 
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main reasons for some of the scepticism expressed about the theories of Rawls and 
Habermas was that they were impractical. Now, the allegation is that justice as 
impartiality and deliberative proceduralism are in the same category. In the rest of this 
section, I respond to this objection. 
 In its most general form the objection states that „liberalism, constitutionalism, 
and democracy, as well as, specifically, liberal constitutional democracy all work, 
when they do, because they serve the mutual advantage of the politically effective 
groups in the society by coordinating those groups on a political and, perhaps, 
economic order‟ (Hardin: 1999: vii-viii, original emphasis). Essentially, the claim 
made here by Russell Hardin is that politics is only about coordination. Thus, despite 
appearances to the contrary, „liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy are mutual-
advantage theories‟ (Hardin: 1999: 1) since they are simply ways of providing order. 
If they do so successfully – that is, in ways that benefit most of the participants – then 
they will be stable; they will, as noted above, „work‟. In defending these theories, 
then, all that can be offered is an account of how they work better than any alternative. 
What is not at stake is that they „meet some ideal standard of the good or the right‟ 
(Hardin: 1999: 319).  
 It is important to observe that Hardin claims that he is making an explanatory and 
not a normative claim (Hardin: 1999: viii). That is, he offers an account of how people 
actually behave and of how politics actually works. This means that he is not telling us 
how politics ought to work or how people ought to behave politically. In short, Hardin 
tells us that self-interest governs politics as a matter of fact. Despite the explanatory 
focus of his account, Hardin goes on to note of impartialist contractualism that, 
„contractualist scholars, such as Thomas Scanlon and Brian Barry, want to claim the 
universal appeal of their conclusions… I think no conclusions in this realm have 
universal appeal‟ (Hardin: 1999: 38). This claim is not explanatory, but is rather 
concerned with the scope and nature of theorising about politics (it is, in a sense, a 
meta-theoretical claim).  
 The impression that Hardin moves between the purely explanatory and the more 
meta-theoretical is reinforced by his rather dismissive comment about political 
theorists outside the tradition of mutual advantage: „Rousseau, Kant, Scanlon, Barry 
and others appeal to rationalist or reasonable-agreement claims that cannot convince 
anyone other than, seemingly, a philosopher‟ (Hardin: 1999: 309). Talk about 
impartiality has, according to Hardin, no appeal outside philosophy. Real politics is all 
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about coordination games between self-interested parties. As I have aligned myself 
with the tradition of appealing to reasonable-agreement claims, Hardin‟s objection, if 
right, would leave little prospect for the normative arguments put forward in this 
thesis. Rather, the claims here are empty phrases, and the overall project not 
worthwhile, as reasonable-agreement is bankrupt both theoretically and practically. 
 One way to respond to Hardin whilst defending the position outlined in this thesis 
would be to claim that liberal constitutionalism is, as a matter of fact, the most 
workable system in the modern societies in which it is established. Moreover, 
precisely because it is established and the costs of dismantling an existing system to 
replace it with a new one are very great, it provides a solution to the coordination 
problem that is to the advantage of most if not all participants (the benefits that might 
be gained by those who would do better under some alternative arrangement are 
outweighed by the transition costs of moving to that system). This would be to 
respond to Hardin on his own territory. However, it is clearly not satisfactory since the 
account offered in this thesis has been a normative one; the claim is that deliberative 
proceduralism is morally defensible. 
 To see the difference, consider the issue of „a successful coordination on a 
constitutional regime that does not seem to give equal standing to some group‟ 
(Hardin: 1999: 306). For a number of reasons – because of problems of collective 
action or because they do not have a viable alternative regime – the unequally treated 
group may be acquiescent and the arrangement may be stable. On Hardin‟s account, of 
course, the advantaged group has no reason to unsettle the established order. In this 
case, were the argument for deliberative proceduralism merely one of mutual 
advantage, it would fail. The unequal established order is workable and the costs of 
transition to any other order – including deliberative proceduralism – high.    
 This contrasts with the argument offered in this thesis for the embedding of basic 
rights in deliberative proceduralism. That argument hinged on the requirement of 
impartial justice that people‟s interests be protected from any threat that might emerge 
from the practice of democracy. That is, the argument for constitutional rights is 
explicitly normative.  
 The question is, why should we believe Hardin‟s claims that politics is only about 
coordination and political theory only explanatory? These claims go beyond those 
made by Waldron (discussed in Chapter two) and, on the face of it, neither is 
plausible. Much political debate is about what is right and wrong and not about what is 
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workable or mutually advantageous, and most political philosophy claims at least to 
be grounded in moral values and to be justified only when it properly builds on those 
values.   
 Of course, Hardin can claim that talk of right or wrong in politics is merely 
illusory or epiphenomenal. Take, for example, the issue of abortion. This contentious 
political issue does not stand out as primarily a question about self-interest and the 
debate is carried out in explicitly normative terms. Moreover, the parties to the debate 
claim that a state that allows or fails to allow abortion is just or otherwise. That is, this 
seem to be an issue where people disagree over what is right and wrong rather than 
where different groups are trying to coordinate. Hardin has available to him the 
response that what is really going on here is that two groups with conflicting interests 
are vying for position in the establishing of political order. The pro-life group, just like 
the slave owners in the South of the USA, are trying to push for a constitutional order 
that includes the banning of abortion or the legality of slaveholding. Their opponents 
are pushing for the reverse. Talk of right or wrong, and the belief that what needs to be 
done here is to come to the right answer, is merely the fig leaf that disguises the 
nakedness of inter-group conflict in a coordination problem. 
 Given that this response is available to Hardin, it is difficult to see how to rebut 
his position in such a way as to show it conclusively to be false. It is similar to the 
argument that sometimes takes place between those who believe in the possibility of 
altruism and those who wish to reduce everything to self-interest. If I give money to 
the homeless and believe that I am motivated by impartial feelings of altruism or by 
demands of justice, I may nevertheless not be able to convince someone who claims 
that I only think those things, but am in fact motivated by the desire to feel good about 
myself. In the end, the argument may be inconclusive, but that does not mean there is 
nothing that can be said. What can be said is that there is no reason to think that the 
bare self-interest account is plausible, and there are few reasons to believe that what 
seems so obviously to be the case is not, in fact, the case. 
 The same applies to Hardin‟s account, and the purpose of this discussion has been 
to show that Hardin‟s arguments that self-interest alone determines politics, and that it is 
impossible to move beyond mutual advantage, do not need to be accepted. This means 
that political equality and impartiality can play a stronger role in politics than is 
assumed by mutual advantage theorists like Hardin. The political order based on justice 
as impartiality and deliberative proceduralism is not only more realistic than Hardin 
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believes, it can also be defended from a normative standpoint as not merely workable, 
but also just. 
 The ambition of deliberative proceduralism is to balance the sometimes competing 
demands from justice and democracy. Deliberative proceduralism builds in many 
elements of mutual advantage and leaves a wide range of issues to be sorted out 
through the ordinary political process, but ultimately political equality and impartiality 
can trump mutual advantage if the fundamental interests of a person are threatened. 
This understanding of political equality and impartiality is plausible because it is 
strong enough to protect the fundamental interests of the person, yet self-interest and 
disagreement are allowed to play a role in politics.  
 Deliberative proceduralism thus steers a middle way between the unjustified 
pessimism of Hardin and Habermas‟s and Rawls‟s unjustified optimism. By being less 
ideal than both Rawls and Habermas, deliberative proceduralism seeks to be more 
practical than these two accounts. The interpretation advanced here has paid particular 
attention to the demands of everyday politics in diverse societies by requiring the 
weakest possible requirements that are still compatible with impartiality and equality. 
The „soft‟ position regarding distributive and cultural justice can also be said to make 
the theory more practical, yet without opening up too much space for mutual 
advantage. By leaving a wide range of questions to be dealt with by ordinary politics, 
and thus emphasising the procedural aspects of a legitimate democratic order, it is 
possible to arrive at outcomes that are consistent with what the citizens think. Even if 
this move does not make the theory as practical as a mutual advantage theory, it aims 
to present a liberal solution to the problem of how theoretical commitments to 
impartiality and equality can be combined with practical concerns such as those 
outlined by Hardin.  
 What I have offered is, I believe, a balance between the demands of mutual 
advantage and the ideals of impartiality and equality; a balance that is closer to ideal 
theorists such as Rawls and Habermas than it is to Hardin and Waldron. Nevertheless, 
the political order of deliberative proceduralism is far more practical than the theories 
of Rawls and Habermas. For all that, the ideals discussed in this thesis are far from 
realized in most democracies in the contemporary world, but the fact that the ideals are 
not realized does not mean that they can never be realized.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has outlined the central tenets of a legitimate political order, and called 
this order deliberative proceduralism. We have seen that this model puts stress on the 
importance of political equality and fair and impartial procedures. Furthermore, when 
applied to controversial issues such as distributive justice and cultural justice, 
deliberative proceduralism delivered plausible answers. In the two last sections, I 
discussed whether the theory was too strong or too weak. Briefly stated, the answer is 
that the theory is strong enough to avoid the criticism of being too weak. There may 
be more reason to worry that the theory is too strong. The theory relies on weaker and 
less controversial notions than other liberal accounts (for example, those of Rawls and 
Habermas), and this is to the advantage of the theory. In the end deliberative 
proceduralism, defends an alternative to the unjustified scepticism and optimism 
found respectively in Hardin as a coordination theorist and Habermas and Rawls as 
consensus theorists. Striving for gentler and more ideal democracies is an ongoing 
activity and the present thesis is a modest contribution towards that end. The attempt 
has been to combine the ideals of impartiality and equality as far as possible with the 
practical concerns expressed in mutual advantage theory.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The previous chapter set out the structure of a liberal constitutionalist political order 
based on protection of fundamental rights and democracy. In addition I discussed the 
political implications of this model called deliberative proceduralism and two 
objections regarding the plausibility of the model. Thus, the previous chapter 
delivered an answer to the question raised in the Introduction concerning how 
commitment to both justice and democracy could possibly be combined in a plausible 
political order. The purpose of these concluding remarks is briefly to try to summarise 
the structure of the argument that led us to the model proposed in the previous chapter. 
In addition, I will take a step back and discuss more explicitly how the arguments in 
the different chapters contribute to the model presented in the previous chapter. I will 
end with a brief discussion of the relationship between politics and philosophy that 
builds on some of the important ideas in this thesis. 
 
1. Liberal Legitimacy and Impartiality 
Liberal constitutionalism as I have conceived of it in this thesis has two crucial 
requirements: fundamental rights and a democratic order. Holding this view does not 
tell us how to combine justice and democracy. Instead stating that liberal 
constitutionalism has these two requirements is rather to point out one of the central 
tensions in combining a commitment to both justice and democracy. To some extent, 
it is possible to resolve the tension between justice and democracy by rejecting the 
strong commitment to one or other. For example, we have seen that Dahl‟s pluralistic 
theory of democracy sides decisively with democracy rather than justice, and Rawls‟ 
theory sides more closely with justice. Siding either with justice or democracy 
dissolves the dilemma of combining justice and democracy because less attention is 
devoted to either justice or democracy. Doing so resolves the tension, but 
simultaneously, that would be the end of liberal constitutionalism as it is often 
understood. Therefore, for liberal constitutionalism to constitute a distinct political 
theory it is necessary to sustain its commitment to both ideals. So, it is necessary to 
search for a solution were both ideals are embodied. The challenge is to combine two 
competing ideals and still be a plausible political theory. The task of this thesis has 
mainly been to map out the extent to which this can be achieved or not.  
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 Crucial in this endeavour was to satisfy the two additional conditions that 
provide the context of liberal constitutionalism: the principle of liberal legitimacy and 
the demands that arise from political and moral pluralism. These two conditions make 
the task even more challenging because they put stringent constraints on what a 
justifiable political order may consist of. Deliberative proceduralism seeks to satisfy 
the principle of liberal legitimacy through a combined commitment to protection of 
fundamental civil and political rights, and a democratic order. The demands of 
pluralism are satisfied through a weak notion of reason and a commitment to 
democratic deliberation. The principle of liberal legitimacy states that a legitimate 
political order must be one that can be justifiable to everyone living under it. 
Deliberative proceduralism seeks to satisfy this principle through universal civil and 
political rights ensuring the fairness and equality required by mutual respect and moral 
equality. Democracy is a second element in establishing liberal legitimacy. Political 
democracy as it is normally understood in modern societies offers equal political 
rights and strives to realize an ideal of an impartial political process that is not tainted 
by certain agendas (religious, cultural, economic, etc). Thus, democracy embodies an 
ideal of fairness and justice that can be justified to those living under such a political 
order. Furthermore, democracy coheres with the people being the moral (and de facto) 
authority of the laws. This ideal coheres with the premise of mutual respect and 
equality, by offering each citizen equal political influence on the outcomes of issues of 
public interest. From the perspective of deliberative proceduralism, this combination 
of justice and democracy is a happy marriage, but proponents of democracy argue that 
the limits put in place by civil rights are constraints on the authority of democracy. If 
liberal constitutionalists took democracy seriously, they would not impose constraints 
taking political power out of the hands of the people and vesting it in rights outside the 
reach of ordinary politics.  
 Because rights outside the reach of politics is undermining democratic 
authority and there is no consensus over the content of the appropriate set of rights 
many critics reject the idea of any such constitutionally embedded set. This feature not 
only creates a problem with respect to the authority of democracy, but also with 
respect to the demands of pluralism. Like the liberal principle of legitimacy, pluralism 
poses a serious challenge for liberal constitutionalism. The deeper and wider the 
political and moral disagreements within a society, the more challenging it is to find a 
political order justifiable to everyone living under it. Still a democratic system has a 
 198 
virtue under conditions of disagreement as ideally democratic procedures will give all 
citizens an equal opportunity to voice their concerns and to influence the public 
debate. The outcome of the democratic process is supposed to reflect what the 
majority think of as the right decision. Thus, the appeal of democracy is in fact 
strengthened by disagreement as it appears as the fairest way to arbitrate under 
conditions of disagreement. Furthermore, democracy, even under deep disagreement, 
is able to sustain its commitment to equality.  
This thesis started with a discussion of the kind of reasons to which it is 
legitimate to appeal in public debate in a democratic system. What I have attempted is 
to describe a political order that ought not to terrify those who believe in the ideal of 
democracy and who reject the idea of constraining democracy with a set of rights to 
protect the basic interests of the individual. At the same time, I have attempted to 
satisfy those who are concerned with justice. This thesis has looked at ways to 
minimize the tensions between justice and democracy; tensions that threaten to 
undermine liberal constitutionalism.  
An important point to note is that whether the liberal constitutionalist project is 
plausible or not, given the starting point – justice and democracy, liberal legitimacy 
and pluralism – the inevitable point to end up is somewhere around the territory 
described in this thesis. The double commitment to justice and democracy and the 
additional conditions of legitimacy and pluralism put constraints on liberal 
constitutionalism and pushes it in the direction of what is described in this thesis. That 
is because adding these constraints limits the available alternatives for liberal 
constitutionalism to a political order based around (1) a relatively weak notion of 
reason; (2) a democratic model emphasising deliberation, but without a strong 
conception of the common good; (3) the co-originality of civil and political rights and 
the analogy between contractualism and deliberative democracy shows that the 
differences between the critics and proponents of substantive rights in the constitution 
are not as pervasive as often assumed in the debate between these two groups. Given 
that starting point the destination is likely to be somewhere along the lines of what has 
been described in this thesis. That does not mean that the model described in this 
thesis is the only available alternative for a liberal constitutionalist order, but it means 
that a justifiable liberal constitutionalist order must resemble the deliberative 
proceduralism I have described. I will now briefly summarise how (1) - (3) help us to 
offer some tentative answers to the central question of this thesis of how liberal 
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constitutionalism, and specifically deliberative proceduralism, can combine the 
commitment to both justice and democracy. 
 
1. Given the pluralistic character of modern societies, a relatively weak notion of 
reason is necessary to accommodate the political and moral disagreement in 
society. Convergence of reason can only be expected on a limited number of 
issues, such as the basic workings of the political system. This includes both the 
set of civil and political rights and a commitment to democracy. Convergence on 
these tenets is both the minimum and the maximum of what liberal 
constitutionalism requires. It is the minimum necessary to sustain a liberal 
constitutionalist order, and at the same time, the maximum that can be demanded 
given pluralism. Equal civil and political rights embedded in the constitution are 
important and reasonable because they help to avoid a political order based on 
mutual advantage. Thus, equal civil and political rights take liberal 
constitutionalism a step further beyond a mere modus vivendi. However, given 
pluralism, there is unlikely to be convergence on the actual outcomes of 
democratic deliberation. This means that liberal constitutionalism does not 
prescribe any outcomes on specific political issues, apart from issues undermining 
civil and political rights. Thus, liberal constitutionalism does not prescribe the 
actual content of most political issues, including social justice and questions 
related to multiculturalism. As was pointed out in previous chapters, a wide range 
of outcomes are compatible and consistent with liberal constitutionalism, but not 
required by the theory. Therefore, the weak understanding of reason in liberal 
constitutionalism gives rise to only modest substantive implications mainly 
confined to civil and political rights. 
2. To ensure that the actual democratic deliberations are carried out in a way that is 
compatible with both the liberal principle of legitimacy and pluralism I have 
suggested a democratic model based on many of the procedures rooted in 
deliberative democracy, but without any references to the outcomes of the 
democratic process as representing a common good. Instead, the strongest 
justifiable notion of a common good in a pluralistic society is to think of the 
democratic system itself as representing the common good. Many of the 
deliberative procedures associated with deliberative democracy encourage wide 
participation in the political process and emphasize reasons and arguments rather 
 200 
than appeals to emotion, rhetoric and ensure that certain influential groups cannot 
rig the political process to their own advantage. This concern fits well with the 
contractual emphasis on reasons. Wide participation and emphasis on reasons aims 
to ensure that political equality is realized and contributes to establishing an 
impartial political system. Such a political system will aim to ensure that all the 
relevant aspects of political issues will be discussed and that different views on 
political issues will be voiced. This does not necessarily mean that the actual 
quality of the outcomes of democratic deliberation will be more correct or closer to 
what is right. In short, deliberative procedures cannot ensure the quality of the 
actual outcomes of democratic decision-making. What it means is that the process 
aims to be impartial and fair to all citizens, and thus contribute to the realization of 
the ideal of political equality. The only thing democracy establishes is what the 
majority think is right, not what is objectively right.  
3. This political order is built around civil and political rights, deliberative 
procedures, and a weak notion of the common good. Now, the remaining 
contentious issue is the role of those civil rights incorporated into the constitution. 
As we have seen, critics object to incorporating such rights either on the grounds 
that they are undemocratic, or that no consensus exists on what rights to include or 
exclude. Deliberative proceduralism relies on the plausibility of incorporating such 
rights and I have presented two arguments aiming to show that the differences 
between the critics and proponents of such rights are not as stark as often assumed. 
The first argument states that the justification of both civil and political rights is 
based on an appeal to fairness and equality. If this holds, then an important 
argument for rejecting civil rights is weakened. This does not answer the question 
of what rights to include or exclude, but if both civil and political rights are 
derived from a shared concern for fairness and equality, these two ideals give us an 
idea of what kind of rights ought to be included. The second argument holds that 
there is an analogy between contractualism and deliberative democracy. Both 
approaches are concerned with establishing a political order where partial concerns 
and the power of influential groups are curbed. The aim is a political order with 
wide participation and impartial procedures. These concerns are reflected in the 
same underlying thinking in both approaches. A main difference is that 
deliberative democrats believe that realizing the political process itself can achieve 
these aims, while contractualists believe that actual political deliberations must be 
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supplemented with a set of rights to promote impartiality. Contractualists think that 
actual political deliberations under certain circumstances can violate the ideal of 
impartiality, and must be supplemented by a set of fundamental rights. While 
deliberative democrats think that the conditions of actual deliberations will 
themselves satisfy the demands of impartiality. I have argued that in most cases 
deliberative procedures ensure adequate concern for impartiality. However, in 
some cases and concerning some issues of fundamental interest to the individual, I 
have argued that the hypothetical reasoning informing contractualism offers a 
supplement to the ideals of actual deliberations. Since both deliberative democracy 
and contractualism rely on some of the same underlying thinking, and if the 
justification of democracy and justice originate in the same concern for fairness 
and equality, the conclusion is that a set of civil rights does not conflict as strongly 
with a commitment to the authority of democracy as is often assumed. 
 
These three points briefly summarised above attempt together to provide an 
answer to how a commitment to both justice and democracy can be combined in 
liberal constitutionalism. I should stress that these three points only show how the 
tensions can be minimized and are not meant to show that justice and democracy can 
easily be combined in a happy marriage. Rather, the point is to show that the conflicts 
between the competing demands from justice and democracy are not as dramatic and 
serious as is often alleged by many critics of liberal constitutionalism. Furthermore, 
the discussion in this thesis has shown that liberal constitutionalism is not out of tune 
with recent developments in democratic and political theory. It is possible to adapt the 
liberal constitutionalist framework to some of the concerns stressed by deliberative 
democrats and at the same time to be sensitive to the demands that arise from the 
pluralism of modern societies.  
 
2. Politics and Philosophy 
I now want to conclude with some thoughts on the relationship between politics and 
philosophy and the tasks of political philosophy. A central argument in this thesis has 
been that it is relatively easy to reach an answer to what justice requires in the abstract, 
but it is much harder to arrive at clear answers as to what justice requires of us to 
realize political equality in specific societies. The solution to this question is to say 
that it is reasonable for citizens to disagree over what, for example, political equality 
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between men and women requires. I argued in Chapter three that it is clearly 
unreasonable to deny women equal political rights, and that justice requires political 
equality between men and women. However, it is a different issue whether political 
equality requires a reserved seat system for women in parliament or not. To hold the 
view that justice does not require a reserved seat system for women is not clearly 
unreasonable. To what extent it is reasonable or unreasonable depends on the 
interpretation and normative weight given to a wide range of empirical observations. 
Whether women ought to have reserved seats in the parliament depends on historical, 
economic and social contingencies open to a wide range of different interpretations.  
Thus, determining what justice requires is a highly complex task. It is not clear 
at all that political philosophy can arrive at definite answers to this and many other 
similar questions regarding social justice and the status of religion, citizenship, and 
group rights (just to mention a few controversial issues in the contemporary political 
and philosophical debate). Ultimately, I argued that these issues ought to be settled 
through democratic procedures as there are a wide range of possible solutions to how 
to realize political equality among men and women and in short, democracy represents 
the best decision-making procedure to determine how a particular society ought to 
realize this ideal. 
The observation of the difficulties associated with determining what justice 
requires in many specific cases I believe gives rise to two tasks for political 
philosophy. These two tasks broadly follow the distinction between the a priori and 
the empirical approach to justice discussed in Chapter three. The a priori approach to 
justice describes principles that can be derived from the use of reason alone. Examples 
are abstract and general principles about the wrongness of slavery and the equal moral 
value of each person and moral ideals such as equality, liberty and impartiality. In 
contrast, the empirical approach aims to go further by investigating how these abstract 
and general principles fare in actual societies. This is to ask questions about how 
equality is manifested in the various institutions and structures of social life. This 
includes, but is not restricted to, political equality, economic equality, gender and 
racial equality, etc. The aim is to analyse the extent to which the different institutions 
and structures of society embody and realize the ideals of impartiality, equality and 
liberty. I will now use the distinction between the a priori and the empirical method to 
describe how the perspective developed in this thesis thinks of the relationship 
between politics and philosophy and the tasks of political philosophy. 
 203 
 The first task is to map out the general and abstract principles and ideals for a 
political order. This is an a priori approach to political philosophy and is based on the 
use of reason without relying on extensive use of empirical evidence and discussions 
of actual political issues. The idea is, for example, to argue in favour of political 
equality between men and women or against slavery in a way that can be done mainly 
through the use of reason and without relying on the historical and social 
contingencies of particular societies. The a priori approach to political philosophy 
helps us to arrive at the general principles and ideals around which we think a political 
order ought to be built. A central task for political philosophy is to discuss the merits 
and demerits of political ideals and principles. Examples of this kind of political 
philosophy are Scanlon‟s contractualism, and Rawls‟s and Barry‟s theories of justice. 
Because this approach to political philosophy relies on abstract reasoning the validity 
of the conclusions are wide ranging and in principle universal. Concerning the two 
examples mentioned above, this is to say that slavery and political inequalities 
between men and women are unjust under all possible societies at all times. Although, 
this might sound like a strong conclusion, it is important to notice that establishing 
these principles does not say anything about what exactly political equality between 
men and women, for example, means in particular societies.  
 A second task is to apply the tools within the more abstract theories to practical 
cases such as, for example, social justice and questions concerning multiculturalism. 
Here usually a specific theory is applied on a controversial political question, and the 
aim is to arrive at an answer to what the right solution to this particular question ought 
to be. Such an analysis will consist of a mix of principles and social and historical 
contingencies. The moral principles and ideals within an a priori theory are combined 
with the particular circumstances in a specific society. An example of such an analysis 
is a discussion of the justifiability of reserved seats in parliament for women in 
Western societies. An analysis of this kind is likely to rely on the interpretation of 
social and historical contingencies and many of these contingencies are open to 
different interpretations. Therefore, the conclusions and underlying assumptions 
reached by an analysis of this kind can easily be questioned because the evidence does 
not necessarily converge. Thus, the validity of the conclusions reached by this type of 
analysis is limited to the particular case(s) discussed and cannot therefore be 
generalized to other societies with different social conditions and history. Examples of 
this kind of political philosophy discussed in this thesis are Barry‟s books on social 
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justice and multiculturalism. Often there will be more than one answer to how social 
justice and political equality can be realized, and the answers offered by political 
philosophy concerning these cases are not authoritative in the way that the answers of 
the a priori approach to political philosophy aim to be.  
 Both these tasks are equally important. To assess the legitimacy of a political 
order some guiding principles are necessary and the a priori approach provides a set 
of principles offering a framework for assessing the actual practices in a society. 
Ultimately, what matters is the extent to which it is possible to arrive at a political 
order that is justifiable and legitimate, and to achieve this, it is necessary to analyse 
some of the particular practices in actual societies to determine if the practices are 
consistent with the ideals. Thus, both the a priori and the empirical approach are 
needed in political philosophy. This aims to show how politics and philosophy are 
connected. An analysis of a specific practice must start from certain ideals and 
principles, and the purpose of the a priori approach is ultimately to define a morally 
justifiable political order. In one way, both the a priori and the empirical approach are 
present in this thesis. The discussion of reason in the first chapters aimed to make 
sense of some of the abstract and general principles and ideals of liberal 
constitutionalism. While the discussion in the later chapters looked at how these ideals 
and principles could be implemented in a political order. Thus, chapters one to four 
were mainly pre-occupied with the role of reason and abstract and general principles 
underlying the liberal constitutionalist approach to political theory. Chapters five to 
seven aimed to show that the notion of reason and a commitment to pluralism, liberal 
legitimacy, fundamental rights, and democracy, could be combined in a model of 
democracy.  
 Following the distinction between the two tasks of political philosophy above, 
the clearest political implication is to emphasize the importance of democracy and 
political equality. At least two important implications follow from this. First, the ideal 
of political equality is of great importance for the legitimacy of a democratic system. 
Political equality ensures legitimacy, and the strong notion of political equality 
advanced here also contributes to ensuring that the outcomes of the democratic 
process are acceptable from a perspective of social justice and multiculturalism. 
Political equality understood in a strong sense will avoid a situation in which wealthy 
and influential cultural groups can skew the political process to their own advantage 
and have stronger influence than their size suggests they should.  
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It is important to notice that a strong notion of political equality is an important 
element in playing down the tension between the competing ideals of justice and 
democracy. Political equality is one of the important meeting points between these 
two ideals, and is foundational to both, and I believe this to be an important insight of 
this thesis. We have seen that both for liberal constitutionalism and contemporary 
democratic theory an important premise is the idea of political equality. Neither liberal 
constitutionalism nor contemporary democratic theory can get by without this 
indispensable premise. Despite this important shared starting point we have seen that 
liberal constitutionalism and contemporary democratic theories interpret the 
requirements of this premise differently. Liberal constitutionalism holds that political 
equality requires a set of constitutionally secured civil and political rights, while many 
democratic theorists reject this interpretation and hold instead that this undermines the 
idea of democratic authority. One of the important aims of this thesis has been to 
break down some of the barriers between these two positions and to argue that the 
opposition between them is not as stark as often assumed. 
 
3. Final Reflections 
The ideas of liberal constitutionalism have had a continuous impact on political 
thinking for centuries at both practical and theoretical levels. Its practical and 
theoretical success has made it into a mainstream approach to political theory. 
Furthermore, its success is closely tied to the development of modernity, and liberal 
constitutionalism can be said to have offered a systematic way to think about politics 
under modern conditions. Today, modern societies are marked by both growing social 
and economic inequalities and by increasing political and moral disagreement. These 
prevalent features of modern societies require both practical and theoretical responses. 
Growing social and economic inequalities may not represent injustices in themselves 
and disagreement may not threaten the stability of society. However, political 
philosophy can contribute to how to understand and clarify the normative implications 
of these trends in modern society. This might not change things for the better by itself, 
but it can perhaps point in the right direction. Being aware of the right direction is the 
first step towards political change, and is as important as directed action towards 
change. If political philosophy can contribute by clarifying political concepts and 
pointing out the direction for possible political change that in itself is a highly valuable 
contribution to politics and society.  
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 What liberal constitutionalism offers is a sophisticated theory that defines the 
scope of justice and the scope of politics that fits with modern society. This is not an 
easy task as modern societies are increasingly complex and interwoven. Thus, defining 
the scope of justice becomes an onerous task and the grave difficulty involved can 
discourage even the most optimistic. Despite the obvious reasons for feeling 
discouraged, ideas and visions are to some extent the starting point for all human 
actions, including politics. Because ideas and ideals have this importance, studying 
them matters, at least in the long run. Bearing this in mind might give some 
consolation when studying the ideals of justice and democracy just feels like another 
quixotic quest for saving the world. 
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